












Discourse in Zimbabwe 
Tom Fry 
Student no. FRYTH0004 
A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of 

Master in Social Science of International Relations 





This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my 

own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, 

of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. 

Signature:_~----=~~~_______.Date: '01a~ I t:,Jq signature removed
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 



















UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 

GRADUATE SCHOOL IN HUMANITIES 

DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE FOR THE DEGREE OF 

MASTER IN THE FACULTV OF HUMANITIES 

I, (name of candidate) 
Tom Fry 
of (address of candidate) 

25 Riversdale Road, London, N5 2ST, United Kingdom 

do hereby declare that I empower the University of Cape Town to produce for the 
purpose of research either the whole or any portion of the contents of my dissertation 
entitled 
Representing 'the people': The National Discourse in Zimbabwe 
in any manner whatsoever. 
(0/0'2./cc\ 














I would like first and foremost to thank my parents, this Masters would have remained merely an 
ambition without their support. The enduring guidance and insight of my supervisor, Dr. Thiven Reddy, 
was invaluable to this project. His patience and critical engagement with my ideas ensured I remained 
enthused and confident in my work. Thank you to Professor Brian Raftopoulos for his early advice and 
recommended readings, and to Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, who kindly sent me some of his then 
unpublished work. Lastly I'd like to express my gratitude to Olivia Woodward and Patrick Fry for their 











This study seeks to understand how nationalist elites in Zimbabwe have constructed an idea of the nation 
over time. It builds on other analyses of the Zimbabwe crisis that privilege the importance of analysing 
how nationalist elites represent a specific image of the nation, 'the people', and their history, and how this 
representation inflects political practice in the country. It departs from these studies by applying this 
approach historically, tracing how an elite configured discourse of the nation has been constructed since 
the emergence of mass nationalism in the 1950's. This allows an understanding of how this discourse 
produces a set of resilient social categories and practices, and shapes how events in contemporary 
Zimbabwe can be interpreted and represented. In order to do reach this understanding I employ a 
theoretical approach that conceives of an elite constructed 'national discourse', a system of representation 
that produces a framework by which a Ination can be constituted, or imagined, and by which ce~tain 
events, objects or circumstances can be interpreted as 'national'. This study traces how nationalist elites 
began to conceive of 'Zimbabwe', its history and culture, and charts how an image of 'the people' was 
produced, and the construction of the privileged category of the 'national hero'. It then shows how in the 
1980's a specific meaning of 'national unity' shaped elite rhetoric and practice on the policy of 
reconciliation, the state-sponsored terror in Matabeleland, and the one-party state agenda, before 
analysing how discourses of modernisation and technical development produced a different way of 
thinking about land. It then illustrates how the histories, images and practices of the national discourse 
have intensified in the period of the third Chimurenga. Much commentary on the crisis has been marked 
by a dichotomy between a radical redistributive project based on indigenous location and historical 
sanction, and a liberal critique focusing on human rights, the rule of law and ideas of citizenship. This set 
of polarities has been both reinforced by, and helped to produce, the character of the national discourse 
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A broad consensus has emerged, amongst academics and more widely, that since the late 1990's 
Zimbabwe has been undergoing a crisis. This crisis is, as Raftopoulos puts it, 'a particular configuration 
ofpolitical and economic processes that has engulfed the country and concentrated the attention of the 
region' (Raftopoulos, 2004: viii). Broadly speaking there has been a vivid disturbance in economic, 
political, and social structures within Zimbabwe, concentrated around and stemming from a rise in civil 
and political opposition to the ZANU-PF government, the increased political activity ofwar veterans, the 
much documented land invasions, the authoritarian reaction of the Zimbabwean state, and the severe 
deterioration of the economy!. 
Much scholarly attention has been paid to the current crisis, in which an incumbent liberation party has 
faced viable political opposition from a newly emerged political movement. What has become clear is 
that ZANU-PF have constructed an idea of the nation, rooted in their version of its history, which casts 
an image of legitimacy over their rule in the face ofpolitical opposition, and paints that opposition as part 
of this history (Ranger, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Muzondidya, 2007, 2004; Raftopoulos, 2004; Ndlovu­
Gatsheni, 2008). The MDC and other civil society organisations have been presented as agents of the 
imperial west, and therefore the climate of political contestation between the two parties has seen the 
issue of historical legitimacy become a dominant theme. The opposition to ZANU-PF rule has to 
campaign not only against the policies of ZANU-PF, but also against its conception of the nation, and 
therefore the conception of itself as an illegitimate and non-indigenous movement. At the same time 
certain groups, including whites and MDC supporters, are fmding themselves discursively excluded from 
the nation, and their claims to representation unrecognised. The way in which nationalist elites conceive 
of the nation in contemporary Zimbabwe has prevented a constructive and tolerant dialogue over 
Zimbabwean identities, and has recast discourses of rights, justice and citizenship in a racialised language 
of historical sanction and indigenous entitlement (Raftopoulos, 2004; Muzondidya, 2007). 
This study seeks to critically interrogate this process. It takes as its cue a commonly observed feature of 
post-2000 nationalism in Zimbabwe, that the way in which ZANU-PF have presented an idea of the 
Zimbabwean nation and its history has precedence, that it is a 'revival' of a previously established way of 
talking about and acting upon political and historical realities. More explicitly, there are significant 
parallels between the nationalism of the 1960's and 1970's and that of the post-2000 era. What I want to 
consider is how has the image of the Zimbabwean nation been constructed by nationalist elites over time? 
By tracing how nationalist elites have historically presented a discourse of the nation we can then try to 
understand what constitutes this 'revival', how this discourse has shaped ways in which events in 











contemporary Zimbabwe have been interpreted and represented. By understanding the discursive history 
of how nationalist elites have represented an idea of 'the people' and their history we can also understand 
the resilience of the social categories and practices that this representation produces. At the same time we 
can see how nationalist elites have required this representation to give life to their political claims and 
projects. 
This paper seeks to address these problems, and in doing so provides a different way of understanding 
the crisis in Zimbabwe. To a large extent it builds upon but also diverges from other intellectual analyses. 
Instead of focussing on policy decisions by ZANU-PF, or the nature of the Zimbabwean state, or 
conceiving of an authoritarian governmental response to a viable political opponent, this study seeks to 
frame the crisis differently. I want to understand post-2000 Zimbabwe as a struggle to define the nation 
itself. In this sense we are not just seeing a ZANU-PF government attempting to maintain political and 
economic power, but also attempting to maintain a specific way of representing the Zimbabwean nation, 
its people, and its history. 
To develop a theoretical approach appropriate to this endeavour this study begins with a review of some 
of the more prominent theories of nations and nationalism. Identifying the key debates in the history of 
the study of nationalism from the perennial school to the ethno-symbolists, and from the modernist 
school to those who conceive of the nation as a construct, I end with a discussion of the Sub-Altern 
Studies Group. In doing so I outline the development of a way of conceiving of a 'national discourse', in 
which anti-colonial nationalist elites present a framework that produces a set of boundaries by which a 
nation can be constituted, or imagined, and by which certain events, objects or circumstances can be 
interpreted as 'national'. This discourse is a system of representation, a way in which historical narratives, 
collectivities, symbols, images and practices cohere around an idea of 'the nation', and this in turn delimits 
future interpretations of political realities. 
Through the following chapters this approach is used to historically trace the development of a 'national 
discourse' in Zimbabwe. The second chapter looks at the emergence of the national discourse in the 
rhetoric and political practices of the emerging mass-nationalist parties, charting how they began to 
conceive of 'Zimbabwe', its history and its culture, with particular reference to how ideas of 'the people' 
were represented, and constructions of the privileged category of 'national hero'. The third chapter looks 
at post-independence Zimbabwe. Firstly it discusses how a specific conception of 'national unity' shaped 
elite rhetoric on the policy of reconciliation, the disturbances in Matabeleland, and the one party state 
agenda. It then considers ~ow discourses around modernisation and technical development produced 
different ways of thinking about land, contradictory to how it was imagined in national history. The last 
chapter covers post-2000 Zimbabwe, specifically trying to understand how elite representations of 











how this 'revival' was both reinforced by, and helped produce, the dichotomies that have marked much 
of the commentary and rhetoric on the crisis in Zimbabwe: on one side a radical redistributive political 
project based on historical sanction and native entitlement, on the other a universalistic critique 














'Ibis chapter begins with a brief discussion of how different interpretations and explanations of the crisis 
in Zimbabwe have gained prominence, in both academic and popular commentary. In doing so it 
highlights how this study will diverge from many of these approaches, and instead try and build upon 
those that have sought to more closely examine how ZANU-PF's presentation of the nation has 
informed political practice in Zimbabwe. In doing so it is necessary to take the nation, or more 
specifically, how elites have historically conceived of the nation, as the central focus of analysis. With this 
in mind a historical review of the theories of nations and nationalism is provided, ending by placing this 
study within an approach that conceives of a 'national discourse'. 
Understanding the crisis in Zimbabwe 
In trying to understand the crisis many observers have fixed their gaze solely on the Zimbabwean 
President. Recent journalistic works have used a loosely psychological analysis, centred on descriptions of 
personal characteristics and behaviour through the President's life, to explain dictatorial inclinations 
of Robert Mugabe (Blair, 2003; Holland, 2008; Meredith, 2002; Norman, 2008). As well as being largely 
speculative these studies are often metonymic. By this I mean Mugabe becomes the focus of analysis, 
and so comes to symbolise the crisis itself. It is largely explained through his actions, choices and 
character traits. This neglects the complex constellation of historical and social factors that give the crisis 
its character. Popular presentations of the Zimbabwe crisis in both African and international media has 
tended to focus on a more simple and ahistorical conception. Focussing on the farm invasions, political 
violence, and the disregard for the rule of law and liberal norms of democratic practice, these accounts 
amount to what Worby calls a charting of Zimbabwe's 'retreat from modernity' (Worby, 2003: 67). Both 
readings complement each other, cohering around the image of an authoritarian leader presiding over a 
regression of the norms of liberal governance. 'Ibis position has been most evident in the Western 
media, the liberal press in Southern Africa, and independent press within Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2006: 
1). 
At the same time another polarity has emerged that tends to read events in Zimbabwe after 2000 as a 











imperialism, and emphasises a history of injustice and dispossession as the justification of this program. 
This position has been dominant in state controlled media in Zimbabwe, and amongst some sympathetic 
groups and organisations internationally (Raftopoulos, 2006: 1). 
These polarities have raised important questions in academic commentary on the crisis in Zimbabwe, 
most notably within the heated debates amongst traditionally leftist scholars2. There has been a 
noticeable divide between those who emphasise the importance of human rights and democratic practice 
and highlight the authoritarian nature of the state while remaining critical of neo-liberal conceptions of 
'civil society', and those who support the structural changes brought on by the land reform process while 
remaining wary of elite accumulation and democratic marginalisation in its processes. 
The second position is perhaps best exemplified in the work of Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros. These 
scholars have, through a largely class-based structural analysis, defended the land invasions as a popular 
revolution that sought to overthrow historical inequalities, and see a civil society based opposition 
movement that is ideologically and materially tied to neoliberal values as incapable of achieving this 
necessary social transformation. For these scholars Zimbabwe is a radicalised state battling against neo­
liberal orthodoxy, although they remain wary of how bourgeoisie interests within the party have co-opted 
the reforms, and lament that the 'revolutionary situation' in Zimbabwe remained focussed on 'a single 
issue' and did not radicalise urban workers or farm workers (Moyo and Yeros, 2007a, 2007b). 
The first position, which similarly uses a political-economy analysis to understand the nature of the crisis 
in Zimbabwe, can be more broadly aligned to scholars like Brian Raftopoulos, Ian Phimister and Patrick 
Bond. Raftopoulos and Phimister have sought to challenge Moyo and Yeros by emphasising the 
authoritarian nature of the state and highlighting elite processes of accumulation within it, and by trying 
to understand the crisis as part of the wider international political economy, paying particular attention to 
the role of South African economic interest and how ZANU-PF's radical politics fmds solidarity with 
other political leaders on the continent (Raftopoulos, Phimister, 2004a, 2004b). Bond and Manyana 
situate the crisis in a history of neoliberal economic reform, state corruption and mismanagement, and 
classic capitalist crisis (Bond, Manyanya, 2002). 
Leaving aside the debates on the left, some other analysts have sought to critically outline how in an 
increasingly authoritarian political climate there has been a collapse of democratic space in Zimbabwe that 
2 For a more detailed look at these debates see Raftopoulos (2006), and Moore (2004). A recent article by 
Mahmood Mamdani in the London Review of Books, which drew much empirical data and critical insight from the 
work of Moyo and Yeros, provoked a raft of responses from scholars of Zimbabwean politics and history, and so 
highlighted how the sheer urgency of the crisis has produced a heated intellectual atmosphere and a set of divergent 











has seen a dramatic and chronic reduction in human rights, liberties and democratic practice, and the 
marginalisation of the rule of law and the independent press (Scarnecchia et aI, 2009; Raftopoulos, 2009; 
IJR, 2006, Goredema, 2004; Rupiya, 2004; Chuma, 2004). Many accounts have adopted a more multi­
layered approach, seeking to understand in greater detail the specifics of the crisis in Zimbabwe, and the 
authoritarian and patriarchal politics that underpins it, all in a historical context (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 
Jensen, 2003; Campbell, 2003). These accounts have critically documented the emergence of a 'party­
state' in Zimbabwe over a longer period (Hammar, 2003; Alexander, 2003, 2006), and complicated the 
issue of land reform by critically investigating the competing agendas of its participants, highlighting how 
elites had benefitted from it, and exploring the negative effects on many commercial farm workers 
(Alexander, 2006; Sachikonye, 2003, 2004; Rutherford, 2008; Cousins, 2003; Marongwe, 2003). Norma 
K.riger has provided detailed studies examining more closely the agendas of war veterans, and their role in 
Zimbabwean politics (Kriger, 2003, 2005, 2006). Scholars have also attempted to bring to light the 
international dimensions of the crisis, situating it in a wider debate over Zimbabwean foreign policy 
(Chan, Patel, 2007). 
At the same time some analysts have explicitly identified the importance of how nationalist elites in 
Zimbabwe have presented a specific and powerful idea of the nation and its history. These studies move 
away from those listed above by placing an emphasis on the 'nation', and how representations of it have 
important ramifications for the politics of identity, citizenship, and legitimacy. Departing from studies 
that revolve around analytical categories such as class, state, or party, they explicitly try to understand the 
importance of how a conception of the nation has implications on political practice. Terence Ranger has 
identified what he calls 'patriotic history', a way in which a dominant narrative of national history has 
emerged in Zimbabwe that seeks to curtail more nuanced and challenging histories and to exclude certain 
political positions (Ranger, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). Raftopoulos has built on this approach, showing how 
this presentation of national history has legitimised the land reform process, and reinforced categories of 
national exclusion for a variety of different groups. It has also tied authoritarian redistributive politics in 
Zimbabwe to a wider idea of Pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism (Raftopoulos, 2003,2004). James 
Muzondidya has shown how ZANU-PF's conception of a singular, essentialised 'African' as the sole 
authentic national subject has had profound implications for other minority groups in the country 
(Muzondidya, 2004, 2007)3. 
3 During the writing of this project I was made aware of the recent work of Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, who in his 
recently published work Do Zimbabweans Exist? (2009), draws from a range of post-modernist theory to try and 
deconstruct the 'national project' in Zimbabwe. The author kindly forwarded me a copy of his then unpublished 
manuscript (2008), and this has proved a valuable resource in terms of insights, sources and references. Ndlovu­
Gatsheni's work is a far more ambitious project than my own. Ii critically investigates a broad range of imaginings 
of the nation throughout the history of Zimbabwe, with significant emphasis on those 'readings' of the nation that 











These studies privilege the importance of understanding how elites have constructed an image of the 
nation and its history, and this study can be aligned with this approach. However, whereas the works 
above concentrate on elite constructions of the nation in contemporary Zimbabwe this study instead 
seeks to frame this process historically, to illustrate that the ways in which nationalist elites in Zimbabwe 
present and practice a national discourse can only be understood by showing how this discourse was 
historically constructed. 
The links between past and present depictions of the nation and national history have been noted by 
these scholars. Raftopoulos points to the 'historical resonance' of liberation histories, and that 'the ruling 
party placed a strong emphasis on reviving the narrative of the liberation struggle in general and the 
heroic roles of ZANU-PF and Mugabe in particular' (Raftopoulos, 2004: 165). In a brief article in which 
he discusses the categories of 'traitor' and 'sell out' and proclamations of loyalty to the nation in the intra­
party conflict of the 1960's, Ranger conceded that 'Patriotic [history]. .. is a revival... When I spoke about 
its 'rise', I ought to have talked about its 'return'" (Ranger, 2005a: 11). 
However, as these studies focus explicitly on the contemporary period, this 'revival' is only made 
reference to, and never systematically analysed. This study seeks to fill such a gap. In doing so it has 
three broad objectives. Firstly it seeks to situate an elite-driven national discourse in a historical context, 
showing how it has always been discursively required by elites as a means of understanding their role as 
'leaders', and their representation of the masses as 'national subjects'. Secondly, it attempts to show how 
the way in which elites construct the nation has inflected politics in Zimbabwe since independence, and 
how this has changed in different historical circumstances. Thirdly it aims to provide a stronger 
understanding of the post-2000 national discourse by illustrating how elite constructions of 'the people', 
land, and national history, are in fact intensifications of previously established modes of interpretation. 
This of course requires a specific way of thinking about nationalism and nations. If the object of study is 
the way in which national elites have constructed an idea of the nation, and how such ideas shape political 
practice, then what is needed is a theoretical approach that allows us to conceive of the nation in this way. 
The Zimbabwean case illustrates the importance of an approach that allows for us to understand the 
nation as a construct ofpolitical elites, a system of the representation of histories, images, and 
collectivities, that shape how certain events, actions and circumstances can be conceived of as 'national'. 
This allows for a more nuanced understanding of how events in post-2000 Zimbabwe have been 
Ndebele particularism, the evolution of what he calls 'Mugabeism', and tries to critically understand the current 
politics of transition in light of this. My own work does share with his an interest in how nationalist elites 'imagined' 
the nation in Zimbabwe, and despite the limitations of this work in terms of length and scope, I hope that in this 











presented through a set of 'national' claims, a specific framework of interpretation that reads political 
realities as part of a national history, and the Zimbabwean people as a specific kind of 'national subject'. 
The following section reviews the existing theoretical literature on nationalism and nations, and ends by 
aligning my study with the Sub-Altern Studies Group and more modern theoretical approaches that 
conceive of a 'national discourse'. 
Theories of Nations and Nationalism 
In recent decades the volume of writing on nationalism has significantly risen, building on the realisation 
that 'what is certain now is that any comprehensive analysis of current economic, cultural and political 
developments cannot avoid addressing the attendant role of nations and nationalisms' (Day, Thompson, 
2004: xi). A growing number of scholars from a variety of disciplines have produced a vast and vital 
critical literature on the subject. The following theoretical review is afflicted by the necessity of 
summation in light of the length of this studt. It thus broadly outlines some of the more influential 
debates within the literature in order to map out a theoretical approach for the analysis of nationalism in 
Zimbabwe, and ends with some of the more modern literature which informs my understanding of a 
'national discourse'. 
A helpful way of understanding the debate at the centre of much of this area of study is to situate it 
within the following core question: what is the historical periodization of nations, and what is the 
relationship between the past and the present in the formation and future of nations? This is of course 
crucial to the Zimbabwean case, where we want to understand how the conception of the nation evolved 
through the liberation struggle, and how this past has delimited how the nation is conceived of in the 
present. 
The Perennialists and the Ethnorymbolit/ sdJool 
Broadly speaking the perennialist school of thought argues that nations have been around for a long time, 
but have taken very different forms and shapes throughout history. The perennialists argue that today's 
nations, and even their nationalisms, Can be traced back several centuries, if not millennia. In the post­
war era Hugh Seton-Watson argued that nations could be divided into those that were modern and novel 
(Eastern Europe, Asia and colonial states) and the old continuous nations who could trace their heritage 
back to the middle ages (W'estern and Northern Europe). This dating of nations back to the breakup of 
4 A comprehensive review of such a large and diverse field is no easy task, and the organisation of the following 
section owes much to the following excellent and in depth summaries of the field: Day, Thompson, 2004; Ozkirimli, 











the Roman Empire has gained strong currency amongst many nationalism scholars and led to numerous 
efforts to date other nations to a similar period (Smith, 2000: 37). 
For Adrian Hastings the origin of many nations could be traced back even further, to the ftrst great 
nation, England and its Anglo-Saxon kings at war with the Danes. His thesis is that nations are ethnic in 
origin, and come about when ethnicities produce vernacular written literatures and are affected by the 
pressure of the state, and that the model for their nationhood comes from the Jewish nation presented in 
the Old Testament. Because Christianity is the only religion that allowed vernacular languages nations are 
thus a Christian phenomenon, and when ethnic groups felt threatened they generated nationalisms to aid 
their defence (Smith, 2000). Although Hastings's thesis is unique, it underlines the central point for the 
perennial school, that nations and nationalism have no necessary connection with modernity and 
modernisation. 
Ethnosymbolism is an attempt that not so much tries to locate nations within a historical period as to 
provide historical links between modem nations and nationalism, and earlier collective identities and 
sentiments. It stresses the importance of antecedents to what we see as modem nations, which, although 
not contradictory with the idea that many nations are novel and that nationalism is a modem ideology, 
does stand against the idea that nations themselves are a modem phenomena. Anthony Smith is the most 
well known and prolific of the ethno-symbolic school. He draws attention to the idea of an ethnie, 'a 
named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more 
elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, and a measure of solidarity' (Smith, 2000: 65). To 
Smith a nation shares with an ethnie a common name, myth or memory, but is also defined by the 
historic territory it occupies and by its public culture and common law. Ethnies do not have to occupy 
their homeland, and have a mass public culture that encompasses its members. Thus Smith argues that 
this distinction allows for us to see how nations have developed beyond single ethnies, can subsume other 
ethnies, or can accommodate diverse new ethnies in a multicultural nation (Smith, 1998: 183). Thus we 
can have a view of history that accommodates a history of both nations and ethnies, and the complex 
interaction between the two can be traced back centuries. 
This approach is underlined by the large significance given to socio-cultural and historic symbols, myths, 
memories of origin and homeland, and how these re-emerge as interactions between the past and the 
modem nation. For example a nation could be traced back to a later date, like Armenia in the fifth 
century, and is simply reoccurring in a different form. In another sense we can traces elements of 
continuity between different aspects of the nation, like institutional arrangements, memories of certain 
events or legal standardisation. A third process linking the nation to the past would be in the 
appropriation of, through rediscovery and authentication, aspects of what later generations consider their 











nationalist movements, allowing nationalists to give a convincing representation to their designated 
compatriots. 
The Nation as Modern 
The perennialist and ethnosymbolic school of thought can be differentiated from the modernist school in 
two important ways. Firstly, it begins any enquiry ofnations and nationalism by acknowledging their 
potential historical duration, and seeks to understand nations by drawing out their antecedents or 
catalysing processes from a far reaching history. Secondly, in doing so they accept that we can divorce 
the idea of a nation from more modern historical processes. 
The modernists, on the other hand, assert that nationalist ideologies, as well as the system of nation 
states, are modern, that is, both recent in date and novel in character, that because of this nations and 
national identities are also recent and novel, and that nations and nationalism find their origin in, or are a 
product of, modernisation and modernity. They also give a strong formative role to elites, the bearers of 
nationalism, in creating modern nations. 
These assertions are visible in the works of modernist scholars. Elie Kedourie traces the philosophical 
lineage of nationalist ideology back to the Enlightenment belief in the mastery of reason and the necessity 
of progress, and Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the self-determination of the national will, but contends 
that these only find modern form in the discontent of 'marginal men' in 19th century Europe and 
twentieth century European colonies (Kedourie, 1971). These marginal men were intellectuals who were 
excluded from power in modern formations of the state, and so set upon nationalist movements to gain 
this power. 
Ernest Gellner's sociological analysis finds no evidence of nations in premodern, agroliterate societies, 
and instead looks to the specific nature of industrialisation as needing a 'high culture' to successfully 
function. Thus nationalism is an intrinsic necessity in modernised society, and nationalism is the tool by 
which modernising elites seek to create nations. Gellner's analysis sees nationalism as a by-product of 
industrialisation, a necessity for the drivers of modernisation to create an idea that could appeal to all 
those whom the radical socioeconomic changes of industrialisation were affecting, based on the assertion 
that nationalism is 'primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent' (Gellner, 1983: 1). This leads to Gellner's famous comment, adopted by many scholars, that: 
'Nations as a God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent ... political destiny, are a myth; 
nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents 











Hobsbawm helpfully summarises this assertion: 'nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make 
states and nationalism, but the other way round' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10). 
For many writers it is the modem professionalised state, powered by capitalism and industrialism, that has 
necessitated the uptake of nationalist ideology by the elites which exercise or seek to gain control of it 
(filly, 1975; Breuilly, 1994). For Breuilly the appeal of a nationalist doctrine comes only when the forces 
of capitalist modernisation alienate the absolutist state from civil society. Its promise of the reintegration 
of state and society appeals to those who are alienated by this division, especially newly educated classes 
(Breuilly, 1994). For Breuilly nationalism is in essence a political movement generated by the forces of 
capitalist modernisation which is intent on capturing state power, and attempts to do so by espousing 
nationalist arguments, which he summarises as: 
a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character 
b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. 
c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of 
political sovereignty. 
(Breuilly, 1994: 2) 
Hobsbawm shares Breuilly's insistence on the modem and political aspects of nationalism; 'Nations only 
exist as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one broadly 
speaking, the citizen state of the French Revolution - but also in the context of a particular stage of 
technological and economic development' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 9-10). 
Here we can see a particularly visible strand of the debate I mentioned above concerning the historical 
location of nations. The assertion here is against the idea that nations are perennial social entities which 
can be located throughout history even if they are not an innate human condition, and even though 
nationalisms are a recent phenomena, the nation itself was immemorial (Smith, 2000: 27). In contrast, the 
argument is that modem nations are themselves the product of nationalisms and cannot be detached 
from the socioeconomic climate and historical conditions from which they emerge. The modernist 
school of nations and nationalism is aligned with the constructionist literature, which seeks to understand 
why and how modem nations emerge, and how best to understand them. 
The Nation as a Cons/met 
As Anthony Smith notes, 'In the past two decades the idea of the nation as a text to be narrated and an 











constructionist school shares the same assertions of the modernist school outlined above, but builds on 
these assertions by viewing nations as social constructs and cultural artefacts. Nationalist elites represent 
these 'inventions' or 'imaginations' of the nation to their designated compatriots. 
The constructionist school has been broadly influenced by two important works, which I will discuss 
briefly bdow. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's The Invention ofTradition puts forward the idea that 
we can best understand the nature and appeal of nations by analysing national traditions, which 
themsdves are invented traditions: 
'Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted 
rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally 
attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past' (Hobsbawm, Ranger, 1983: 1-2) 
They are: 
'Highly rdevant to that comparativdy recent historical innovation, the 'nation', with its associated 
phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest on 
exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical 
novdty implies innovation' (ibid.: 13-14) 
This is evident in the functional basis of invented tradition assigned to it by the authors. Invented 
traditions establish social cohesion of groups and real or artificial communities; in doing so they legitimise 
institutions and relations of authority, and aim to socialise by inculcating beliefs, value systems and 
conventions of behaviour (Smith, 2000: 119). 
Although in many ways dissimilar to Hobsbawm's work Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities is 
regarded a seminal work not just in the constructionist school but in the entire fidd of nations and 
nationalism. He emphasises the importance of print capitalism in the dissemination ofprinted works 
from the 16th century onwards as linguistic diversity began to wane, and the rise of a reading public to 
receive representations of an imagined community, and to thus become a nation. To Anderson the 
nation is an imagined political community, sovereign and cross-class, but remains unique to a specific area 
and historical time period. Anderson's broad implied theory is supplemented by in depth historical 
sociological analysis of circumstances in particular areas of culture and period. However this insistence 
on specific circumstantial dements to the emergence of nations is underlined by an emphasis on the idea 
of the nation as a narrative of the imagination, a text and discourse to be deconstructed. As Smith notes, 











and nations for literary and textual analysis that accepts that discourse and social construction play an 
important role in the peculiar and changing character of nations. This has pushed the modernist 
paradigm beyond its original fundamentally sociological and historical causal analysis. 
It is important here to also point out Anthony Smith's view that within the modem and constructionist 
literature there still remains an emphasis on the ideology of nationalism. By ideology he means the set of 
specific images, symbols and concepts ('the people', 'the homeland', authenticity, destiny and autonomy) 
that mark them off from other ideologies, like socialism or conservatism. Implicit in the work of the 
modernist and constructionist school is the acceptance that the state will use specific images, cultural 
artefacts, national histories and other ideas for political purposes, but they also require them to give life 
and meaning to their claims. He uses the example of land: 
'The urge to possess land which characterises nationalism, is not confined to its political properties: the 
land is also the land of 'our ancestors', the historic land, and hence desired for its symbolic value as much 
as its political empowerment or its economic resources' (Smith, 2000: 92) 
Only through images and symbols is it possible to portray and represent an elite conception of the nation, 
and give that portrayal its sense of significance and distinctiveness. It is here that there is significant 
congruence with the constructionist and ethno-symbolic schools of nationalism (Smith, 2000: 92). 
Postcolonial Nationalism 
Responding to the major theoretical approaches above some modem scholars have pointed to a 
'theoretical blindness' in the historical basis of these works, namely that they do not reflect the 
experiences of the subordinated classes of former European colonies. As Eley and Suny note, these 
scholars have ushered in one of the most important theoretical developments of the last two decades by 
exploring 'the ways in which even the nation's most generous and inclusively democratic imaginings 
entail processes of protective and exclusionary positioning against others' (Eley, Suny, 1996: 28). These 
works, coming most notably from the Sub-Altern Studies Group, moved away from the question ofwhen 
we can date the nation, to explore history from the vantage point of the subordinated, and so show how 
the way that postcolonial nations are represented served to suppress the voices of the 'subalterns' 
(Ozkirimli,2000: 194). 
Figures such as Gayatri Spivak, Ranajit Guha and Partha Chaterjee have outlined how nationalist 
independence movements assumed a bourgeoisie character, their practice always inflected by the political, 











represent the interests of the majority (Chatterjee, 1986; Guha, 1983; Spivak, 1988, 1994). For Chaterjee, 
anti-colonial nationalism was a 'derivative discourse' in that, although: 
'nationalism denied the alleged inferiority df the colonised people: it also asserted that a backward nation 
could 'modernise' itself while retaining cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it 
challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of 
'modernity' on which colonial domination was based' (Chaterjee, 1986: 30) 
Homi Bhabha shares Chaterjee's concern with how Western discourses have been reiterated by anti­
colonial nationalism. For Bhabha the effect of colonial power is not to explicitly generate submission or a 
repression of 'native traditions', but to produce a hybridisation, what he calls 'mimicry' (Bhabha, 1994, 
1990). If anti-colonial nationalism is replicating the Western nationalism, then anti-colonial practice is 'a 
displacement of sorts, a subtle articulation of difference within the semiotic space of the same' (Lazarus, 
1999: 133). Colonial mimicry is: 
'the desire for a reformed, recognisable Other, as a suijeel tfdifforence that is almost the same, but not quite. 
Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence: in order to be 
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference' (Bhabha, 1994: 86) 
The 'mimicry' of colonial subjects, and their elites, of the colonial power is a means of power over that 
subject by fortifying the dominance of colonial knowledge. At the same time however it undermines a 
system of knowledge based on difference, and so becomes a means to challenge colonial power. 
In a later work Chaterjee developed his original thesis, and argued against what he saw as Anderson's idea 
that nationalisms in Asia and Africa were adoptions of a modular form of nationalism established in the 
Americas and Europe: 
'If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' 
forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? .. 
The most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa 
are posited not on an identity but rather on a diJforence with the 'modular' forms of the national society 
propagated by the modem West' (Chaterjee, 1996: 216) 
For Chaterjee the problem is that Anderson and others begin their analysis of anti-colonial nationalism 
with the quest for political power, when anti-colonial nationalism derives and reproduces much of its 
discourse from what he calls the material domain - that of economics, statecraft, science and technology. 












of the nation's cultural identity, is nationalisms 'sovereign territory', and here it 'refuses to allow the 
colonial power to intervene'. The result is a significant feat of the imagination, a project that attempts to 
'to fashion a 'modern' national culture that is nevertheless not Western' (Chaterjee, 1996: 217). It is here 
that Chaterjee locates Bhabha's 'difference'; anti and postcolonial nationalism is 'almost the same, but not 
quite' as West~rn nationalisms, and for Chaterjee this 'difference' is found in Indian religion and cultural 
practice, indigenous spirituality that remains largely untouched by Western ideas and colonial governance. 
The Nation as Discourse 
What are the implications of this wo.rk on how we can begin to think about nations and nationalism? 
Chaterjee, Bhabha and the Sub-Altern Studies scholars share with the constructionist school the idea that 
the nation is an imagined idea, a discourse that gives meaning to political claims by situating them within 
the discursive framework of the 'nation'. By situating their analyses in the post-colonial context they 
highlight how nationalist elites have attempted to present (or imagine) national collectivity that includes 
all groups in society, and to which these groups have an allegiance. For Spivak in particular, the nation is 
a 'mode of representation', an elite configuration that attempts to represent the subaltern as a national 
subject. As Lazarus observes: 
'On Spivak's reading, to cast 'the colonised' as such in a historical narrative is to privilege a certain kind of 
agency, a certain kind of subjectivity and of 'speaking' - that of the colonised suiject who 'speaks' as a 
national(tst) and to homogenise and bracket as incidental all other kinds' (Lazarus, 1999: 111) 
In this sense we can begin to conceive of a 'national discourse' - a mode of representation of popular 
social practice. Here I mean discourse in a loosely Foucauldian sense as 'practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49)5. More explicitly, a discursive structure can be 
thought of as a 'systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are 
formed within a particular context' (Mills, 1997: 15). A national discourse in this sense is a framework of 
interpretation that represents a space in which one can be constituted as 'national'. It is concerned with 
creating a space in which the 'true' nation can be represented: 
'Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is the types of discourse it harbours 
and causes to function as true' (Foucault, 1979: 46, quoted in Mills, 1997: 16) 
5 By 'loosely' I mean that I do not wish to fully engage with a Foucauldian definition of discourse, or discursive 
structures, in which there is no subject as such outside of the discourse. Instead, aligning more with Anderson and 
the Sub-altern Studies Group, I want to focus on how a discourse of 'nation' is developed by elites, and how this 











I am interested here in the idea that a national discourse provides a set of boundaries by which a nation 
can be constituted, or imagined, and by which certain events, objects or circumstances can be interpreted 
as 'national'. A national discourse then is a certain way of reproducing what Smith calls the common 
ideology of nations a defInition of 'the people', the homeland, historical narratives, authenticity and of 
representing them as true and vitaL In this sense certain historical events, symbols, images, social 
practices and concepts cohere around an idea of 'the nation', and these delimit how other events can be 
interpreted. For example certain historical events are represented as sequential, and are discursively 
bound to each other to form a narrative of a national history, and this in turn delimits how future events 
can potentially be presented. Or, as Spivak would be interested in, popular uprisings against colonialism 
are presented as part of a wider national struggle, and those who take part in them as 'national subjects'. 
This way of thinking about nations is starting to generate some popularity (see for example Calhoun, 
1997; Ozkirimli, 2005). Calhoun provides us with a quite effective way of thinking about a national 
discourse. For him there are certain rhetorical characteristics ofnations, variably identifIed in the rich 
history of nationalism outlined above as constitutive ingredients of a nation, but also used by nationalist 
groups and wider society. These include: 
'Boundaries, of territory, population, or both... Direct membership, in which each individual is 
understood to be immediately a part of a nation and in that respect categorically equivalent to other 
members... Temporal depth - a notion of the nation as such existing through time, including past and 
future generations, and having a history ... Common descent or racial characteristics ... Special historical or 
even sacred relations to a certain territory' (Calhoun, 1997: 5) 
These can be considered as claims that are made about nations, which vary in content and number from 
nation to nation, and cannot be used to defIne a precise defInition or an empirically testable description. 
Instead nations are constituted 'by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking and acting 
that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilise people for collective 
projects, and to evaluate peoples and practices' (Calhoun, 1997: 5). 
This is, I feel, a useful way of thinking about the problem I raised in the introduction to this piece: how 
has the image of the Zimbabwean nation been constructed by nationalist elites over time? By tracing how 
an elite-confIgured discourse of the nation has emerged in Zimbabwe we can better understand its power 
in shaping how contemporary events in the country have been interpreted and represented. By tracing 
the discursive history of how the nationalist movement has represented an idea of 'the people' and their 
history, we can also understand the resilience of the social categories and practices that this representation 
produces. At the same time we can see how these representations delimit how subjectivities, collectivities 











Bhabha and Chaterjee also leave us with a telling question that must be kept in mind when trying to 
understand anti- and post-colonial nationalism in Zimbabwe. What in the Zimbabwean case constitutes 
'the difference' between nationalism as it is conceived of in most Euro-centric theoretical approaches and 
anti or post-colonial nationalisms? Chaterjee to some extent found an answer in traditional Indian 
religion, although in Zimbabwe the dominance of Christianity may mean that this 'difference'is located in 
another form. With this in mind how can we understand what constitutes this 'difference', how did 
Zimbabwean anti-colonial nationalist elites present a nation that was 'different', that drew from some idea 
of indigenousness practice and historical location? If on one hand nationalism was a modernising force 
fighting for political independence and democracy, in what way was this ambition situated within a 














and its Heroes 
The rise of mass nationalism in Zimbabwe had as its background a diverse political culture, with a large 
variety of associational activity and political formation. Despite this fact the emerging national discourse 
rested on two dominant conceptions of what constituted 'the people' of Zimbabwe. Firstly they were 
imagined as a democratic citizenry, reflecting the political goals of the nationalist movement. But, at the 
same time, a discourse developed around a 'united African' as a national subject. This primordial figure 
of native authenticity became historically located in an emerging narrative of an 'African' people. 
Beginning in Great Zimbabwe it progressed into an unbroken thread of African resistance against 
colonialism, and the struggle against Rhodesian rule became known as the second Chimurenga. 
This narrative has at its centre the image of the 'national hero', sacredly endowed "vith historical 
legitimacy to lead the nation to its destiny of self-determination. This status has been reified through a 
system of official memorialisation and historical commemoration, and with it a hierarchy of historical 
authority and political legitimacy has been discursively constructed. The leaders of ZANU-PF have been 
placed at its summit, but at the same time the status of 'national hero' wields significant political currency 
to those who seek to challenge this historical legitimacy. 
The emerging 'Zimbabwe' 
In his work on the formation of a ruling political class in Zimbabwe David Moore points to a quote that 
illustrates how in the late 1940's and early 1950's a small, mission school educated, African elite began to 
illustrate the beginnings of a collective identity ofAfricans living in Southern Rhodesia based upon 
national political goals. Quoting from an early Goromonzi school magazine we can see the beginnings of 
a Zimbabwean 'consciousness' based on an idea of a nation-wide polity: 
'(if we) desert our people, who will teach and uplift them? .. Only if all educated Africans do their bit to 
improve their small comer and each unites with the others, fighting the same battle, will we attain the 
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illustrate the beginnings of a collective identity of Africans living in Southern Rhodesia based upon 
national political goals. Quoting from an early Goromonzi school magazine we can see the beginnings of 
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The political future of this generation lay in the nationalist parties of the 1950's and 1960's, but the origins 
of pan-territorial nationalism are widely regarded to be found further back in history, in the different 
interrelations between various earlier forms of political organisation from the late 19th century onwards. 
From the Matabele Homeland Society (MRS) that sought an ancestral homeland within the remit of the 
colonial state, to the Young Ethiopian Manyika Society that campaigned for the rights of their native 
(,viMat!Jika language in the face of colonial language harmonisation policies, to the nascent trade union 
organisations like the Federation of Bulawayo African Trade Unions (FBATU), a complex network of 
, political formations emerged in colonial Southern Rhodesia that were part of an ongoing process of the 
intercession and conftguration of political identity. Included in this were organisations that had already 
begun to operate on a nationwide political basis, including the Southern Rhodesia Bantu Congress 
(SRBC), a conservative organisation fighting for voting and economic rights for those members of the 
African community able to compete with Europeans (West, 2002). Enocent Msi do observes that: 
'Southern Rhodesians of the early 1950's might not have defmed themselves as nationalists, nor had they 
imagined a named nation and its social boundaries. They were not technically Zimbabweans. They had 
many identities that at times fed into each other, including those based on ethnicity, region, gender and 
trade union membership' (Msindo, 2007: 273-4) 
Although they had in common a genesis provoked through lived encounters with colonial policy, from 
forced removals to taxation, these social formations drew on various discourses to articulate political 
demands. These included the appropriation and channelling of localised religious histories into rural self­
help societies, the pan-African radicalism of Marcus Garvey, and liberal democratic discourses derived 
from international connections to The British Fabian society, the liberal movement in Cape Town and the 
civil rights movement in the USA6. 
As the historical literature on pre-1950's Rhodesia demonstrates it is difficult and even unnecessary to 
attempt to identify a linear trajectory from early associationallife to broader based nationalism, and more 
helpful to conceive of the emergence of a complex and constantly negotiated indigenous political culture 
which provided the organisational and societal grounds for the rise of nationalism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
6 There is an extensive historical and historiographical literature on political formations in pre and post-war 
Rhodesia. For an analysis of the impact of Garveyism in Zimbabwe see West, 2002b. For a comprehensive history 
of the rise of a heterogeneous, urban black middle class into nationalist politics see West, 2002a. For a history of 
early liberalism and democracy in urban Rhodesia see Scameccia, 2008. For a historical analysis of the formation of 
political identity and nationalism in rural Matabeleland see Ranger, 1999; Alexander, McGregor, Ranger, 2000. For a 












highlights the unevenness of this process, citing numerous examples of members seamlessly moving 
between different organisations, including ethnic, national and others, and exploring how these 
formations appropriated and adopted different discourses in an ongoing arbitration of a pluralistic 
political terrain (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 45-50). 
By the 1950's the educated elites described by Moore had become the dominant interlocutors of 
nationalism through the founding of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) in 
1957, a reconstituted SRBC, and, following its banning, the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1960 
(West, 2002: 207-218; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 51). The nationalist parties became a political home for an 
emerging African elite and often a site of discursive absorption of the array of grievances expressed by the 
organisations mentioned above, or simply subordinated smaller organisations and interest groups 
(Raftopoulos, 1999: 125-126). 
It is important to note here the obvious heterogeneous origins of nationalist political formation, and the 
implication that any coherent articulation of nation-ness by it would have to necessarily represent a 
diverse community of identities, whether ethnic or political. Despite this Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes how 
the SADC, the NDP and later the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1961, as well as the 
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) after ZAPU's split in 1963, all affirmed a presumed 
notion of united citizenship under democratic rule. From the liberal democratic idea of citizenship under 
the SRANC, to the one-man-one-vote solution to colonialism espoused by ZAPU and ZANU, the 
nationalist parties presented an idea of 'the people', but more often than not did so in the language of 
democratic rule. For example the 1965 constitution of ZAPU begins with: 
A. 	 Aims and objective: 
1. 	 To establish the policy of one-man-one-vote as the basis of government in this country. 
11. 	 To maintain the spirit of democracy and love of liberty among the people of Zimbabwe. 
iii. 	 To unite the African people so that they liberate themselves from all forms of 
imperialism and colonialism. 
IV. 	 To fight relentlessly for the elimination of all forms of oppression. 
v. 	 To create conditions for the economic prosperity of the people under a government 
based on the principle of one-man-one vote. 
Vi. To foster the development of the best values in African culture and traditions, so as to 
establish a desirable order. 
(ZAPU, 1968) 
ZANU, despite emphasising differences between the two major nationalist parties, presented a similar 











radical... it defined itself just like ZAPU as 'a non-racial union of all the peoples of Zimbabwe who share a 
common destiny and a common fate believing in the African character of Zimbabwe and democratic rule 
by the majority regardless of race, colour, creed or tribe" (ZANU, 1963, quoted in N dlovu-Gatsheni, 
2008: 80). The national parties began to speak of 'a people' as a discursive entity, a fixed unitary populace 
on whose behalf they spoke, but what is important here is that the contours and character of this entity is 
defined in two ways. Central to these definitions are the recurring themes of democracy, unity and 'the 
African people', and there are significant tensions between them. 
Firstly Zimbabwe is presented as a political community that must be fought for, under which a 
democratic dispensation will allow for a minimal delimitation ofwho 'the people' are. In this case, a non­
racial, democratic imagining of Zimbabwean-ness allows for the formulation of a united citizenship, 
above other forms of identity like ethnicity, associational membership or race. In this case the nation 
itself is conceived of as a democratic political community; firstly it is a democratic citizenry under one­
man one-vote, but at the same time it is a unified collective in that the political premise of democratic, 
independent rule unites 'the people' above and beyond other identities present within the territorial body 
which they seek to liberate. 
This is the nationalism espoused by N dabaningi Sithole, the founder and first leader of ZANU, in his 
1959 book Afiican Nationalism. Aimed mainly at a sceptical Western audience, it sought to portray 
nationalism as not against whites but against white supremacy in order to seek a society that looks beyond 
race and tribe and is built on democratic ideals of freedom and equality (Sithole, 1968). The model is, in 
Chaterjee's sense, largely 'derivative', drawing from the one-man one-vote model of British parliamentary 
rule. This translates into majority ule, but the meanings of majority rule had connotations of rule by the 
majority racial group: rule by Africans. Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, understood this, and asserted 
that majority rule 'meant' non-racialism and democracy. To be a national subject was largely defmed by 
being a voter in a democratic society: 
'There is talk by some people that 'majority rule' means rule by Africans only; that Africanisation will 
deprive Europeans of their jobs and that there will be a general lowering of standards. To us majority rule 
means the extension of political rights to all people so that they are able to elect a Government of their 
own choice, irrespective of race, colour or creed of the individual forming such a government. All that 
matters is that a Government must consist of the majority party elected by the majority of the country's 
voters' (Nkomo, 1964, quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008) 
However, present in the early mission statements of the nationalist parties is a pervasive image of 
'Africans' and 'African people' as a collectivity. In stressing the need for unity amongst Africans, the 











the premise on which the nationalist parties operate. To put it differently, a united community of 
'Africans' is desirable and unity must be encouraged to truly realise this, and we, the nationalists, speak on 
behalf of that realisation, that future community. In speaking on its behalf they are thus creating the 
discursive boundaries, symbols and histories which define its emerging form. Although the democratic 
ideals form part of this, the heavy emphasis on 'African character', 'African people' and 'the best values in 
African culture and traditions' being used 'to establish a desirable order', begin to reveal a deepening of 
this idea of collectivity beyond notions of a united democratic community. At the same they reveal 
inconsistencies and tensions over what is meant by 'the people'; are they a united citizenry under a 
democratic dispensation, or does 'majority rule' under this system in fact connote a different conception 
of 'the people', a united community of 'Africans' that creates a new 'order'? If so what constitutes this 
'people', and their 'African character'? 
A central symbol for this presentation of 'African' collective unity was the naming of the country 
Zimbabwe, explicitly endorsed in the titles of the leading nationalist parties. Michael Mawema is generally 
recognised as using the term Zimbabwe as a signifier of the nation for the first time when addressing a 
rally of supporters sometime in the early 1960's, when he was president of the NDP (Fontein, 2006; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). The archaeological site carries great historical valence as the embodiment of 
past African achievement, and is generally interpreted as 'national' heritage. As Robert Mugabe noted 
when opening an extension to the Great Zimbabwe Site Museum in 1988: 
'Great Zimbabwe is an important symbol for it shows this generation what we as a people were capable 
of achieving. It encourages us to reach for greater heights in our fight to rebuild Zimbabwe' (quoted in 
Fontein,2006: 119) 
At the point of its adoption it also carried great significance as a site of contestation over national 
belonging. In his extensive anthropological study of Great Zimbabwe Fontein notes that various 
nationalists and academics point to the fact that the adoption of Zimbabwe as the name of the country in 
waiting was a reaction against Rhodesian appropriation of its history. From the late 19th century onwards 
various archaeologists and historians had put forward foreign origin myths for Great Zimbabwe. These 
theories, and the challenges they received from other academics, are collectively known as the 'Zimbabwe 
controversy' (Fontein, 2006: 3-13). Kaarlshom (1989) and Chennels (1996) works on Rhodesian settler 
discourses point out the narrative strategy of Rhodesian nationalism which defined Rhodesian identity as 
a reaction to constructed ideas of black inferiority and primitiveness (part of the environment rather than 
a social entity). The institutionalisation of foreign origin stories of Great Zimbabwe as official history by 
the colonial state points to the symbolic myth of Great Zimbabwe as an early white civilisation as a key 
element of this discourse. Karlshomm thus argues that according to this narrative the Rhodesians were 











civilisation was defeated by hordes of black savages became an allegory for the setder community itself 
(K.arlshomm, 1989). As Great Zimbabwe became an important symbol for the nationalist movement, the 
'Zimbabwe controversy' returned in a new wave of Rhodesian revisionist literature in the 1960's and 
1970's that attempted to reassert the sites foreign origins (Fontein, 2006: 122-123). 
The naming of Zimbabwe was then also seen as a reclamation of the origins of the nation, and allegorical 
of the independence struggle itself. In this sense the ruins became a meaningful trope by which the 
collective 'people' could be imagined as a historically valid entity. 
The second Chimurenga 
During the period of Great Zimbabwe's elevation to national symbolism within the liberation movement 
historians began to utilise oral histories in order to understand the African past, and many of these 
became central texts of the national discourse. By highlighting the past rebellions of ancestral figures like 
Chaminuka, Ambuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi against colonial rule, they traced a linear genealogy of 
African rebellion. Terence Ranger's Revolt in Southern Rhodesia (1967) was particularly influential in its 
focus on the roles played by Nehanda and Kaguvi in Mashonaland, and the Mwari cult in Matabelenad, 
and its exaggerated portrayal of Shona and N debele unity and popular resistance in the conflicts of 
1896/7. 
Written after Ranger was deported from Southern Rhodesia in 1963 for his part in the nationalist 
movement, the text has faced continuing criticism. First seriously undermined by the historical analysis of 
Beach and Cobbings in the late 1970'S7, opinion on Revolt in Southern Rhodesia widely conforms to Robins's 
characterisation of it as a nationalist 'praise text', and Ranger as one of the 'willing scribes of a celebratory 
African nationalist history that profoundly shaped official accounts of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle' 
(Robins, 1996: 76). The influence of this work in fixing a resonant national narrative linking the struggle 
for independence with earlier resistance cannot be underestimated. Ranger has detailed interesting 
examples where he suspects nationalist leaders used the names and histories displayed in his work to 
mobilise support for the nationalist struggle. A 1975 speech made by then ZANU leader Sithole is an 
example: 
'I greet you in the name of our brave and gallant heroes of the Chimurenga of 1896-7 who fell in the great 
cause of liberating this, our wonderful country, from foreign rule ...In the names of Mkwati, N ehanda, 
Kagubi, Mashagombe, Makoni, Kunwi-Nyandoro and others in Mashonaland, and I greet you in the 
names of Somabulana, Mlugulu, Dhliso, Siginyamatshe, Mpotswana, and others in Matabeleland who 
master-minded and prosecuted the first Chimurenga in Zimbabwe... The fighters of the second Chimurenga 











of Zimbabwe now also have guns - the thing that makes all men the same size - and we are confident 
that those who defeated us in the first Chimurenga will be defeated without fail.' (Ndlovu-Gtsheni, 2008: 
54) 
Ranger's work was part of a newly emerging character of the Zimbabwean national discourse whereby in 
the rural areas the spiritual authority of certain ancestors had become central tenets in the articulation and 
legitimisation of the struggle for independence. Fontein observes, 'As political mythology/theology with 
which to imagine a nation, and, importantly, to provide historical/ancestral precedence for the use of 
violence as a means with which to fight for and ultimately establish an independent Zimbabwe, the 
rebellions of the 1890's, the first Chimurenga, became as important for Zimbabwean nationalism as Great 
Zimbabwe was in terms of providing a deep historical example of past African achievement and future 
aspiration' (Fontein, 2006: 143). Nationalist leaders began to refer to the independence struggle as the 
second Chimurenga, and acted out this historical connection to the past. In 1962 after arriving back from a 
trip abroad Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, was met at the airport by a ninety year old veteran of the 
1867 uprisings who ceremoniously handed over to him a war-axe, sword and knobkerrie, and asked of 
Nkomo to 'Take this sword and these other weapons ofwar, and with them fight the enemy to the bitter 
end' (Ranger, 1967: 385; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 57). 
Fontein points to an important passage in Revolt in Southern Rhodesia where Ranger quotes the writings of 
nationalist politician Nathan Shamuyarira: 
'Mr Shamuyarira goes on to describe how the National Democratic Party ... 'added one important factor 
that had been singularly missing in Rhodesian nationalism: emotion'. He described their mass meetings, 
the prayers to Chaminuka, 'thudding drums, ululation by women dressed in national costumes, and 
ancestral prayers'. 'In rural areas meetings became political gatherings and more - social occasions where 
old friendships were renewed and new ones made, past heritage was revived through prayers and 
traditional singing with African instruments, ancestral spirits invoked to guide and lead the new nation ... 
Christianity and civilisation took a back seat, and new forms of worship, new attitudes were thrust 
forward dramatically ... the spirit pervading the meetings was African, and the desire was to put the 
twentieth century in an African context'. These meetings he tells us, had an emotional impact 'that went 
far beyond claiming to rule the country - it was an ordinary man's participation in creating something 
new, a new nation" (N. Shamuyarira, 1965: 28-31 quoted in Ranger, 1967: 384-5) 
Shamuyarira's descriptions of NDP rural meetings display how the invocation of the sacred ancestors was 
an important aspect of the national discourse. What is also evident is the performance of a cultural 
nationalism that fmds its origins in a distinctly African past. The discursive entity of the 'Zimbabwean 











is Shamuyarira's seemingly contradictory description of the 'new attititudes' of a 'new nation' in the 
context of the revival of 'past heritage', 'traditional singing' and 'ancestral spirits'. His 'emotion' in this 
case seems to be the valence ofAfricanist authenticity, whereby the newly imagined nation is realised as 
novel and old at the same time, a modem formulation of ancient indigenous culture and purpose. This 
authenticity is performed in the sense that it was to some extent adopted by nationalist elites as part of a 
wider image of 'authenticity'. We must remember that the ceremonies in which Shamuyarira took part 
may have had distinctly local characteristics, but in a national discourse that conceives of a 'united 
African' national subject these particularities become themselves 'African' rather than of a distinctive 
place, ethnicity or culture. 
The performance of authenticity began to take hold amongst nationalists in the 1960's, as leaders like 
Nkomo and Leopold Takawira sported traditional animal skins and fur hats, and the NDP explicitly 
began to encourage its followers to use African instruments in party songs, wear traditional cloths and 
shoes, and to drink water from Zimbabwean water pots instead of cups and jars8 (M:sindo, 2007: 269; 
Bhebe, 1989: 101). The national discourse thus conceived of a collectivity presumed to be united through 
authenticity as Africans, connected through a lineage of indigenous struggle against political and cultural 
exploitation, and legitimated by sacred authority. Needless to say, this quality of the national discourse 
has profound implications for how identities are imagined in Zimbabwe and how historical validity 
confers national heroic status on the bearers ofnationalism itself. 
Guerrillas as Vana Vevhu 
Rural mobilisation during the armed struggle phase of the ftght for independence in Zimbabwe is an area 
that has had signiftcant attention paid to it amongst academics. Terence Ranger has alerted us to how 
studies have demonstrated that rural nationalism was often partly autonomous of the larger movement. 
A signiftcant part of this is down to its periodisation; after the ban on the nationalist parties in 1964 urban 
nationalist activity pretty much stopped but in the rural areas the ban was less easy to enforce. After 
guerrillas began inflltrating Rhodesia from neighbouring countries they did so almost entirely in rural 
areas (Ranger, 2003: 7). In doing so they interacted with local rural communities in varying ways, 
producing different patterns of mobilisation, conflict and resistance. 
This latter observation is most obvious in the lively debate and conflicting interpretations over rural 
mobilisation and ideological support for the nationalist movement during the liberation war. David Lan, 
in his work Guns and Rain, sought to demonstrate how the close associations between mhondoro spirit 
mediums and guerrillas saw the guerrillas incorporated into existing spiritual narratives over land and 
8 It is interesting to note that a young Robert Mugabe, who joined the NDP in 1960, is often attributed a prominent 











conflict. As the modern manifestations of the mhondoro spirits, guerrillas found legitimacy for their violent 
struggle - focussed strongly on the symbolic importance of rights to land (Lan, 1985). In Ranger's Peasant 
Consdousness and Guem'lla War in Zimbabwe rural experiences of colonial conquest, land alienation and 
authoritarian state practices provided the grounds for nationalist mobilisation (Ranger, 1985). Central to 
this was a revival of support for spirit mediums, who Ranger argued were symbols of 'the fundamental 
right of the peasantry to the land', and their collaboration with guerrillas (Alexander, 1996: 176). These 
works have come under heavy criticism from scholars, most notably Norma Kriger in her work 
Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices. She emphasises the importance in recognising varying agendas 
and internal struggles in the peasantry, and, most provocatively, how guerrillas often used coercion as a 
means of mobilisation (Kriger, 1992). Maxwell (1999) and Danee! (1995) have sought to emphasise local 
agendas, the varying status and approaches of different guerrillas, and how the church also played an 
important role in galvanising local support for the nationalist struggle9• 
What these studies demonstrate is the sheer diversity, both regionally and amongst contingent factors, in 
the interactions between the peasantry, guerrillas, local institutions, narratives and ideologies. I want to 
focus on how the national discourse outlined above, whereby 'national' sacred ftgures like Nehanda and 
Chaminuka were seen as the spiritual antecedent of the second Chimurenga, was played out, interacted and 
furthered at a local level. In doing so it is possible to understand how 'authentic' imaginings of past and 
present national heroes had important implications for the identity and political status of the nationalist 
elites and guerrillas both pre- and post-independence. 
In their training camps the guerrillas received not only military and political education, but were also told 
of the nationalist mythology linking their struggle to those of their ancestors. An interview between Joost 
Fontein and a former guerrilla describes this process, noting the famous prophecy attributed to Ambuya 
Nehanda before she was hanged in 1897: 
'When we were in the camps in Mozambique we were given political education ... we were told about how 
Sekuru Kaguvi, and Ambuya Nehanda led the struggle to ftght against those new colonisers, and the 
heroics they performed ... You know it actually inspired us, because they were very brave, and for the 
simple reason that they were ftghting for their country. So there was a phrase that she [Amhuya 
Nehanda] said, when she was being hanged. 'Our bones will rise, you can kill me now, but our bones will 
rise against you'. As I speak that phrase it sort of gives you an inexplicable feeling ofwanting to take it 
from there and go forward, you see? So the inspiration was that, 'My bones will rise', and we were told 
that we were the bones, the very bones that Ambuya was saying' (VaKanda, 2001, quoted in Fontein, 
2006: 144) 











Here we see how the national discourse not only draws a linear history between the 'country' of Nehanda 
and Kaguvi - although records suggest that no such 'country' existed at that point - and the struggle for 
Zimbabwe, but also confers a spiritual sanctity upon those taking part in the liberation war; it constructs 
an identity with preordained status and legitimacy, based upon an imagined tradition of national self­
determination and struggle10• Central to this identity is the winning, both symbolic and political, of the 
land, the historical terrain of struggle on which the batde for Zimbabwe has taken place. 
Lan (1985), Ranger (1985) and Fontein (2006) have demonstrated how this mythology, strongly 
advocated by political elites, was furthered by guerrillas in rural areas during the struggle. As well as 
paying homage to their 'national' ancestral figures like Nehanda, guerrillas worked closely with local spirit 
mediums, and in doing so were incorporated into distinctively local narratives of traditional ancestry, and 
were granted access to sacred places usually only accessible by the elders and mediums of that specific 
area (Lan, 1985; Daneel, 1995). Fontein has shown how through the connections drawn by guerrillas and 
the people they worked amongst Great Zimbabwe became conceived of as not only an example of past 
African achievement and historical legitimacy as oudined by the nationalist parties, but also as a sacred 
site of national importance. The degree of variation among accounts, whereby Great Zimbabwe can be 
seen as a place where nationalist leaders consult ancestors, or as a place where spirit mediums from 
around the country would gather to strategise, is testament to the fact that this dimension of the site's 
importance to nationalism emerged from varied local discourses. As Fontein notes, 'in this process, these 
'original' and 'authentic' imaginings were taken a great deal further by guerrillas and the 'traditionalists' 
they co-opted than most of the 'western-educated' and thoroughly 'modern' nationalist elite themselves 
would have gone' (Fontein, 2006: 147). 
A common refrain among nationalists during the war was that the povo, the masses, would have to be 
'conscientised', both in order to understand the political ideologies underpinning the nationalists plans for 
the country, and to build the 'unity' necessary to realise Zimbabwe's destiny as an independent and 
prosperous nation. As Mugabe reflected in 1982. 'The history of the national struggle for liberation as 
waged by my party, ZANU, has been the history of the mobilisation, conscientisation and direction of the 
broad oppressed masses as a national collectivity' (Mugabe, 1982: 1). But in the case of rural mobilisation 
we see how guerrillas had to negotiate already existing social and historical categories, and in doing so 
ensured that to some extent the dominant national discourse became hybridised when inculcating itself 
within local discourses of power and tradition. This is an important dimension to consider, that in terms 
of shaping the interpretation of symbols, institutions, and identities the dominant national discourse most 
10 Of course here the imagination is most powerfully applied to the idea of 'national' struggle. There is no denying 











often propagated by elites will of necessity interact with contesting discourses over the constitution of 
their representation II, 
As a dominant national discourse of historical and sacred legitimacy resonated and deepened in rural 
Zimbabwe during the war, so the identity of vana vevhu, meaning 'son of the soil', calcified as an identity 
within this narrative. Most commonly used to describe those who took part in the nationalist movement, 
and the guerrillas who fought in the war, it is, as Bhebe observed, a 'powerful emotive term' and a central 
part of the 'liberation culture and language' (Bhebe, 1989: 101). It is a national signifier that connotes an 
identity whose foundations are the imagined histories of the first and second Chimurenga, the spiritual 
legitimacy of those who fought in them, and the sanctity of the terrain they fought for. If 'the people' are 
a united and authentic African collectivity, their 'destiny' is to be realised through the vana vevhu, the 
historical liberators of the nation. At independence a specially printed banner was hung across the nation, 
and on it a picture of the Nehanda medium hovered above that of Mugabe, himself depicted upon the 
ruins of Great Zimbabwe. The image was common on clothes, posters, and pamphlets (Lan, 1985: 218), 
and is a fitting manifestation of the centrality of this potent symbolism to the imagination of the 
Zimbabwean nation. 
The Heroes after Independence 
In 1980, following the Lancaster House negotiations and the resulting national constitution, elections 
were held in Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF recorded a triumphant victory. The future of the guerrillas from 
the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the Zimbabwean People's 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), formed an important part of the negotiations, and a strategy was 
developed for the demobilisation of the guerrilla armies, the incorporation of combatants into a new 
national army, and a more general reintegration of combatants into Zimbabwean society. Norma Kriger's 
extensive study of this phase, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe, reveals how the identity of 'liberation 
hero' and the invocation of 'war credentials' were a constant symbolic means of legitimating claims to 
authority and res.ources. Throughout this period guerrilla appeals to government for rations, improved 
conditions, political support and jobs was centred on their identity as vana vevhul2• As she notes, 'At the 
11 This process is complex, and local imaginings of place and history are themselves open to hybridisation or are 
simply absent from official narratives. For a discussion of how in post-independence Zimbabwe local histories and 
sacred imaginings of the Great Zimbabwe ruins were marginalised by the 'professionalised' and 'objectifying' 
heritage management of the site by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) see Fontein 
(2006, 2009) 
12 This period was also marred with conflict between the two parties, and the very visible marginalisation of ZIPRA 
guerrillas is well documented. See Kriger, 2003, Alexander et al (2000) for more details. See below for a discussion 











end of the assembly phase, the demobilised guerrillas were established as a privileged group, largely 
stripped of their armed power but with a potent resource in their symbolic status as liberators and 
fighters' (Kriger, 2003: 67). 
Kriger notes that many guerrillas continued to use their noms de guerre after the demobilisation process, 
both in the army and workplaces (Kriger, 2003: 163). Pfukwa underlines the importance of this process 
by characterising Zimbabwean war names beyond the limited idea of a referential signifier, and as 'a social 
statement reflecting the bearer, the namer and the social environment within which the name is found' 
(pfukwa, 2003: 16). In this sense the war name was a means of affuming a specific identity, a renaming 
within the context of the second Chimurenga and the sacred quest for national liberation. War names 
often concealed regional or ethnic affiliation, renounced colonial categories and sought to develop new 
social and ideological orientation. 'The process of renaming opened up new possibilities, attributes and 
values, in addition to reshaping ideologies and creating new concepts of the self as well as redefining the 
groups within which the self operated' (pfukwa, 2007: 241). Names like Mbumburu (Bullets), Rwirai 
Nyika (Fight for the nation) and Chimedza Mabhunu (He who swallows white men), were a way of 
imagining 'the identity of the fighter as part of a wider social discourse that questioned the status quo and 
explored new political, social and cultural identities' (pfukwa, 2007: 245). The retention of war names in 
post-independence Zimbabwe was patt of a process in which the identity of 'national hero' was 
maintained, valorised and politically and materially recognised. 
When institutionally articulated, this identity became a legally protected status that endowed rights to 
resources, in the forms of demobilisation allowance, secure employment in the army, or employment 
opportunities and war pensions. As a legal and cultural identity it thus became an attractive prospect, and 
contestation for the right to be recognised as a 'hero' became prevalent. Kriger documents numerous 
accounts of fraudulent activities in the demobilisation period, as people posed as guerrillas to gain access 
to state-sponsored resources, or to acquire authority within workplaces and various bureaucratic divisions 
(Kriger, 2003: 88-91, 98, 118, 127). 
This drew forward a question that still resonates in Zimbabwe today: Who is a war hero? It was at this 
early point that government support and reward for ex-combatants over other war participants ­
detainees, political prisoners, members of rural communities who had provided support to the armies, 
teachers in training camps, to name just some - became visible, as privileges were almost entirely reserved 
for active combatants. These groups began to protest and afftrm the value of their participation in the 
struggle, and so contestation over identification became an important part of how the second Chimurenga 
was remembered and politically recognised in independent Zimbabawe13. The legal recognition of 
participation in the war was established as a means by which offtcial national histories could be widened 











to include new claimants, and so a means by which individuals could gain access to a powerful social 
category. The title of 'national hero' and the claim to liberation credentials, and so to enshrined national 
status, became an ongoing arena of contest over national recognition and resources, and a register of 
political legitimacy. 
The Commemorated Nation 
Soon after independence the government oversaw a policy of national reinscription of public space. The 
erasure of colonial symbols and monuments was widespread; roads and places were renamed, and many 
statues of colonial figures, such as that of Cecil Rhodes in Harare, were removed. In line with the 
reconciliation policy of the time (see the next chapter), only those symbols deemed politically 
controversial were removed. However Nathan Shamuyarira, then head of the National Monument 
Committee overseeing the project, revealed an interesting conceptualisation of the term 'reconciliation': 
'The occasion of removing statues and monuments and erecting new ones is not one of recrimination, 
. but rather a time of reconciliation - reconciling us to the reality of our independence, the death of 
colonialism and the national aspirations of the people. It is an occasion for the proper marriage of our 
past history and our dedication to the new social order' (Shamuyarira, quoted in I<riger, 1995: 141)14 
In this sense the policy of national inscription, the reclaiming of public space to reflect the newly 
determined nation, is a means of reconciling people with a new national history. It is the imagining of an 
appropriate, or 'proper' in Shamuriya's terms, presentation of histories that reflect the new 'social order'. 
In other words, an official national history of Zimbabwe is performed and reified through the creation of 
sites of memorial and commemoration, and this is seen as representative of the newly realised nation. 
Important in this process were the creation of two forms of national commemoration; the proclamation 
of two public holidays on August the lld> and 12th, called Heroes Days, and the construction of a Heroes 
Acre just outside Harare. The Heroes Acre contains walls painted with murals depicting the liberation 
struggle, a statue depicting three heroic guerrillas, a tower upon which sits the Eternal Flame of liberation, 
and a tomb of the Unknown Soldier. National iconography, from flags to images of the emblematic 
Zimbabwe Bird figure from Great Zimbabwe, is vividly present across the site15• The Heroes Acre 
official brochure explicitly links the site to the idea of a national collectivity based on the struggle against 
colonialism. Heroes Acre is: 




15 These observations are borrowed from Richard Werbner's article on Heroes Acre and memory in postcolonial 













'an expression as well as a symbol of the indefatigable collective will of Zimbabweans to be the makers of 
their own history, and to be their own liberators by participating in the protracted, arduous and bitter 
struggle for self-determination ... [it] arouses national consciousness, forges national unity and identity ... [it] 
is a symbol of the masses struggle for freedom that transcends tribalism, ethnicism, regionalism and 
racism' (Minis try ofInformation, 1996: 2) 
Despite this endeavour Heroes Acre reflects the struggle over the identity of 'national hero' by drawing 
interesting demarcations between those deserving of certain levels of sacralisation in the name of national 
history. The brochure states that those eligible for burial at the site will have: 
'laid down their lives for Zimbabwe to be born and for the masses to be liberated. They subordinated 
their individual interests to the collective interests of Zimbabwe as a whole ... Theirs was an unwavering 
support for the cause of freedom and justice for which they accepted and endured suffering and brutality 
with fortitude' (Ministry of Information, 1996: 5) 
However this became an act of self-memorialisation for the governing elite, as only members of the 
inner-circle of those nationalist figures who formed the first government of Zimbabwe were buried at the 
site (Kriger, 1995; Werbner, 1998). Their families receive state pensions and grants, and the heroes' 
funerals are entirely state sponsored. Former guerrillas and lesser party members are restricted to 
Provincial or Local hero status, and in many cases are expected to finance the funerals themselves. 
Heroes Acre thus reflects a grading system of heroes, a ranked set of distinctions in which nationhood, or 
national value, is distributed unequally. The political elite in control of the memorialisation process as 
Werbner puts it, 'sacralising an imprint of itself on the Zimbabwean landscape' (Werbner, 1998: 78). 
It is worth quoting Werbner's analysis here at length: 
'... one tension is represented at Heroes Acre by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the named, 
individualised tombstones of the distinguished heroes. The anonymous and empty Tomb is for all, and 
without distinction. Here nationality and citizenship are for all the people, and equality of sociality 
endures. Against that is the differentiated representation of the heroic dead in the individual tombstones. 
What Is memorialised is the distinction of the select few, a national elite. It is the unmistakable 
representation of a nation of - in Zimbabwean usage - the chifover the povo or masses, a nation of graded 
levels, subordinating the local to the national' 
It is important to remember that the national discourse has at its centre the identity ofthe 'hero', the 
sacred bearer of an ancient national destiny and symbol of the fight for the homeland. With this comes a 












Nehanda looking down upon his chosen successor, Mugabe, is resonant here. The elites' status as 
legitimate leaders of the nation, and the vehicle through which the masses can realise their sacred destiny, 
is temporally and spatially [!Xed through a state imposed system of commemoration and tribute in which 
some heroes are more legitimate than others. 
The state memorialisation process has also been subject to contestation. ZAPU, who in the early and late 
1980's was politically marginalised and its main area of support, Matabeleland, the subject of state 
imposed terror, consistently challenged the grading ofheroesl6• Most notably the renowned ZIPRA 
commander Lookout Masuku was not granted a state funeral at Heroes Acre, and this event along with 
other controversies over the bestowal of heroic status became a frame of reference by which ZAPU and 
other groups could contest the political authority of the ZANU elite, and so the party's historically 
granted legitimacy. By asking the question '\V'ho is a hero?' they are challenging the moral and political 
legitimacy of official national history and the practices of national elites. 
Conclusion 
What is interesting about the above observations is how the national discourse evolved in Zimbabwe on a 
set of contradictions that complicate any answer to the question: who belongs to the nation, and what 
part do they play within it? In one sense the nationalist parties imagined a nation in the form of their own 
political goals; majority rule, democracy, one-man one-vote, and a united citizenry. In this formulation 
the nation is not delimited, margins of nationhood are drawn widely. Rights are bestowed equally and 
legally. 
However, this vision of nationhood as citizenry is tempered by the discursive boundaries of an imagined 
Zimbabwe that is constructed as primordial through its temporal link to ancient civilisation. Here the 
discursive entity of the 'the people' is given an elemental character, an essentialised 'tradition' and cultural 
'Africaness'. It is presented as a modern manifestation of something prior to colonialism and Rhodesian 
rule, a united collective of the indigenous. Immediately we face a different idea of what constitutes the 
national subject, a different framework by which we can judge political practice, the granting of rights, 
and the allocation of resources. The discursive construction of an ancient and sacred nation, and a 
citizenry and political order defined by democratic values, is potentially fraught with contradiction and 
fragility. It offers different ways of thinking about what constitutes the national collective, and in doing 
so how members of this collective are identified in political practice. As we shall see this contradiction 
has been played out in the ways rights, citizenship and justice have been conceived ofin Zimbabwe. 











A mythological national history has also constructed an identity of 'national hero' as central to the 
imagining of the nation. This has taken two overlapping fonns. Firstly, the guerrillas are recognised 
within the national discourse as the spiritually ordained liberators of the nation, the vana vevhu. With this 
identity comes cultural and political status and moral authority. Secondly, through a process of official 
memorialisation and historical commemoration the political elite who gained control of the state have 
created a distinction between themselves and other national heroes. By placing themselves at the head of 
a hierarchy of national historical authority they have endowed political legitimacy on themselves as the 
valid leaders of the nation. This valorisation of heroic nationhood has created a site of contest whereby 
the legitimacy of political authority can be challenged by questioning who deserves the identity of the 














In this chapter I want to examine the question of 'national unity' within the national discourse. How it 
was conceived of, and practised, by the nationalist parties in power, was an important question in 
Zimbabwe in the 1980's and 1990's. 'Wbat is considered here is how a different meaning of 'national 
unity' became a central political principle once ZANU-PF came to power, one that moved beyond 
'national unity' as a people united as being Zimbabwean, and instead came to mean political unity as the 
recognition of ZANU-PF as rightful and legitimate representatives of the nation, its people and their 
interests. 
The second part of the chapter will focus on how the political and socioeconomic teleology of the 
nationalist movement - its policy agenda concerning economic development created different 
discursive representations and practices of some of the central identities and symbols at the heart of the 
national discourse. The pursuit of economic modernisation and technical development had important 
implications for the architecture of institutions, rights to land, and the state's role in controlling and 
ideologically defming social resistance to government policy. 
'National Unity' as a p~>litical principle 
As described in the previous chapter, national unity amongst the nationalist parties was not taken for 
granted. It was stressed as one of their fundamental aims. The idea of building 'national consciousness' 
was how 'the people' could be realised, and in itself became the justification for the legitimacy of the 
nationalist parties' pursuit of power: for the nationalist party to speak on behalf of 'everyone', they must 
endeavour to realise that 'everyone'. As the 1980 ZANU-PF constitution states, a central aspect of party 
policy is to 'Promote national consciousness and the unity of all of our people in pursuance of aims and 
objectives' (ZANU-PF, 1980). However, the historically endowed legitimacy of the ruling elite to lead the 
nation and pursue its destiny has seen a reinterpretation of the idea of 'national unity' beyond the idea of 
a national collectivity. 
The national discourse outlined the status of 'national hero', and in doing so placed the nationalist elites at 











unified, singular 'African people' through history, and within this narrative a set of leaders endowed with 
a sacred authority to represent their interests. They are not merely positioned as 'heroes', but as 
legitimate leaders, those figures who represent the wider interests of 'the people'. If the ruling elite are 
constructed within the national discourse as the 'rightful'leaders of the nation, then unity becomes not 
only a case of 'a people united through being Zimbabwean' but also as 'united in the support of the party 
that speaks on behalf of the Zimbabwean people, that represents them, and legitimately defines their 
historical destiny'. This interpretation had serious implications for Zimbabwean society, laying down a 
framework for some degree of racial tolerance through the policy of reconciliation, and, at the same time, 
violent state-sponsored terror. It was also a crucial rationale of the one-party state agenda pursued by the 
government17• 
The Conditions of Reconciliation 
At the dawn of independence ZANU-PF and the newly formed government began a stated policy of 
reconciliation, an approach that at one point saw Zimbabwe heralded as 'a model of racial reconciliation 
in a post-guerrilla war context' (Raftopoulos, 2004: viii). I quote here from Mugabe's much referenced 
speech on the evening of his party's victory in the 1980 national elections: 
'Surely this is now the time to beat our swords into ploughshares so we can attend to the problems of 
developing our economy and society ... I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new 
pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together, as 
Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and 
rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery' (M:ugabe, quoted in de Waal, 1990: 
46) 
17 I would argue that it is imperative to trace this meaning of 'national unity' back to the intra-party conflicts of the 
1960's and 1970's, what Masipula Sithole called 'the struggles within the struggle', although regrettably the length 
and scope of this study prevents this taking place here. Some of the factors often cited as explanations of these 
disputes include disagreements over lobbying for foreign support, the extent to which armed conflict should be 
pursued, ethnic factors, and the Sino-Soviet divide. For a reading that emphasises personality conflict and ethnicity 
see Sithole's Zimbabwe: Struggle; within the Struggle (1999) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008). For a study that interprets the 
major conflicts within the parties as the manifestations of a clear divide between Marxist and bourgeoisie elements 
of the emerging ruling class in Zimbabwe see Moore (1991). What needs to be considered is how the rival parties 
'spoke' for the nation, how their justifications to represent 'the people' were grounded in a renunciation of ethnic 
identity or particular interests, and how rival parties were represented as somehow outside of the nation, as 'ethnic' 
or as somehow 'selling out' the nation. In these representations we can begin to discover how the legitimacy of 
national leadership depended on how the led, 'the people', and their relationship to elites, were constructed. This I 











Mugabe further elaborated on the underlying logic of this approach: 
'Let us constitute a oneness derived from our common objective and total commitment to build a great 
Zimbabwe that will be the pride of all Africa. Let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a 
common interest that knows no race, colour or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single 
loyalty. Long live our freedom!' (Mugabe, quoted in Ministry of Information, 1980) 
Here the principle is clear; the 'oneness' of national unity must be derived from a 'total commitment' to 
building a great Zimbabwe that will alleviate the 'problems of developing our economy and society'. 
Reconciliation in this sense is the conflation of becoming 'Zimbabwean' with 'a single loyalty' to the aims 
and objectives of economic and social development. If we consider that the substance and protocols of 
this socio-economic project are laid down by the newly elected government then implicit in this 
fortnulation is the recognition that 'loyalty' is therefore also to those national elites who now hold power. 
National unity is the 'common interest' as represented by the nationalist elites. Here the distinctions 
between 'national unity' and 'national loyalty' become ill-defined, a blurring of the social markers of 
nationhood that has plagued Zimbabwe from the 1980's until today. 
It should be noted here that the reconciliation 'policy' was never exactly a government policy at all, in that 
there was no specific governing legislation, no programmatic plans or applied policies, and no institutions 
or bodies responsible for overseeing and monitoring. It is widely acknowledged that instead the policy 
was a calculated set of rhetorical statements, like those above, aimed directly at white members of the 
population18. 
Various interpretations exist that try to piece together the rationale for the policy of reconciliation. It can 
be seen as a pragmatic policy of national security used to placate the threat of internal disturbance by 
former members of the Rhodesian security forces, or the external threat of South African intervention 
(see de Waal, 1990), or political reassurance that sought to allay fears of retribution amongst the white 
community (Sachikonye, 2004; Moyo, 1992). At the same time it was a political necessity stemming from 
the constraints of the Lancaster House constitution, which protected property rights for 10 years, dictated 
that white-owned land had to be purchased by the government only under a 'willing buyer, willing seller' 
agreement, and guaranteed a white electoral monopoly of 20 seats in the 100 seat parliament 
(Raftopoulos, 1994; Alexander, 2006). For Herbst (1990) it constituted a tacit agreement between the 
ruling elite and whites that, although existing whites could stay and be free from discrimination and high 
levels of state interference in the private sector, their children would not face the same protection, and 
indigenisation of the economy and the public sector would intensify within a generation. 
18 It should be noted that there were a series of key political appointments of white figures, including the retention 











Although economic policy and state practice would have important implications for how whites were 
identified in Zimbabwe, as I discuss below, what I want to focus on here is how the rhetoric around 
reconciliation allowed for white entry into the social category of nationhood, and how implicit in this was 
the conflation of <national unity' and <national loyalty'. This entailed an erasure of the historical record, or 
a rearticulation of that record whereby whites, and white farmers, are no longer remembered as central to 
the colonial project that the nationalists fought against. They are no longer the enemy from whom the 
country was liberated. This must entail, as Blair Rutherford has pointed out, a form of anti-memory 
which cleanses present identities of past wrongs (Rutherford,2004: 552). The dismantling and erasure of 
colonial identifications could be seen in the systematic spatial reinscription process, whereby statues and 
memorials of colonial figures were removed by the government. But <forgetting' associations with a 
history of subjugation and exploitation was also a rhetorical device used by ZANU-PF, as exemplified in 
Mugabe's independence speech: 
<If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national 
interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love 
that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should 
seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven 
and forgotten' (Jvfugabe, quoted in Ministry of Information, 1980) 
Here the anti-memory over colonial complicity means a unity of <interest, loyalty, rights and duties', but in 
practice it meant a retraction of the white community from public politics and contestation. For a large 
part in the 1980's they concentrated on day-to-day business, and sometimes local government affairs, 
while relying on public pressure groups, such as the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries (CZI) and 
the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), to lobby the government behind the scenes (Rutherford, 2004: 
553; Moyo, 1992: 22; Herbst, 85, 137)19. 
This tacit understanding that there must be no political activity that would compromise the control of the 
governing party was disrupted in the 1985 elections, when the emergence of the Conservative Alliance of 
Zimbabwe (CAZ) under Ian Smith in 1985, widely seen as the reincarnation of the Rhodesian Front, saw 
the party win 15 of the 20 seats reserved for whites. The reaction by ZANU-PF was that this was against 
the inherent principles of reconciliation. Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of State for National 
Security, said: 
19 The power of these groups, far larger than other groups such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU), cannot be underestimated, and to a large extent they allowed for the continued prosperity and security of 











'the vote cast by the majority of the white electorate has shown us that the trust we placed in whites and 
our belief that they were getting reconciled to the new political order was a trust and belief that was not 
deserved... [Whites] have spilled the blood of thousands of our people ... The vote has proved that they 
have not repented in any way' (Mnangagwa, 1985, quoted in Kriger, 2005: 12) 
Again in 1990 Nathan Shamuyarira labelled those whites who planned to vote for Edgar Tekere's 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), then in an alliance with the CAZ, as 'anti-reconciliation'. Eddison 
Zvogbo put forward an image of the ZUM as simply the CAZ in disguise: 
'The Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith plunged us into war. When Smith realised he had lost the war he 
found some blacks to do his work for him. ZANU sought reconciliation after the war, but the RF did 
not die and so ... there's no such thing as ZUM, only CAZ' (Zvogbo, quoted in Kriger, 2005: 15) 
The fragility of the identity of the 'reconciled white' is exemplified by the ease with which past discursive 
identifications are brought forcefully into political rhetoric. Here the idea of reconciliation as unified 
loyalty is evident, most explicitly in Mnangagwa's assertion that reconciliation is about acquiescence to 
'the new political order', and in the absence of this compliance, the remembering of the death of 
thousands ofAfricans at white hands. 
Gukurahundi and the Dissidents 
From 1983 to late 1986 Matabeleland, and part of the Midlands, was the scene of escalating violence 
between various government agencies and small numbers of former guerrillas who had fled the 
demobilisation and integration scheme. In events described by Mugabe as Gukurahundi (the rain that 
washes away the chaff before summer rains) it is estimated that approximately 20,000 people lost their 
lives, most of them civilian supporters of ZAPU who were suspected of having allegiances to those who 
became known as the 'dissidents' (phimister, 2008: 197). 
These events had their origins in the history of hostility and competition between ZAPU and ZANU, and 
the regional patterns of recruitment and operation during the liberation war (Alexander et al, 2000: 181). 
After the elections in 1980 it became even clearer that political support followed the regional and ethnic 
lines established during the conflict, with ZAPU's membership and electoral constituency dominated by 
Ndebele speakers from Matabeleland and ZANU's broadly Shona speaking. The two parties had a long 
history of conflict after the party split in 1963, as well as a series of internal struggles and divergences. 
Armed conflict between ZIPRA and ZANLA was also prolific, in the field and in training camps in 











(Zimbabweans People's Army) when ZANLA guerrillas and the Tanzanian Defence Force disarmed and 
massacred a large number of ZIPRA ftghters (Kriger, 2003: 25; White, 2003). 
Many guerrillas from both armies refused to gather in designated Assembly Points (AP) to be integrated 
into the nascent ZNA (Zimbabwean National Army). Their reasons included fear that the Rhodesian 
Army would attack them, disagreement '\vith the terms of the setdement, the wish to campaign for their 
parties, or simply to return home (Alexander et aI, 2000). Reports of violence and looting by some 
guerrillas were widespread, and security forces were deployed to control and capture them. Although 
initially admonished by both parties, and labelled 'oudaws', 'unruly elements' and 'renegades', after the 
elections armed men on the loose in Matabeleland came to be known as 'dissidents', and their motives 
and the threat they presented were increasingly cast in political terms (Alexander et al, 2000: 185). 
Guerrillas were moved from rural AP's to urban areas, and clashes flared up between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA guerrillas. ZANU politicians in the new government increasingly couched their rhetoric in terms 
of the political threat posed by ZIPRA and ZAPU, with Mugabe noting 'very sinister undertones, a 
defmite organised pattern' to the violence (Alexander et al, 2000: 188). At an election rally in 1980 Enos 
Nkala, an Ndebele ZANU-PF Minister, declared that 'from today the PF [ZAPO] has declared itself the 
enemy of ZANU-PF' and encouraged supporters to form 'vigilante committees' to defend themselves 
against the perceived threat (Kriger, 2003: 77). Political discord between the parties continued and in 
1982, after arms caches were allegedly found at the homes of senior ZAPU politicians, Nkomo and other 
ZAPU ministers were sacked from the government. Senior ZIPRA commanders, including Lookout 
Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa, were arrested on charges of treason, and despite the dismissal of 
evidence in their court trials they remained in jail until 1986. 
As more ZIPRA guerrillas fearing persecution by the government and ZANLA fled into rural 
Matabelend, Nkomo and ZAPU were regularly charged with organising their activities as part of a 
choreographed effort to overthrow the government. This was despite consistent opposition by ZAPU to 
the desertions and the return to arms of their ZIPRA guerrillas. Tension and paranoia was only increased 
in 1982 when South Africa began operations aimed at destabilising the country, including the recruitment 
and arming of a group of Zimbabwean insurgents called Super ZAPU operating in Matabeleland, which 
only further legitimised ZANU-PF's military response. 
The violence in Matabeleland signiftcandy worsened '\vith the deployment of the notorious 5th Brigade, a 
North Korean trained unit direcdy answerable to the Prime Minister and explicidy intended for 'internal 
defence purposes'. Its political rationale was obvious in the purging of all ex-ZIPRA members from its 
ranks, and the chosen victims of its violent but systematic and organised campaign. In a widespread 











and thousands of civilians. The often grotesquely violent and harrowing nature of its activities is borne 
witness to in the individual testimonies of its victims (see CC]P, 1997). The 5th Brigade operated on a 
background of political rhetoric that justified the targeting of civilians on the grounds that 'We don't 
differentiate when we fight, because we can't tell who a dissident is', as Mugabe put it. It also equated 
support for ZAPU with support for dissidents. This was exemplified by Enos Nkala's 1983 threat that if 
you support ZAPU 'you will die or be sent to prison', a view advocated by several other government 
ministers (CC]P, 1997: 44). 
Despite the obvious ethnic dimension to the conflict, the political justifications were pivoted on a 
discourse of 'national unity' that polarised the characters of ZAPU and ZANU as self-interested and 
tribal on one hand, and national and unifying on the other. In April 1983 Minister of State Sydney 
Sekeramayi told a rally that 'the army will stay a long, long time ... the majority of people realise they have 
been misled by PF-ZAPU... [and] will understand the national character ofPF-ZANU' (CC]P, 1997: 54). 
At an election rally in 1985 Mugabe said that 'people in Matabeleland are being tortured, robbed and 
murdered because of the selfish political interests of DrJoshua Nkomo... I am asking you to vote for 
ZANU-PF because we want to be one people' (phimister, 2008: 209). 
Again in 1985 Mugabe went on to underline that the problems in Matabeleland were that the presence of 
ZAPU and the dissidents were themselves emblematic of national disunity, and stood in the way of 
people understanding that they were a coalescent aspect of an inevitable national collective: 
'It is really a pity that we are talking in terms of Matabeleland and the rest of the country ... Really the 
problem is Nkomo and ZAPU as I see it. Nkomo and ZAPU and the dissidents. Nkomo cannot accept 
a secondary role in our political order and so he must organise the people tribally, and if they cannot be 
organised tribally, he must set the dissidents on them so that they will do his will. We have been 
discussing this issue with the people of Matabeleland at various levels and there is no doubt in our mind 
that it's more the fact of the fear of the dissidents ... They [the people of Matabelenad] are not a strange 
people, they are not a foreign element - they are part and parcel of our population and we have interacted 
with them at various levels ... and we are satisfied that without ZAPU, without the dissident element, they 
will fall in line ... we do not distinguish them from people elsewhere. Their fate is intertwined with the 
fate of others. Their destiny is the same as the destiny of other people and we never talk in terms of 
Ndebeles, Shonas, Vendas, Tongas - we never do that... In fact we discourage that in our own political 
philosophy. The people in ZANU did not vote for me because they were against the Ndebeles ... 
Everywhere we went we told the people they were one, and so it is the oneness of the people we are 











We are reminded once again that through the national elites imagining of 'the people' they are discursively 
defined and delimitated as a collectivity; as tribe-less and monolithic in their 'oneness'. For ZANU-PF to 
speak for all of Zimbabwe it must realise this 'oneness' by constantly asserting it; they 'told the people 
they were one', and that ZANU-PF had 'a national character', and they must erase any imagining that 
subverts this unity, in this case the ruthless political ambition of Nkomo and his tendency to 'tribalise' the 
people of Matabeleland. To 'speak' in terms of sub-national identities is proscribed, only the national will 
be spokenzo. 
It is in these terms that the national discourse 'speaks' the people of Matabeleland into nationhood, 
through a representation of them as tribeless, homogenously Zimbabwean and so politically represented 
by ZANU-PF. The praxis of this articulation of nationhood is coercion and suppression, but it finds 
legitimacy in the.inevitable, the idea of a common 'destiny' and 'fate'. Mugabe is telling supporters of 
ZAPU that they are part of this destiny, this is his knowledge which he inust share with them. The 
implication is that national destiny is interpreted by ZANU-PF, the only legitimate leaders of the nation21 . 
In this case loyalty to ZANU-PF becomes a marker of nationhood, a standard by which citizens can be 
seen to have realised their 'oneness' and common destiny. The 1980 election poster that states ZANU­
PF V ANHU, VANHU lZANU-PF (ZANU-PF is the people, the people are ZANU-PF) is perhaps 
telling of the inherent logic of this formulation. For ZAPU and the people of Matabeleland, and the 
white supporters of CAZ or ZUM, political disloyalty brings forth discursive representations that cast 
dissenters as exterior to the nation, somehow outside of that defined as inescapable and preordained. 
If the national discourse represented events in Matabeleland as a matter of unity and nationhood, this 
exclusion or silencing of ethnic interpretations was not mirrored amongst communities at the receiving 
end of its violent practice. In their extensive social history of Matabeleland, Alexander, McGregor and 
Ranger (2000) note local memories of an almost entirely Shona 5th Brigade often making recourse to 
ethnic justifications for their use of violence. The events were interpreted as ethnic persecution: 
'[people] came to see the conflict not as one fought against the dissidents but against the Ndebele and 
ZAPU. In local accounts there is constant slippage between an emphasis on tribalism and on inter-party 
20 This silence in the national discourse over ethnic identity is symptomatic of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Muzondidya call the 'echoing silence' of ethnicityin Zimbabwe generally. 'Until recently, Zimbabweans have been 
conspicuously silent about questions of ethnicity. As in the colonial period, especially during the days of the 
nationalist liberation struggle, all attempts to discuss ethnic identities, especially their manifestation in the political 
and economic spheres, were brushed aside' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Muzondida, 2007: 276). 
21 One is reminded here of the ZANU-PF liberation song 'Zvinoziba neZANU', in which the people ask how they 
can defeat the Rhodesians and gain their independence, to which the chorus answer is Zvino:;jbwa neZANU (only 











conflict as the motive force behind the Fifth Brigade's violence ... people elided the categories ofNdebele 
and ZAPU: an attack on the Ndebele was an attack on ZAPU, an attack on ZAPU was an attack on the 
N debele ... The Fifth Brigades greatest 'success' may have been in hardening ethnic prejudice and in 
bolstering a strong identification between ethnicity and political affiliation' (Alexander et aI, 2000: 223) 
Drawing on interviews with former dissidents Alexander notes that they at once lamented what they saw 
as the ethnicisation of what had been an inclusive political project, and justified raids into Shona areas on 
the grounds that the government was persecuting Ndebele people (Alexander, 2004: 170). In their 
important report into the civil strife of the 1980's The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) 
also concluded that it 'hardened' ethnic identifications and brought a broad feeling of alienation from the 
national body politic (CCJP, 1997: 59-60). The irony here is that, to paraphrase Richard Werbner, the 
insistence on and enforcement of a de-ethnicised national unity 'fed and in turn was fed by its antithesis, 
the polarisation of... two super-tribes, the Shona against the Ndebele' (Werbner, 1991: 159). 
There has been a noticeable increase in Ndebele cultural organisations in the region since the 
disturbances, and a continuing discourse around ideas of political reform to introduce federal government 
or even an independent Ndebele state (Raftopoulos, 1994: 19). Ndlovu-Gatsheni has traced the 
genealogy of what he calls 'Ndebele particularism' in the historical construction of N debele ethnicity. He 
finds that the massacres in Matabeleland have been a more modern occurrence in a sequence of events 
that have historically galvanised a long-standing trend of Ndebele self-determination. This sequence has 
continued to manifest itself in radical Ndebele cultural and political organisations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2008: 119-122). We are reminded that the premise of Zimbabwean nationhood, the idea that there exists 
a definable national community, was not settled by the imaginings of the nationalist elites. Instead the 
silences of the national discourse, its inability to speak ethnicity as social category within Zimbabwe, and 
its authoritarian practices, form a kind of exclusion that has the potential to imbricate itself into the series 
of historical processes that have shaped and produced ethnic identification. 
The One-Party State 
The Unity Accord of 1987 that saw ZAPU subsumed into ZANU-PF led the new united party to declare 
once again that it would seek to establish a one-party state in Zimbabwe (Unity Accord, 1987). In 1990 
the restrictions of the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement, which guaranteed the rights of people 
to form and join political parties, would no longer be in place and ZANU-PF could begin to work 
towards the completion of an agenda that it had begun to set in the early 1980's (Moyo, 1991: 83). With 
ZAPU now no longer legally active the electoral threat of Matabeleland, which they had won comfortably 











As the likelihood of a one-party state increased so the debates around its suitability to Zimbabwe began 
to flourish amongst party members and Zimbabwean intellectuals. Academics began to analyse the 
historical and ideological foundations of the concept, situating it in a wider African and global tradition 
with a variety of antecedents and explanatory factors. Many observers sought a materialist critique in 
which a petit-bourgeoisie scramble to keep other factions from the political power that allows for 
personal accumulation (Zimunya, 1991; Musarurwa, 1991; Mutambara, 1991). Others interrogated the 
justifications that presented one-party rule as the modern manifestation of ancient and authentic forms of 
African social organisation (Sithole, 1989; Mandaza, 1991; Nabudere, 1989). Drawing from Nyerere's 
Ujamma, this discourse seeks to find pre-colonial precedents for the one-party state in traditional social 
organisation, and saw ZANU-PF cite the idea that in an African community there is 'only one chief' 
(Nabudere, 1989: 3; Meyns, 1989: 184). These critics broadly found that these ideas of historical lineage 
were largely inaccurate affectations, pointing out that there were nothing like the very modern forms of 
party and state found in the African past, and that pre-colonial social structure could often be exploitative 
and undemocratic. 
For Sithole (1991) and Mandaza (1991) the Leninist idea of the one single authentic vanguard party is an 
important foundation for the one-party state in Socialist African countries and had significant influence in 
Zimbabwe. Sithole argued that democratic centralism as a form of deliberation and debate is a resonant 
form of political organisation to nationalist parties whose allegiance was often with the Soviet Union and 
China, but it could easily be manipulated to serve the interests of those who propose it. Mandaza also 
asserts that implicit theoretical justification for one-party state rule could be found in the 'modernisation 
thesis', with its emphasis on unity and strong leadership to counter the inevitable instability and strife that 
occurred as developing countries moved towards a Western model of development (Mandaza, 1991: 22­
23). 
These analyses are undoubtedly relevant to the Zimbabwean case, and illustrate the complex origins of 
the drive for the one-party state in Africa. However, as Meyns and Moyo (1991) point out, the 
justifications given for the one-party state in Zimbabwe were most commonly embedded in the discourse 
around 'national unity' and were a continuation of the agenda that sought to remove alternative centres of 
political support, most obviously ZAPU. At the centre of the debate around the one-party state in 
Zimbabwe was the 'aim of maintaining and consolidating national unity' (Meyns, 1989: 185), a concept 
deemed by Moyo to be considered 'sacrosant' by ZANU-PF (Moyo, 1991: 89). 
In 1984 Mugabe stated: 
'We must be nationally united and therefore it is necessary that we show this image to our people, the 











of opinion can be accommodated ... We will not go about a one-party state in an arbitrary manner. We 
realise that we have various opinions in the country - we have various ethnic groups; we have different 
races, different religious bodies and men of different religious persuasions and that therefore from a 
political view it is necessary that we try to cater for these heterogeneous opinions of our people, but we 
do that under a homogeneous arrangement that recognises that ftrst and foremost we are one Zimbabwe' 
(M:ugabe, 1984, quoted in Meyns, 1989: 185) 
Here again we see the desire to 'show' the people of Zimbabwe their 'oneness', to illustrate it in order to 
realise it The 'best way' of doing so is through a political apparatus that reflects the position of ZANU­
PF as the legitimate embodiment of the nation, and as the bearer of its destiny, the 'umbrella' under 
which people gather. At the same time the one-party state produces a system of governance that ensures 
that any opinion stemming from a sub-national identity or affiliation is subsumed under a 'homogeneous 
arrangement', a way of ensuring that these concerns must be of a national nature. It is an institutional 
composition under which contestation and deliberation can take place, and interests can be represented, 
without galvanising other forms of social and political identiftcation, and so without threatening the unity 
of all Zimbabweans. It also recognises and preserves the only legitimate incarnation of 'one Zimbabwe', 
ZANU-PF. 
The 1985 ZANU-PF election manifesto illustrates that within this discourse is a logical causal relationship 
between an institutional arrangement that preserves national unity and the fulftlment of the task of 
economic and social development: 
'Unity is our ftrst task towards the attainment of a just society where everyone's needs will be met. 
Zimbabwe will only develop when colour, tribe, sex, language and region are no longer of consequence in 
determining how our wealth is to be distributed ... That is why, in line with our Second Congress 
Resolution, we pledge to work towards the attainment of a One-Party State ... That is why ZANU-PF 
seeks to bring all Zimbabweans under its umbrella so that there is only One Leader the Party - for One 
Zimbabwe... we shall establish one party to represent the interests of all working people in Zimbabwe, all 
those who seek to abolish the exploitation of man by man and bring about justice for all' (ZANU-PF, 
1985: 5) 
Here national unity in the form of the one-party state is explicidy regarded as the condition under which 
the nation can realise its developmental goals. However it was in the discourses around modernisation 
and development, and the consolidation of state authority, that alternative representations and practices 
emerged that were often contrary to the symbols and identities of the national discourse. 













and its Heroes 
The rise of mass nationalism in Zimbabwe had as its background a diverse political culture, with a large 
variety of associational activity and political formation. Despite this fact the emerging national discourse 
rested on two dominant conceptions of what constituted 'the people' of Zimbabwe. Firstly they were 
imagined as a democratic citizenry, reflecting the political goals of the nationalist movement. But, at the 
same time, a discourse developed around a 'united African' as a national subject. 1b.is primordial figure 
of native authenticity became historically located in an emerging narrative of an 'African' people. 
Beginning in Great Zimbabwe it progressed into an unbroken thread of African resistance against 
colonialism, and the struggle against Rhodesian rule became known as the second Chimurenga. 
This narrative has at its centre the image of the 'national hero', sacredly endowed with historical 
legitimacy to lead the nation to its destiny of self-determination. This status has been reified through a 
system of official memorialisation and historical commemoration, and with it a hierarchy of historical 
authority and political legitimacy has been discursively constructed. The leaders ofZANU-PF have been 
placed at its summit, but at the same time the status of 'national hero' wields significant political currency 
to those who seek to challenge this historical legitimacy. 
The emerging 'Zimbabwe' 
In his work on the formation of a ruling political class in Zimbabwe David Moore points to a quote that 
illustrates how in the late 1940's and early 1950's a small, mission school educated, African elite began to 
illustrate the beginnings of a collective identity ofAfricans living in Southern Rhodesia based upon 
national political goals. Quoting from an early Goromonzi school magazine we can see the beginnings of 
a Zimbabwean 'consciousness' based on an idea of a nation-wide polity: 
'(if we) desert our people, who will teach and uplift them? .. Only if all educated Africans do their bit to 
improve their small comer and each unites with the others, fighting the same battle, will we attain the 











The political future of this generation lay in the nationalist patties of the 1950's and 1960's, but the origins 
of pan-territorial nationalism are widely regarded to be found further back in history, in the different 
interrelations between various earlier forms of political organisation from the late 19th century onwards. 
From the Matabele Homeland Society (MHS) that sought an ancestral homeland within the remit of the 
colonial state, to the Young Ethiopian Manyika Society that campaigned for the rights of their native 

t-hiMat!Jika language in the face of colonial language harmonisation policies, to the nascent trade union 

organisations like the Federation of Bulawayo African Trade Unions (FBATU), a complex network of 

. political formations emerged in colonial Southern Rhodesia that were part of an ongoing process of the 

intercession and configuration of political identity. Included in this were organisations that had already 
begun to operate on a nationwide political basis, including the Southern Rhodesia Bantu Congress 
(SRBC), a conservative organisation fighting for voting and economic rights for those members of the 
African community able to compete with Europeans (West, 2002). Enocent Msindo observes that: 
'Southern Rhodesians of the early 1950's might not have defined themselves as nationalists, nor had they 
imagined a named nation and its social boundaries. They were not technically Zimbabweans. They had 
many identities that at times fed into each other, including those based on ethnicity, region, gender and 
trade union membership' (Msindo, 2007: 273-4) 
Although they had in common a genesis provoked through lived encounters with colonial policy, from 
forced removals to taxation, these social formations drew on various discourses to articulate political 
demands. These included the appropriation and channelling of localised religious histories into rural self­
help societies, the pan-African radicalism of Marcus Garvey, and liberal democratic discourses derived 
from international connections to The British Fabian society, the liberal movement in Cape Town and the 
civil rights movement in the USA6. 
As the historical literature on pre-1950's Rhodesia demonstrates it is difficult and even unnecessary to 
attempt to identify a linear trajectory from early associationallife to broader based nationalism, and more 
helpful to conceive of the emergence of a complex and constantly negotiated indigenous political culture 
which provided the organisational and societal grounds for the rise of nationalism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
6 There is an extensive historical and historiographical literature on political fonnations in pre and post-war 
Rhodesia. For an analysis of the impact of Garveyism in Zimbabwe see West, 2002b. For a comprehensive history 
of the rise of a heterogeneous, urban black middle class into nationalist politics see West, 2002a. For a history of 
early liberalism and democracy in urban Rhodesia see Scameccia, 2008. For a historical analysis of the formation of 
political identity and nationalism in rural Matabeleland see Ranger, 1999; Alexander, McGregor, Ranger, 2000. For a 












highlights the unevenness of this process, citing numerous examples of members seamlessly moving 
between different organisations, including ethnic, national and others, and exploring how these 
formations appropriated and adopted different discourses in an ongoing arbitration of a pluralistic 
political terrain (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 45-50). 
By the 1950's the educated elites described by Moore had become the dominant interlocutors of 
nationalism through the founding of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) in 
1957, a reconstituted SRBC, and, following its banning, the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1960 
(West, 2002: 207-218; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 51). The nationalist parties became a political home for an 
emerging African elite and often a site of discursive absorption of the array of grievances expressed by the 
organisations mentioned above, or simply subordinated smaller organisations and interest groups 
(Raftopoulos, 1999: 125-126). 
It is important to note here the obvious heterogeneous origins of nationalist political formation, and the 
implication that any coherent articulation of nation-ness by it would have to necessarily represent a 
diverse community of identities, whether ethnic or politicaL Despite this Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes how 
the SADC, the NDP and later the Zimbabwean African People'S Union (ZAPU) in 1961, as well as the 
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) after ZAPU's split in 1963, all afftrmed a presumed 
notion of united citizenship under democratic rule. From the liberal democratic idea of citizenship under 
the SRANC, to the one-man-one-vote solution to colonialism espoused by ZAPU and ZANU, the 
nationalist parties presented an idea of 'the people', but more often than not did so in the language of 
democratic rule. For example the 1965 constitution of ZAPU begins with: 
A. 	 Aims and objective: 
1. 	 To establish the policy of one-man-one-vote as the basis of government in this country. 
11. 	 To maintain the spirit of democracy and love of liberty among the people of Zimbabwe. 
iii. 	 To unite the African people so that they liberate themselves from all forms of 
imperialism and colonialism. 
IV. 	 To fight relendessly for the elimination of all forms of oppression. 
v. 	 To create conditions for the economic prosperity of the people under a government 
based on the principle of one-man-one vote. 
VI. 	 To foster the development of the best values in African culture and traditions, so as to 
establish a desirable order. 
(ZAPU, 1968) 
ZANU, despite emphasising differences between the two major nationalist parties, presented a similar 











radical... it deftned itself just like ZAPU as 'a non-racial union of all the peoples of Zimbabwe who share a 
common destiny and a common fate believing in the African character of Zimbabwe and democratic rule 
by the majority regardless of race, colour, creed or tribe" (ZANU, 1963, quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2008: 80). The national parties began to speak of 'a people' as a discursive entity, a ftxed unitary populace 
on whose behalf they spoke, but what is important here is that the contours and character of this entity is 
defined in two ways. Central to these deftnitions are the recurring themes of democracy, unity and 'the 
African people', and there are significant tensions between them. 
Firstly Zimbabwe is presented as a political community that must be fought for, under which a 
democratic dispensation will allow for a minimal delimitation of who 'the people' are. In this case, a non­
racial, democratic imagining of Zimbabwean-ness allows for the formulation of a united citizenship, 
above other forms of identity like ethnicity, associational membership or race. In this case the nation 
itself is conceived of as a democratic political community; firstly it is a democratic citizenry under one­
man one-vote, but at the same time it is a unified collective in that the political premise of democratic, 
independent rule unites 'the people' above and beyond other identities present within the territorial body 
which they seek to liberate. 
This is the nationalism espoused by Ndabaningi Sithole, the founder and first leader of ZANU, in his 
1959 book Afri("t1n Nationalism. Aimed mainly at a sceptical Western audience, it sought to portray 
nationalism as not against whites but against white supremacy in order to seek a society that looks beyond 
race and tribe and is built on democratic ideals of freedom and equality (Sithole, 1968). The model is, in 
Chaterjee's sense, largely 'derivative', drawing from the one-man one-vote model of British parliamentary 
rule. This translates into majority rule, but the meanings of majority rule had connotations of rule by the 
majority racial group: rule by Africans. Joshua Nkomo, leader ofZAPU, understood this, and asserted 
that majority rule 'meant' non-racialism and democracy. To be a national subject was largely defined by 
being a voter in a democratic society: 
'There is talk by some people that 'majority rule' means rule by Africans only; that Africanisation will 
deprive Europeans of their jobs and that there will be a general lowering of standards. To us. majority rule 
means the extension of political rights to all people so that they are able to elect a Government of their 
own choice, irrespective of race, colour or creed of the individual forming such a government. All that 
matters is that a Government must consist of the majority party elected by the majority of the country's 
voters' (Nkomo, 1964, quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008) 
However, present in the early mission statements of the nationalist parties is a pervasive image of 
'Africans' and 'African people' as a collectivity. In stressing the need for unity amongst Africans, the 











the premise on which the nationalist parties operate. To put it differendy, a united community of 
'Africans' is desirable and unity must be encouraged to truly realise this, and we, the nationalists, speak on 
behalf of that realisation, that future community. In speaking on its behalf they are thus creating the 
discursive boundaries, symbols and histories which define its emerging form. Although the democratic 
ideals form part of this, the heavy emphasis on 'African character', 'African people' and 'the best values in 
African culture and traditions' being used 'to establish a desirable order', begin to reveal a deepening of 
this idea of collectivity beyond notions of a united democratic community. At the same they reveal 
inconsistencies and tensions over what is meant by 'the people'; are they a united citizenry under a 
democratic dispensation, or does 'majority rule' under this system in fact connote a different conception 
of 'the people', a united community of 'Africans' that creates a new 'order'? If so what constitutes this 
'people', and their 'African character'? 
A central symbol for this presentation of 'African' collective unity was the naming of the country 
Zimbabwe, explicidy endorsed in the tides of the leading nationalist parties. 1vfichael Mawema is generally 
recognised as using the term Zimbabwe as a signifier of the nation for the ftrst time when addressing a 
rally of supporters sometime in the early 1960's, when he was president of the NDP (Fontein, 2006; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni,2008). The archaeological site carries great historical valence as the embodiment of 
past African achievement, and is generally interpreted as 'national' heritage. As Robert Mugabe noted 
when opening an extension to the Great Zimbabwe Site Museum in 1988: 
'Great Zimbabwe is an important symbol for it shows this generation what we as a people were capable 
of achieving. It encourages us to reach for greater heights in our ftght to rebuild Zimbabwe' (quoted in 
Fontein, 2006: 119) 
At the point of its adoption it also carried great signiftcance as a site of contestation over national 
belonging. In his extensive anthropological study of Great Zimbabwe Fontein notes that various 
nationalists and academics point to the fact that the adoption of Zimbabwe as the name of the country in 
waiting was a reaction against Rhodesian appropriation of its history. From the late 19th century onwards 
various archaeologists and historians had put forward foreign origin myths for Great Zimbabwe. These 
theories, and the challenges they received from other academics, are collectively known as the 'Zimbabwe 
controversy' (Fontein, 2006: 3-13). Kaarlshom (1989) and Chennels (1996) works on Rhodesian setder 
discourses point out the narrative strategy of Rhodesian nationalism which deftned Rhodesian identity as 
a reaction to constructed ideas of black inferiority and primitiveness (part of the environment rather than 
a social entity). The institutionalisation of foreign origin stories of Great Zimbabwe as offtcial history by 
the colonial state points to the symbolic myth of Great Zimbabwe as an early white civilisation as a key 
element of this discourse. Karlshomm thus argues that according to this narrative the Rhodesians were 











civilisation was defeated by hordes of black savages became an allegory for the settler community itself 
(K.arlshomm, 1989). As Great Zimbabwe became an important symbol for the nationalist movement, the 
'Zimbabwe controversy' returned in a new wave of Rhodesian revisionist literature in the 1960's and 
1970's that attempted to reassert the sites foreign origins (Fontein, 2006: 122-123). 
The naming of Zimbabwe was then also seen as a reclamation of the origins of the nation, and allegorical 
of the independence struggle itself. In this sense the ruins became a meanirigful trope by which the 
collective 'people' could be imagined as a historically valid entity. 
The second Chimurenga 
During the period of Great Zimbabwe's elevation to national symbolism within the liberation movement 
historians began to utilise oral histories in order to understand the African past, and many of these 
became central texts of the national discourse. By highlighting the past rebellions of ancestral figures like 
Chaminuka, Ambuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi against colonial rule, they traced a linear genealogy of 
African rebellion. Terence Ranger's Revolt in Southern Rhodesia (1967) was particularly influential in its 
focus on the roles played by Nehanda and Kaguvi in Mashonaland, and the Mwari cult in Matabelenad, 
and its exaggerated portrayal of Shona and Ndebele unity and popular resistance in the conflicts of 
1896/7. 
Written after Ranger was deported from Southern Rhodesia in 1963 for his part in the nationalist 
movement, the text has faced continuing criticism. First seriously undermined by the historical analysis of 
Beach and Cobbings in the late 1970'S7, opinion on Revolt in Southern Rhodesia widely conforms to Robins's 
characterisation of it as a nationalist 'praise text', and Ranger as one of the 'willing scribes of a celebratory 
African nationalist history that profoundly shaped official accounts of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle' 
(Robins, 1996: 76). The influence of this work in fixing a resonant national narrative linking the struggle 
for independence with earlier resistance cannot be underestimated. Ranger has detailed interesting 
examples where he suspects nationalist leaders used the names and histories displayed in his work to 
mobilise support for the nationalist struggle. A 1975 speech made by then ZANU leader Sithole is an 
example: 
'I greet you in the name of our brave and gallant heroes of the Chimurenga of 1896-7 who fell in the great 
cause of liberating this, our wonderful country, from foreign rule ...In the names of Mkwati, N ehanda, 
Kagubi, Mashagombe, Makoni, Kunwi-Nyandoro and others in Mashonaland, and I greet you in the 
names of Somabulana, Mlugulu, Dhliso, Siginyamatshe, Mpotswana, and others in Matabeleland who 
master-minded and prosecuted the first Chimurenga in Zimbabwe ... The fighters of the second Chimurenga 











of Zimbabwe now also have guns - the thing that makes all men the same size - and we are confident 
that those who defeated us in the fust Chimunnga will be defeated without fail.' (Ndlovu-Gtsheni, 2008: 
54) 
Ranger's work was part of a newly emerging character of the Zimbabwean national discourse whereby in 
the rural areas the spiritual authority of certain ancestors had become central tenets in the articulation and 
legitimisation of the struggle for independence. Fontein observes, 'As political mythology/theology with 
which to imagine a nation, and, importantly, to provide historical/ancestral precedence for the use of 
violence as a means with which to fight for and ultimately establish an independent Zimbabwe, the 
rebellions of the 1890's, the fust Chimurenga, became as important for Zimbabwean nationalism as Great 
Zimbabwe was in terms of providing a deep historical example of past African achievement and future 
aspiration' (Fontein, 2006: 143). Nationalist leaders began to refer to the independence struggle as the 
second Chimurenga, and acted out this historical connection to the past. In 1962 after arriving back from a 
trip abroad Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, was met at the airport by a ninety year old veteran of the 
1867 uprisings who ceremoniously handed over to him a war-axe, sword and knobkerrie, and asked of 
Nkomo to 'Take this sword and these other weapons ofwar, and with them fight the enemy to the bitter 
end' (Ranger, 1967: 385; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 57). 
Fontein points to an important passage in Revolt in Southern Rhodesia where Ranger quotes the writings of 
nationalist politician Nathan Shamuyarira: 
'Mr Shamuyarira goes on to describe how the National Democratic Party ... 'added one important factor 
that had been singularly missing in Rhodesian nationalism: emotion'. He described their mass meetings, 
the prayers to Chaminuka, 'thudding drums, ululation by women dressed in national costumes, and 
ancestral prayers'. 'In rural areas meetings became political gatherings and more social occasions where 
old friendships were renewed and new ones made, past heritage was revived through prayers and 
traditional singing with African instruments, ancestral spirits invoked to guide and lead the new nation ... 
Christianity and civilisation took a back seat, and new forms of worship, new attitudes were thrust 
forward dramatically ... the spirit pervading the meetings was African, and the desire was to put the 
twentieth century in an African context'. These meetings he tells us, had an emotional impact 'that went 
far beyond claiming to rule the country - it was an ordinary man's participation in creating something 
new, a new nation" (N. Shamuyarira, 1965: 28-31 quoted in Ranger, 1967: 384-5) 
Shamuyarira's descriptions ofNDP rural meetings display how the invocation of the sacred ancestors was 
an important aspect of the national discourse. W'hat is also evident is the performance of a cultural 
nationalism that finds its origins in a distinctly African past. The discursive entity of the 'Zimbabwean 











is Shamuyarira's seemingly contradictory description of the 'new attititudes' of a 'new nation' in the 
context of the revival of 'past heritage', 'traditional singing' and 'ancestral spirits'. His 'emotion' in this 
case seems to be the valence of Africanist authenticity, whereby the newly imagined nation is realised as 
novel and old at the same time, a modern formulation of ancient indigenous culture and purpose. This 
authenticity is performed in the sense that it was to some extent adopted by nationalist elites as part of a 
wider image of 'authenticity'. We must remember that the ceremonies in which Shamuyarira took part 
may have had distinctly local characteristics, but in a national discourse that conceives of a 'united 
African' national subject these particularities become themselves 'African' rather than of a distinctive 
place, ethnicity or culture. 
The performance of authenticity began to take hold amongst nationalists in the 1960's, as leaders like 
Nkomo and Leopold Takawtta sported traditional animal skins and fur hats, and the NDP explicitly 
began to encourage its followers to use African instruments in party songs, wear traditional cloths and 
shoes, and to drink water from Zimbabwean water pots instead of cups and jars8 (Msindo, 2007: 269; 
Bhebe, 1989: 101). The national discourse thus conceived of a collectivity presumed to be united through 
authenticity as Africans, connected through a lineage of indigenous struggle against political and cultural 
exploitation, and legitimated by sacred authority. Needless to say, this quality of the national discourse 
has profound implications for how identities are imagined in Zimbabwe and how historical validity 
confers national heroic status on the bearers of nationalism itself. 
Guerrillas as Vana Vevhu 
Rural mobilisation during the armed struggle phase of the fight for independence in Zimbabwe is an area 
that has had significant attention paid to it amongst academics. Terence Ranger has alerted us to how 
studies have demonstrated that rural nationalism was often partly autonomous of the larger movement. 
A significant part of this is down to its periodisation; after the ban on the nationalist parties in 1964 urban 
nationalist activity pretty much stopped but in the rural areas the ban was less easy to enforce. After 
guerrillas began inftltrating Rhodesia from neighbouring countries they did so almost entirely in rural 
areas (Ranger, 2003: 7). In doing so they interacted with local rural communities in varying ways, 
producing different patterns of mobilisation, conflict and resistance. 
This latter observation is most obvious in the lively debate and conflicting interpretations over rural 
mobilisation and ideological support for the nationalist movement during the liberation war. David Lan, 
in his work Guns and Rain, sought to demonstrate how the close associations between mhondoro spirit 
mediums and guerrillas saw the guerrillas incorporated into existing spiritual narratives over land and 
8 It is interesting to note that a young Robert Mugabe, who joined the NDP in 1960, is often attributed a prominent 











conflict. As the modern manifestations of the mhondoro spirits, guerrillas found legitimacy for their violent 
struggle focussed strongly on the symbolic importance of rights to land (Lan, 1985). In Ranger's Peasant 
Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe rural experiences of colonial conquest, land alienation and 
authoritarian state practices provided the grounds for nationalist mobilisation (Ranger, 1985). Central to 
this was a revival of support for spirit mediums, who Ranger argued were symbols of 'the fundamental 
right of the peasantry to the land', and their collaboration with guerrillas (Alexander, 1996: 176). These 
works have come under heavy criticism from scholars, most notably Norma Kriger in her work 
Zimbabwe's Guemlla War. Peasant Voices. She emphasises the importance in recognising varying agendas 
and internal struggles in the peasantry, and, most provocatively, how guerrillas often used coercion as a 
means of mobilisation (Kriger, 1992). Maxwell (1999) and Daneel (1995) have sought to emphasise local 
agendas, the varying status and approaches of different guerrillas, and how the church also played an 
important role in galvanising local support for the nationalist struggle9• 
What these studies demonstrate is the sheer diversity, both regionally and amongst contingent factors, in 
the interactions between the peasantry, guerrillas, local institutions, narratives and ideologies. I want to 
focus on how the national discourse outlined above, whereby 'national' sacred figures like Nehanda and 
Chaminuka were seen as the spiritual antecedent of the second Chimurenga, was played out, interacted and 
furthered at a local level. In doing so it is possible to understand how 'authentic' imaginings of past and 
present national heroes had important implications for the identity and political status of the nationalist 
elites and guerrillas both pre- and post-independence. 
In their training camps the guerrillas received not only military and political education, but were also told 
of the nationalist mythology linking their struggle to those of their ancestors. An interview between Joost 
Fontein and a former guerrilla describes this process, noting the famous prophecy attributed to Ambuya 
Nehanda before she was hanged in 1897: 
'When we were in the camps in Mozambique we were given political education ... we were told about how 
Sekuru Kaguvi, and Ambuya Nehanda led the struggle to fight against those new colonisers, and the 
heroics they performed ... You know it actually inspired us, because they were very brave, and for the 
simple reason that they were fighting for their country. So there was a phrase that she [Ambuya 
Nehanda] said, when she was being hanged. 'Our bones will rise, you can kill me now, but our bones will 
rise against you'. As I speak that phrase it sort of gives you an inexplicable feeling of wanting to take it 
from there and go forward, you see? So the inspiration was that, 'My bones will rise', and we were told 
that we were the bones, the very bones that Ambuya was saying' (VaKanda, 2001, quoted in Fontein, 
2006: 144) 











Here we see how the national discourse not only draws a linear history between the 'country' ofNehanda 
and Kaguvi - although records suggest that no such 'country' existed at that point and the struggle for 
Zimbabwe, but also confers a spiritual sanctity upon those taking part in the liberation war; it constructs 
an identity with preordained status and legitimacy, based upon an imagined tradition of national self­
determination and struggle10• Central to this identity is the winning, both symbolic and political, of the 
land, the historical terrain of struggle on which the battle for Zimbabwe has taken place. 
Lan (1985), Ranger (1985) and Fontein (2006) have demonstrated how this mythology, strongly 
advocated by political elites, was furthered by guerrillas in rural areas during the struggle. As well as 
paying homage to their 'national' ancestral figures like Nehanda, guerrillas worked closely with local spirit 
mediums, and in doing so were incorporated into distinctively local narratives of traditional ancestry, and 
were granted access to sacred places usually only accessible by the elders and mediums of that specific 
area (Lan, 1985; Daneel, 1995). Fontein has shown how through the connections drawn by guerrillas and 
the people they worked amongst Great Zimbabwe became conceived of as not only an example of past 
African achievement and historical legitimacy as outlined by the nationalist parties, but also as a sacred 
site of national importance. The degree ofvariation among accounts, whereby Great Zimbabwe can be 
seen as a place where nationalist leaders consult ancestors, or as a place where spirit mediums from 
around the country would gather to strategise, is testament to the fact that this dimension of the site's 
importance to nationalism emerged from varied local discourses. As Fontein notes, 'in this process, these 
'original' and 'authentic' imaginings were taken a great deal further by guerrillas and the 'traditionalists' 
they co-opted than most of the 'western-educated' and thoroughly 'modern' nationalist elite themselves 
would have gone' (Fontein, 2006: 147). 
A common refrain among nationalists during the war was that the pava, the masses, would have to be 
'consdentised', both in order to understand the political ideologies underpinning the nationalists plans for 
the country, and to build the 'unity' necessary to realise Zimbabwe's destiny as an independent and 
prosperous nation. As Mugabe reflected in 1982. 'The history of the national struggle for liberation as 
waged by my party, ZANU, has been the history of the mobilisation, consdentisation and direction of the 
broad oppressed masses as a national collectivity' (Mugabe, 1982: 1). But in the case of rural mobilisation 
we see how guerrillas had to negotiate already existing social and historical categories, and in doing so 
ensured that to some extent the dominant national discourse became hybridised when inculcating itself 
within local discourses of power and tradition. This is an important dimension to consider, that in terms 
of shaping the interpretation of symbols, institutions, and identities the dominant national discourse most 
10 Of course here the imagination is most powerfully applied to the idea of 'national' struggle. There is no denying 











often propagated by elites will of necessity interact with contesting discourses over the constitution of 
their representationll• 
As a dominant national discourse of historical and sacred legitimacy resonated and deepened in rural 
Zimbabwe during the war, so the identity of vana vevhu, meaning 'son of the soil', calcified as an identity 
within this narrative. Most commonly used to describe those who took part in the nationalist movement, 
and the guerrillas who fought in the war, it is, as Bhebe observed, a 'powerful emotive term' and a central 
part of the 'liberation culture and language' (Bhebe, 1989: 101). It is a national signifier that connotes an 
identity whose foundations are the imagined histories of the first and second Chimurenga, the spiritual 
legitimacy of those who fought in them, and the sanctity of the terrain they fought for. If 'the people' are 
a united and authentic African collectivity, their 'destiny' is to be realised through the vana vevhu, the 
historical liberators of the nation. At independence a specially printed banner was hung across the nation, 
and on it a picture of the Nehanda medium hovered above that of Mugabe, himself depicted upon the 
ruins of Great Zimbabwe. The image was common on clothes, posters, and pamphlets (Lan, 1985: 218), 
and is a fitting manifestation of the centrality of this potent symbolism to the imagination of the 
Zimbabwean nation. 
The Heroes after Independence 
In 1980, following the Lancaster House negotiations and the resulting national constitution, elections 
were held in Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF recorded a triumphant victory. The future of the guerrillas from 
the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the Zimbabwean People's 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), formed an important part of the negotiations, and a strategy was 
developed for the demobilisation of the guerrilla armies, the incorporation of combatants into a new 
national army, and a more general reintegration of combatants into Zimbabwean society. Norma Kriger's 
extensive study of this phase, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe, reveals how the identity of 'liberation 
hero' and the invocation of 'war credentials' were a constant symbolic means of legitimating claims to 
authority and resources. Throughout this period guerrilla appeals to government for rations, improved 
conditions, political support and jobs was centred on their identity as vana vevhu12• As she notes, 'At the 
11 This process is complex, and local imaginings of place and history are themselves open to hybridisation or are 
simply absent from official narratives. For a discussion of how in post-independence Zimbabwe local histories and 
sacred imaginings of the Great Zimbabwe ruins were marginalised by the 'professionalised' and 'objectifying' 
heritage management of the site by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) see Fontein 
(2006, 2009) 
12 This period was also marred with conflict between the two parties, and the very visible marginalisation of ZIPRA 
guerrillas is well documented. See Kriger, 2003, Alexander et al (2000) for more details. See below for a discussion 











end of the assembly phase, the demobilised guerrillas were established as a privileged group, largely 
stripped of their armed power but with a potent resource in their symbolic status as liberators and 
fighters' (I<riger, 2003: 67). 
I<riger notes that many guerrillas continued to use their noms de guerre after the demobilisation process, 
both in the army and workplaces (I<riger, 2003: 163). Pfukwa underlines the importance of this process 
by characterising Zimbabwean war names beyond the limited idea of a referential signifier, and as 'a social 
statement reflecting the bearer, the namer and the social environment within which the name is found' 
(pfukwa, 2003: 16). In this sense the war name was a means of affirming a specific identity, a renaming 
within the context of the second Chimurenga and the sacred quest for national liberation. War names 
often concealed regional or ethnic affiliation, renounced colonial categories and sought to develop new 
social and ideological orientation. 'The process of renaming opened up new possibilities, attributes and 
values, in addition to reshaping ideologies and creating new concepts of the self as well as redefining the 
groups within which the self operated' (pfukwa, 2007: 241). Names like Mbumburu (Bullets), Rwirai 
Nyika (Fight for the nation) and Chimedza Mabhunu (He who swallows white men), were a way of 
imagining 'the identity of the fighter as part of a wider social discourse that questioned the status quo and 
explored new political, social and cultural identities' (pfukwa, 2007: 245). The retention ofwar names in 
post-independence Zimbabwe was part of a process in which the identity of 'national hero' was 
maintained, valorised and politically and materially recognised. 
When institutionally articulated, this identity became a legally protected status that endowed rights to 
resources, in the forms of demobilisation allowance, secure employment in the army, or employment 
opportunities and war pensions. As a legal and cultural identity it thus became an attractive prospect, and 
contestation for the right to be recognised as a 'hero' became prevalent. Kriger documents numerous 
accounts of fraudulent activities in the demobilisation period, as people posed as guerrillas to gain access 
to state-sponsored resources, or to acquire authority within workplaces and various bureaucratic divisions 
(Kriger, 2003: 88-91, 98, 118, 127). 
This drew forward a question that still resonates in Zimbabwe today: Who is a war hero? It was at this 
early point that government support and reward for ex-combatants over other war participants ­
detainees, political prisoners, members of rural communities who had provided support to the armies, 
teacbers in training camps, to name just some - became visible, as privileges were almost entirely reserved 
for active combatants. These groups began to protest and affirm the value of their participation in the 
struggle, and so contestation over identification became an important part of how the second Chimurenga 
was remembered and politically recognised in independent Zimbabawe13• The legal recognition of 
participation in the war was established as a means by which official national histories could be widened 
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to include new claimants, and so a means by which individuals could gain access to a powerful social 
category. The title of 'national hero' and the claim to liberation credentials, and so to enshrined national 
status, became an ongoing arena of contest over national recognition and resources, and a register of 
political legitimacy. 
The Commemorated Nation 
Soon after independence the government oversaw a policy of national reinscription of public space. The 
erasure of colonial symbols and monuments was widespread; roads and places were renamed, and many 
statues of colonial figures, such as that of Cecil Rhodes in Harare, were removed. In line with the 
reconciliation policy of the time (see the next chapter), only those symbols deemed politically 
controversial were removed. However Nathan Shamuyarira, then head of the National Monument 
Committee overseeing the project, revealed an interesting conceptualisation of the term 'reconciliation': 
'The occasion of removing statues and monuments and erecting new ones is not one of recrimination, 
.but rather a time of reconciliation - reconciling us to the reality of our independence, the death of 
colonialism and the national aspirations of the people. It is an occasion for the proper marriage of our 
past history and our dedication to the new social order' (Shamuyarira, quoted in Kriger, 1995: 141)14 
In this sense the policy of national inscription, the reclaiming ofpublic space to reflect the newly 
determined nation, is a means of reconciling people with a new national history. It is the imagining of an 
appropriate, or 'proper' in Shamuriya's terms, presentation of histories that reflect the new 'social order'. 
In other words, an official national history of Zimbabwe is perfonned and reified through the creation of 
sites of memorial and commemoration, and this is seen as representative of the newly realised nation. 
Important in this process were the creation of two fonns of national commemoration; the proclamation 
of two public holidays on August the 11 th and 12th, called Heroes Days, and the construction of a Heroes 
Acre just outside Harare. The Heroes Acre contains walls painted with murals depicting the liberation 
struggle, a statue depicting three heroic guerrillas, a tower upon which sits the Eternal Flame of liberation, 
and a tomb of the Unknown Soldier. National iconography, from flags to images of the emblematic 
Zimbabwe Bird figure from Great Zimbabwe, is vividly present across the site15• The Heroes Acre 
official brochure explicitly links the site to the idea of a national collectivity based on the struggle against 
colonialism. Heroes Acre is: 




15 These observations are borrowed from Richard Werbner's article on Heroes Acre and memory in postcolonial 













'an expression as well as a symbol of the indefatigable collective will of Zimbabweans to be the makers of 
their own history, and to be their own liberators by participating in the protracted, arduous and bitter 
struggle for self-determination ... [it] arouses national consciousness, forges national unity and identity ... [it] 
is a symbol of the masses struggle for freedom that transcends tribalism, ethnicism, regionalism and 
racism' (Ministry of Information, 1996: 2) 
Despite this endeavour Heroes Acre reflects the struggle over the identity of 'national hero' by drawing 
interesting demarcations between those deserving of certain levels of sacralisation in the name of national 
history. The brochure states that those eligible for burial at the site will have: 
'laid down their lives for Zimbabwe to be born and for the masses to be liberated. They subordinated 
their individual interests to the collective interests of Zimbabwe as a whole ... Theirs was an unwavering 
support for the cause of freedom and justice for which they accepted and endured suffering and brutality 
with fortitude' (Ministry of Information, 1996: 5) 
However this became an act of self-memorialisation for the governing elite, as only members of the 
inner-circle of those nationalist figures who formed the first government of Zimbabwe were buried at the 
site (Kriger, 1995; Werbner, 1998). Their families receive state pensions and grants, and the heroes' 
funerals are entirely state sponsored. Former guerrillas and lesser party members are restricted to 
Provincial or Local hero status, and in many cases are expected to finance the funerals themselves. 
Heroes Acre thus reflects a grading system of heroes, a ranked set of distinctions in which nationhood, or 
national value, is distributed unequally. The political elite in control of the memorialisation process is, as 
Werbner puts it, 'sacralising an imprint of itself on the Zimbabwean landscape' (\Verbner, 1998: 78). 
It is worth quoting Werbner's analysis here at length: 
'... one tension is represented at Heroes Acre by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the named, 
individualised tombstones of the distinguished heroes. The anonymous and empty Tomb is for all, and 
without distinction. Here nationality and citizenship are for all the people, and equality of sociality 
endures. Against that is the differentiated representation of the heroic dead in the individual tombstones. 
What is memorialised is the distinction of the select few, a national elite. It is the unmistakable 
representation of a nation of - in Zimbabwean usage - the tile/over the POl)O or masses, a nation of graded 
levels, subordinating the local to the national' 
It is important to remember that the national discourse has at its centre the identity ofthe 'hero', the 
sacred bearer of an ancient national destiny and symbol of the fight for the homeland. With this comes a 











Nehanda looking down upon his chosen successor, Mugabe, is resonant here. The elites' status as 
legitimate leaders of the nation, and the vehicle through which the masses can realise their sacred destiny, 
is temporally and spatially fixed through a state imposed system of commemoration and tribute in which 
some heroes are more legitimate than others. 
The state memorialisation process has also been subject to contestation. ZAPU, who in the early and late 
1980's was politically marginalised and its main area of support, Matabeleland, the subject of state 
imposed terror, consistently challenged the grading ofheroes16• Most notably the renowned ZIPRA 
commander Lookout Masuku was not granted a state funeral at Heroes Acre, and this event along with 
other controversies over the bestowal of heroic status became a frame of reference by which ZAPU and 
other groups could contest the political authority of the ZANU elite, and so the party's historically 
granted legitimacy. By asking the question 'Who is a hero?' they are challenging the moral and political 
legitimacy of official national history and the practices ofnational elites. 
Conclusion 
What is interesting about the above observations is how the national discourse evolved in Zimbabwe on a 
set of contradictions that complicate any answer to the question: who belongs to the nation, and what 
part do they play within it? In one sense the nationalist parties imagined a nation in the form of their own 
political goals; majority rule, democracy, one-man one-vote, and a united citizenry. In this formulation 
the nation is not delimited, margins of nationhood are drawn widely. Rights are bestowed equally and 
legally. 
However, this vision of nationhood as citizenry is tempered by the discursive boundaries of an imagined 
Zimbabwe that is constructed as primordial through its temporal link to ancient civilisation. Here the 
discursive entity of the <the people' is given an elemental character, an essentialised <tradition' and cultural 
<Africaness'. It is presented as a modern manifestation of something prior to colonialism and Rhodesian 
rule, a united collective of the indigenous. Immediately we face a different idea ofwhat constitutes the 
national subject, a different framework by which we can judge political practice, the granting of rights, 
and the allocation of resources. The discursive construction of an ancient and sacred nation, and a 
citizenry and political order defmed by democratic values, is potentially fraught with contradiction and 
fragility. It offers different ways of thinking about what constitutes the national collective, and in doing 
so how members of this collective are identified in political practice. As we shall see this contradiction 
has been played out in the ways rights, citizenship and justice have been conceived of in Zimbabwe. 











A mythological national history has also constructed an identity of 'national hero' as central to the 
imagining of the nation. This has taken two overlapping forms. Firstly, the guerrillas are recognised 
within the national discourse as the spiritually ordained liberators of the nation, the vana vcvhu. With this 
identity comes cultural and political status and moral authority. Secondly, through a process of official 
memorialisation and historical commemoration the political elite who gained control of the state have 
created a distinction between themselves and other national heroes. By placing themselves at the head of 
a hierarchy of national historical authority they have endowed political legitimacy on themselves as the 
valid leaders of the nation. This valorisation of heroic nationhood has created a site of contest whereby 
the legitimacy of political authority can be challenged by questioning who deserves the identity of the 














In this chapter I want to examine the question of 'national unity' within the national discourse. How it 
was conceived of, and practised, by the nationalist patties in power, was an important question in 
Zimbabwe in the 1980's and 1990's. What is considered here is how a different meaning of 'national 
unity' became a central political principle once ZANU-PF came to power, one that moved beyond 
'national unity' as a people united as being Zimbabwean, and instead came to mean political unity as the 
recognition of ZANU-PF as rightful and legitimate representatives of the nation, its people and their 
interests. 
The second part of the chapter will focus on how the political and socioeconomic teleology of the 
nationalist movement - its policy agenda concerning economic development - created different 
discursive representations and practices of some of the central identities and symbols at the heart of the 
national discourse. The pursuit of economic modernisation and technical development had important 
implications for the architecture of institutions, rights to land, and the state's role in controlling and 
ideologically defining social resistance to government policy. 
'National Unity' as a P?litical principle 
As described in the previous chapter, national unity amongst the nationalist patties was not taken for 
granted. It was stressed as one of their fundamental aims. The idea of building 'national consciousness' 
was how 'the people' could be realised, and in itself became the justification for the legitimacy of the 
nationalist parties' pursuit of power: for the nationalist patty to speak on behalf of 'everyone', they must 
endeavour to realise that 'everyone'. As the 1980 ZANU-PF constitution states, a central aspect of patty 
policy is to 'Promote national consciousness and the unity of all of our people in pursuance of aims and 
objectives' (ZANU-PF, 1980). However, the historically endowed legitimacy of the ruling elite to lead the 
nation and pursue its destiny has seen a reinterpretation of the idea of 'national unity' beyond the idea of 
a national collectivity. 
The national discourse outlined the status of 'national hero', and in doing so placed the nationalist elites at 











unified, singular 'African people' through history, and within this narrative a set of leaders endowed with 
a sacred authority to represent their interests. They are not merely positioned as 'heroes', but as 
legitimate leaders, those figures who represent the wider interests of 'the people'. If the ruling elite are 
constructed within the national discourse as the 'rightful' leaders of the nation, then unity becomes not 
only a case of 'a people united through being Zimbabwean' but also as 'united in the support of the party 
that speaks on behalf of the Zimbabwean people, that represents them, and legitimately defmes their 
historical destiny'. This interpretation had serious implications for Zimbabwean society, laying down a 
framework for some degree of racial tolerance through the policy of reconciliation, and, at the same time, 
violent state-sponsored terror. It was also a crucial rationale of the one-party state agenda pursued by the 
government!7. 
The Conditions of Reconciliation 
At the dawn of independence ZANU-PF and the newly formed government began a stated policy of 
reconciliation, an approach that at one point saw Zimbabwe heralded as 'a model of racial reconciliation 
in a post-guerrilla war context' (Raftopoulos, 2004: viii). I quote here from Mugabe's much referenced 
speech on the evening of his party's victory in the 1980 national elections: 
'Surely this is now the time to beat our swords into ploughshares so we can attend to the problems of 
developing our economy and society ... I utge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new 
pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together, as 
Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and 
rehabilitate out society as we reinvigorate out economic machinery' (Mugabe, quoted in de Waal, 1990: 
46) 
17 I would argue that it is imperative to trace this meaning of 'national unity' back to the intra-party conflicts of the 
1960's and 1970's, what Masipula Sithole called 'the struggles within the struggle', although regrettably the length 
and scope of this study prevents this taking place here. Some of the factors often cited as explanations of these 
disputes include disagreements over lobbying for foreign support, the extent to which armed conflict should be 
pursued, ethnic factors, and the Sino-Soviet divide. For a reading that emphasises personality conflict and ethnicity 
see Sithole's Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle (1999) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008). For a study that interprets the 
major conflicts within the parties as the manifestations of a clear divide between Marxist and bourgeoisie elements 
of the emerging ruling class in Zimbabwe see Moore (1991). What needs to be considered is how the rival parties 
'spoke' for the nation, how their justifications to represent 'the people' were grounded in a renunciation of ethnic 
identity or particular interests, and how rival parties were represented as somehow outside of the nation, as 'ethnic' 
or as somehow 'selling out' the nation. In these representations we can begin to discover how the legitimacy of 
national leadership depended on how the led, 'the people', and their relationship to elites, were constructed. TIlls I 











Mugabe further elaborated on the underlying logic of this approach: 
'Let us constitute a oneness derived from our common objective and total commitment to build a great 
Zimbabwe that will be the pride of all Africa. Let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a 
common interest that knows no race, colour or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single 
loyalty. Long live our freedom!' (Mugabe, quoted in Ministry of Information, 1980) 
Here the principle is clear; the 'oneness' of national unity must be derived from a 'total commitment' to 
building a great Zimbabwe that will alleviate the 'problems of developing our economy and society'. 
Reconciliation in this sense is the conflation of becoming 'Zimbabwean' with 'a single loyalty' to the aims 
and objectives of economic and social development. Ifwe consider that the substance and protocols of 
this socio-economic project are laid down by the newly elected government then implicit in this 
formulation is the recognition that 'loyalty' is therefore also to those national elites who now hold power. 
National unity is the 'common interest' as represented by the nationalist elites. Here the distinctions 
between 'national unity' and 'national loyalty' become ill-deftned, a blurring f the social markers of 
nationhood that has plagued Zimbabwe from the 1980's until today. 
It should be noted here that the reconciliation 'policy' was never exactly a government policy at all, in that 
there was no specific governing legislation, no programmatic plans or applied policies, and no institutions 
or bodies responsible for overseeing and monitoring. It is widely acknowledged that instead the policy 
was a calculated set of rhetorical statements, like those above, aimed directly at white members of the 
population18• 
Various interpretations exist that try to piece together the rationale for the policy of reconciliation. It can 
be seen as a pragmatic policy of national security used to placate the threat of internal disturbance by 
former members of the Rhodesian security forces, or the external threat of South African intervention 
(see de Waal, 1990), or political reassurance that sought to allay fears of retribution amongst the white 
community (Sachikonye, 2004; Moyo, 1992). At the same time it was a political necessity stemming from 
the constraints of the Lancaster House constitution, which protected property rights for 10 years, dictated 
that white-owned land had to be purchased by the government only under a 'willing buyer, willing seller' 
agreement, and guaranteed a white electoral monopoly of 20 seats in the 100 seat parliament 
(Raftopoulos, 1994; Alexander, 2006). For Herbst (1990) it constituted a tacit agreement between the 
ruling elite and whites that, although existing whites could stay and be free from discrimination and high 
levels of state interference in the private sector, their children would not face the same protection, and 
indigenisation of the economy and the public sector would intensify within a generation. 
18 It should be noted that there were a series of key political appointments of white figures, including the retention 











Although economic policy and state practice would have important implications for how whites were 
identified in Zimbabwe, as I discuss below, what I want to focus on here is how the rhetoric around 
reconciliation allowed for white entry into the social category of nationhood, and how implicit in this was 
the conflation of 'national unity' and 'national loyalty'. This entailed an erasure of the historical record, or 
a rearticulation of that record whereby whites, and white farmers, are no longer remembered as central to 
the colonial project that the nationalists fought against. They are no longer the enemy from whom the 
country was liberated. This must entail, as Blair Rutherford has pointed out, a form of anti-memory 
which cleanses present identities of past wrongs (Rutherford, 2004: 552). The dismantling and erasure of 
colonial identifications could be seen in the systematic spatial reinscription process, whereby statues and 
memorials of colonial figures were removed by the government. But 'forgetting' associations with a 
history of subjugation and exploitation was also a rhetorical device used by ZANU-PF, as exemplified in 
Mugabe's independence speech: 
'If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national 
interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love 
that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should 
seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven 
and forgotten' (Mugabe, quoted in Ministry of Information, 1980) 
Here the anti-memory over colonial complicity means a unity of 'interest, loyalty, rights and duties', but in 
practice it meant a retraction of the white community from public politics and contestation. For a large 
part in the 1980's they concentrated on day-to-day business, and sometimes local government affairs, 
while relying on public pressure groups, such as the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries (CZI) and 
the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), to lobby the government behind the scenes (Rutherford, 2004: 
553; Moyo, 1992: 22; Herbst, 85, 137)19. 
This tacit understanding that there must be no political activity that would compromise the control of the 
governing party was disrupted in the 1985 elections, when the emergence of the Conservative Alliance of 
Zimbabwe (CAZ) under Ian Smith in 1985, widely seen as the reincarnation of the Rhodesian Front, saw 
the party win 15 of the 20 seats reserved for whites. The reaction by ZANU-PF was that this was against 
the inherent principles of reconciliation. Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of State for National 
Security, said: 
19 The power of these groups, far larger than other groups such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU), cannot be underestimated, and to a large extent they allowed for the continued prosperity and security of 











'the vote cast by the majority of the white electorate has shown us that the trust we placed in whites and 
our belief that they were getting reconciled to the new political order was a trust and belief that was not 
deserved... [Whites] have spilled the blood of thousands of our people... The vote has proved that they 
have not repented in any way' (Mnangagwa, 1985, quoted in Kriger, 2005: 12) 
Again in 1990 Nathan Shamuyarita labelled those whites who planned to vote for Edgar Tekere's 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), then in an alliance with the CAZ, as 'anti-reconciliation'. Eddison 
Zvogbo put forward an image of the ZUM as simply the CAZ in disguise: 
'The Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith plunged us into war. \X1hen Smith realised he had lost the war he 
found some blacks to do his work for him. ZANU sought reconciliation after the war, but the RF did 
not die and so... there's no such thing as ZUM, only CAZ' (Zvogbo, quoted in Kriger, 2005: 15) 
The fragility of the identity of the 'reconciled white' is exemplified by the ease with which past discursive 
identifications are brought forcefully into political rhetoric. Here the idea of reconciliation as unified 
loyalty is evident, most explicitly in Mnangagwa's assertion that reconciliation is about acquiescence to 
'the new political order', and in the absence of this compliance, the remembering of the death of 
thousands of Africans at white hands. 
Gukurahundiand the Dissidents 
From 1983 to late 1986 Matabeleland, and part of the Midlands, was the scene of escalating violence 
between various government agencies and small numbers of former guerrillas who had fled the 
demobilisation and integration scheme. In events described by Mugabe as Gukurahundi (the rain that 
washes away the chaff before summer rains) it is estimated that approximately 20,000 people lost their 
lives, most of them civilian supporters of ZAPU who were suspected of having allegiances to those who 
became known as the 'dissidents' (phimister, 2008: 197). 
These events had their origins in the history of hostility and competition between ZAPU and ZANU, and 
the regional patterns of recruitment and operation during the liberation war (Alexander et aI, 2000: 181). 
After the elections in 1980 it became even clearer that political support followed the regional and ethnic 
lines established during the conflict, with ZAPU's membership and electoral constituency dominated by 
Ndebele speakers from Matabeleland and ZANU's broadly Shona speaking. The two parties had a long 
history of conflict after the party split in 1963, as well as a series of internal struggles and divergences. 
Armed conflict between ZIPRA and ZANLA was also prolific, in the field and in training camps in 











(Zimbabweans People's Army) when ZANLA guerrillas and the Tanzanian Defence Force disarmed and 
massacred a large number of ZIPRA fighters (Kriger, 2003: 25; White, 2003). 
Many guerrillas from both armies refused to gather in designated Assembly Points (AP) to be integrated 
into the nascent ZNA (Zimbabwean National Army). Their reasons included fear that the Rhodesian 
Army would attack them, disagreement with the terms of the settlement, the wish to campaign for their 
parties, or simply to return home (Alexander et al, 2000). Reports of violence and looting by some 
guerrillas were widespread, and security forces were deployed to control and capture them. Although 
initially admonished by both parties, and labelled 'outlaws', 'unruly elements' and 'renegades', after the 
elections armed men on the loose in Matabeleland came to be known as 'dissidents', and their motives 
and the threat they presented were increasingly cast in political terms (Alexander et aI, 2000: 185). 
Guerrillas were moved from rural AP's to urban areas, and clashes flared up between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA guerrillas. ZANU politicians in the new government increasingly couched their rhetoric in terms 
of the political threat posed by ZIPRA and ZAPU, with Mugabe noting 'very sinister undertones, a 
definite organised pattern' to the violence (Alexander et ai, 2000: 188). At an election rally in 1980 Enos 
Nkala, an Ndebele ZANU-PF Minister, declared that 'from today the PF [ZAPU] has declared itself the 
enemy of ZANU-PF' and encouraged supporters to form 'vigilante committees' to defend themselves 
against the perceived threat (Kriger, 2003: 77). Political discord between the parties continued and in 
1982, after arms caches were allegedly found at the homes of senior ZAPU politicians, Nkomo and other 
ZAPU ministers were sacked from the government. Senior ZIPRA commanders, including Lookout 
Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa, were arrested on charges of treason, and despite the dismissal of 
evidence in their court trials they remained in jail until 1986. 
As more ZIPRA guerrillas fearing persecution by the government and ZANLA fled into rural 
Matabelend, Nkomo and ZAPU were regularly charged with organising their activities as part of a 
choreographed effort to overthrow the government. This was despite consistent opposition by ZAPU to 
the desertions and the return to arms of their ZIPRA guerrillas. Tension and paranoia was only increased 
in 1982 when South Africa began operations aimed at destabilising the country, including the recruitment 
and arming of a group of Zimbabwean insurgents called Super ZAPU operating in Matabeleland, which 
only further legitimised ZANU-PF's military response. 
The violence in Matabeleland significantly worsened with the deployment of the notorious 5th Brigade, a 
North Korean trained unit directly answerable to the Prime Minister and explicitly intended for 'internal 
defence purposes'. Its political rationale was obvious in the purging of all ex-ZIPRA members from its 
ranks, and the chosen victims of its violent but systematic and organised campaign. In a widespread 











and thousands of civilians. The often grotesquely violent and harrowing nature of its activities is borne 
witness to in the individual testimonies of its victims (see CCJP, 1997). The 5th Brigade operated on a 
background of political rhetoric that justified the targeting of civilians on the grounds that 'We don't 
differentiate when we fight, because we can't tell who a dissident is', as Mugabe put it. It also equated 
support for ZAPU with support for dissidents. This was exemplified by Enos Nkala's 1983 threat that if 
you support ZAPU 'you will die or be sent to prison', a view advocated by several other government 
ministers (CCJP, 1997: 44). 
Despite the obvious ethnic dimension to the conflict, the political justifications were pivoted on a 
discourse of 'national unity' that polarised the characters of ZAPU and ZANU as self-interested and 
tribal on one hand, and national and unifying on the other. In April 1983 Minister of State Sydney 
Sekeramayi told a rally that 'the army will stay a long, long time ... the majority of people realise they have 
been misled by PF-ZAPU ... [and] will understand the national character ofPF-ZANU' (CCJP, 1997: 54). 
At an election rally in 1985 Mugabe said that 'people in Matabeleland are being tortured, robbed and 
murdered because of the selfish political interests ofDrJoshua Nkomo... I am asking you to vote for 
ZANU-PF because we want to be one people' (phimister, 2008: 209). 
Again in 1985 Mugabe went on to underline that the problems in Matabeleland were that the presence of 
ZAPU and the dissidents were themselves emblematic of national disunity, and stood in the way of 
people understanding that they were a coalescent aspect of an inevitable national collective: 
'It is really a pity that we are talking in terms of Matabeleland and the rest of the country ... Really the 
problem is Nkomo and ZAPU as I see it. Nkomo and ZAPU and the dissidents. Nkomo cannot accept 
a secondary role in our political order and so he must organise the people tribally, and if they cannot be 
organised tribally, he must set the dissidents on them so that they will do his will. We have been 
discussing this issue with the people of Matabeleland at various levels and there is no doubt in our mind 
that it's more the fact of the fear of the dissidents ... They [the people of Matabelenad] are not a strange 
people, they are not a foreign element - they are part and parcel of our population and we have interacted 
with them at various levels ... and we are satisfied that without ZAPU, without the dissident element, they 
will fall in line ... we do not distinguish them from people elsewhere. Their fate is intertwined with the 
fate of others. Their destiny is the same as the destiny of other people and we never talk in terms of 
Ndebeles, Shonas, Vendas, Tongas - we never do that ... In fact we discourage that in our own political 
philosophy. The people in ZANU did not vote for me because they were against the Ndebeles ... 
Everywhere we went we told the people they were one, and so it is the oneness of the people we are 











We are reminded once again that through the national elites imagining of 'the people' they are discursively 
defined and delimitated as a collectivity; as tribe-less and monolithic in their 'oneness'. For ZANU-PF to 
speak for all of Zimbabwe it must realise this 'oneness' by constantly asserting it; they 'told the people 
they were one', and that ZANU-PF had 'a national character', and they must erase any imagining that 
subverts this unity, in this case the ruthless political ambition of Nkomo and his tendency to 'tribalise' the 
people of Matabeleland. To 'speak' in terms of sub-national identities is proscribed, only the national will 
be spoken20. 
It is in these terms that the national discourse 'speaks' the people ofMat abele land into nationhood, 
through a representation of them as tribeless, homogenously Zimbabwean and so politically represented 
by ZANU-PF. The praxis of this articulation of nationhood is coercion and suppression, but it finds 
legitimacy in the inevitable, the idea of a common 'destiny' and 'fate'. Mugabe is telling supporters of 
ZAPU that they are part of this destiny, this is his knowledge which he must share with them. The 
implication is that national destiny is interpreted by ZANU-PF, the only legitimate leaders of the nation21 . 
In this case loyalty to ZANU-PF becomes a marker of nationhood, a standard by which citizens can be 
seen to have realised their 'oneness' and common destiny. The 1980 election poster that states ZANU­
PF VANHU, VANHU lZANU-PF (ZANU-PF is the people, the people are ZANU-PF) is perhaps 
telling of the inherent logic of this formulation. For ZAPU and the people of Matabeleland, and the 
white supporters of CAZ or ZUM, political disloyalty brings forth discursive representations that cast 
dissenters as exterior to the nation, somehow outside of that defined as inescapable and preordained. 
If the national discourse represented events in Matabeleland as a matter of unity and nationhood, this 
exclusion or silencing of ethnic interpretations was not mirrored amongst communities at the receiving 
end of its violent practice. In their extensive social history of Matabeleland, Alexander, McGregor and 
Ranger (2000) note local memories of an almost entirely Shona 5th Brigade often making recourse to 
ethnic justifications for their use of violence. The events were interpreted as ethnic persecution: 
'[people] came to see the conflict not as one fought against the dissidents but against the Ndebele and 
ZAPU In local accounts there is constant slippage between an emphasis on tribalism and on inter-party 
20 This silence in the national discoU!se over ethnic identity is symptomatic of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Muzondidya call the 'echoing silence' of ethnicity in Zimbabwe generally. 'Until recently, Zimbabweans have been 
conspicuously silent about questions of ethnicity. As in the colonial period, especially during the days of the 
nationalist liberation struggle, all attempts to discuss ethnic identities, especially their manifestation in the political 
and economic spheres, were brushed aside' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Muzondida, 2007: 276). 
21 One is reminded here of the ZANU-PF liberation song 'Zvinoziba neZANU', in which the people ask how they 
can defeat the Rhodesians and gain their independence, to which the chorus answer is Zvinoifbwa neZAl.'v'U (only 











conflict as the motive force behind the Fifth Brigade's violence ... people elided the categories of Ndebele 
and ZAPU: an attack on the Ndebele was an attack on ZAPU, an attack on ZAPU was an attack on the 
Ndebele... The Fifth Brigades greatest 'success' may have been in hardening ethnic prejudice and in 
bolstering a strong identification between ethnicity and political affiliation' (Alexander et aI, 2000: 223) 
Drawing on interviews with former dissidents Alexander notes that they at once lamented what they saw 
as the ethnicisation of what had been an inclusive political project, and justified raids into Shona areas on 
the grounds that the government was persecuting Ndebele people (Alexander, 2004: 170). In their 
important report into the civil strife of the 1980's The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) 
also concluded that it 'hardened' ethnic identifications and brought a broad feeling of alienation from the 
national body politic (CCJP, 1997: 59-60). The irony here is that, to paraphrase Richard Werbner, the 
insistence on and enforcement of a de-ethnicised national unity 'fed and in turn was fed by its antithesis, 
the polarisation of... two super-tribes, the Shona against the Ndebele' (Werbner, 1991: 159). 
There has been a noticeable increase in Ndebele cultural organisations in the region since the 
disturbances, and a continuing discourse around ideas of political reform to introduce federal government 
or even an independent Ndebele state (Raftopoulos, 1994: 19). Ndlovu-Gatsheni has traced the 
genealogy of what he calls 'Ndebele particularism' in the historical construction of Ndebele ethnicity. He 
finds that the massacres in Matabeleland have been a more modem occurrence in a sequence of events 
that have historically galvanised a long-standing trend of Ndebele self-determination. This sequence has 
continued to manifest itself in radical Ndebele cultural and political organisations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2008: 119-122). We are reminded that the premise of Zimbabwean nationhood, the idea that there exists 
a defmable national community, was not settled by the imaginings of the nationalist elites. Instead the 
silences of the national discourse, its inability to speak ethnicity as social category within Zimbabwe, and 
its authoritarian practices, form a kind of exclusion that has the potential to imbricate itself into the series 
of historical processes that have shaped and produced ethnic identification. 
The One-Party State 
The Unity Accord of 1987 that saw ZAPU subsumed into ZANU-PF led the new united party to declare 
once again that it would seek to establish a one-party state in Zimbabwe (Unity Accord, 1987). In 1990 
the restrictions of the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement, which guaranteed the rights of people 
to form and join political parties, would no longer be in place and ZANU-PF could begin to work 
towards the completion of an agenda that it had begun to set in the early 1980's (Moyo, 1991: 83). With 
ZAPU now no longer legally active the electoral threat of Matabeleland, which they had won comfortably 











As the likelihood of a one-party state increased so the debates around its suitability to Zimbabwe began 
to flourish amongst party members and Zimbabwean intellectuals. Academics began to analyse the 
historical and ideological foundations of the concept, situating it in a wider African and global tradition 
with a variety of antecedents and explanatory factors. Many observers sought a materialist critique in 
which a petit-bourgeoisie scramble to keep other factions from the political power that allows for 
personal accumulation (Zimunya, 1991; Musarurwa, 1991; Mutambara, 1991). Others interrogated the 
justifications that presented one-party rule as the modem manifestation of ancient and authentic forms of 
African social organisation (Sithole, 1989; Mandaza, 1991; Nabudere, 1989). Drawing from Nyerere's 
Ujamma, this discourse seeks to find pre-colonial precedents for the one-party state in traditional social 
organisation, and saw ZANU-PF cite the idea that in an African community there is 'only one chief 
(Nabudere, 1989: 3; Meyns, 1989: 184). These critics broadly found that these ideas of historical lineage 
were largely inaccurate affectations, pointing out that there were nothing like the very modem forms of 
party and state found in the African past, and that pre-colonial social structure could often be exploitative 
and undemocratic. 
For Sithole (1991) and Mandaza (1991) the Leninist idea of the one single authentic vanguard party is an 
important foundation for the one-party state in Socialist African countries and had significant influence in 
Zimbabwe. Sithole argued that democratic centralism as a form of deliberation and debate is a resonant 
form of political organisation to nationalist parties whose allegiance was often with the Soviet Union and 
China, but it could easily be manipulated to serve the interests of those who propose it. Mandaza also 
asserts that implicit theoretical justification for one-party state rule could be found in the 'modernisation 
thesis', with its emphasis on unity and strong leadership to counter the inevitable instability and strife that 
occurred as developing countries moved towards a Western model of development (Mandaza, 1991: 22­
23). 
These analyses are undoubtedly relevant to the Zimbabwean case, and illustrate the complex origins of 
the drive for the one-party state in Africa. However, as Meyns and Moyo (1991) point out, the 
justifications given for the one-party state in Zimbabwe were most commonly embedded in the discourse 
around 'national unity' and were a continuation of the agenda that sought to remove alternative centres of 
political support, most obviously ZAPU. At the centre of the debate around the one-party state in 
Zimhabwe was the 'aim of maintaining and consolidating national unity' (Meyns, 1989: 185), a concept 
deemed by Moyo to be considered 'sacrosant' hy ZANU-PF (Moyo, 1991: 89). 
In 1984 Mugabe stated: 
'We must be nationally united and therefore it is necessary that we show this image to our people, the 











of opinion can be accommodated... We will not go about a one-party state in an arbitrary manner. We 
realise that we have various opinions in the country - we have various ethnic groups; we have different 
races, different religious bodies and men of different religious persuasions - and that therefore from a 
political view it is necessary that we try to cater for these heterogeneous opinions of our people, but we 
do that under a homogeneous arrangement that recognises that ftrst and foremost we are one Zimbabwe' 
(Mugabe, 1984, quoted in Meyns, 1989: 185) 
Here again we see the desire to 'show' the people of Zimbabwe their 'oneness', to illustrate it in order to 
realise it. The 'best way' of doing so is through a political apparatus that reflects the position of ZANU­
PF as the legitimate embodiment of the nation, and as the bearer of its destiny, the 'umbrella' under 
which people gather. At the same time the one-party state produces a system of governance that ensures 
that any opinion stemming from a sub-national identity or affiliation is subsumed under a 'homogeneous 
arrangement', a way of ensuring that these concerns must be of a national nature. It is an institutional 
composition under which contestation and deliberation can take place, and interests can be represented, 
without galvanising other forms of social and political identiftcation, and so without threatening the unity 
of all Zimbabweans. It also recognises and preserves the only legitimate incarnation of 'one Zimbabwe', 
ZANU-PF. 
The 1985 ZANU-PF election manifesto illustrates that within this discourse is a logical causal relationship 
between an institutional arrangement that preserves national unity and the fulftlment of the task of 
economic and social development: 
'Unity is our ftrst task towards the attainment of a just society where everyone's needs will be met. 
Zimbabwe will only develop when colour, tribe, sex, language and region are no longer of consequence in 
determining how our wealth is to be distributed... That is why, in line with our Second Congress 
Resolution, we pledge to work towards the attainment of a One-Party State... That is why ZANU-PF 
seeks to bring all Zimbabweans under its umbrella so that there is only One Leader - the Party - for One 
Zimbabwe... we shall establish one party to represent the interests of all working people in Zimbabwe, all 
those who seek to abolish the exploitation of man by man and bring about justice for all' (ZANU-PF, 
1985: 5) 
Here national unity in the form of the one-party state is explicitly regarded as the condition under which 
the nation can realise its developmental goals. However it was in the discourses around modernisation 
and development, and the consolidation of state authority, that alternative representations and practices 
emerged that were often contrary to the symbols and identities of the national discourse. 











Rural Zimbabwe has long been regarded as a bifurcated space, with sharp distinctions in social formation, 
power relations, and discursive representations between commercial land, traditionally farmed and owned 
by whites, and communal land, home of the peasantry (Rutherford, 2001; Alexander, 2006). Rutherford 
notes that amongst the analyses and prescriptions of academics and policy makers this divide is most 
often represented as a dual economy; white land is commercial and productive, or seen as an exploitative 
capitalist sector, while communal land is traditional, subsistence based agriculture, or a pre-capitalist 
sector where pre-colonial social relations are used to underwrite the low wage reproduction of African 
labour. As Rutherford notes: 
'The dual economy model not only explains rural Zimbabwe but carries with it a prescription for its 
future development: Africans will 'modernise' by becoming either full time workers in the capitalist 
sector, or self-sufficient peasants enjoying government support and land redistributed from the 
commercial farms' (Rutherford, 2001: 8) 
This dominant narrative has produced a juxtaposition of social categories between 'commercial farmers' 
and 'African peasants', and within this lies a developmental teleology. Those in communal land will, in 
one way or another, be subject to a trans formative agenda that seeks to modernise social and economic 
relations. 
This teleological developmentalism has seen communal areas subject to a history of state interventions, in 
both colonial and post-colonial eras. In the 1930's and 1940's as colonial administrators faced increasing 
pressure for more efficient production in the colonies and political self-determinism grew amongst 
Africans, 'native' areas became of increasing concern to colonial governments. Policy prescriptions in the 
colonies began to be defined through the paradigm of 'development'; the International Monetary Fund 
(IMP) and World Bank (WB) provided plans and funds aimed at replicating European countries through 
planned industrialisation and the opening up of markets for northern economies (Rutherford, 2001: 22). 
Rutherford quotes Escobar, saying 'Development, as a mode of thinking and a source of practices, soon 
became an omnipresent reality' (Rutherford, 2001: 22). 
State planners in Southern Rhodesia strengthened bureaucratic control and increased state interventions 
into 'native' areas as discourses of 'technical development' and 'modernisation' became a powerful 
epistemological current in defining relations between colonial authority and African people (Alexander, 
2006: 45-47; Drinkwater, 1991: 40-72). The 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA), and numerous 
plans after this, sought to consolidate state authority, centralise land planning, and stabilise and rationalise 











'u. resting on the authority of Western science, and the common anthropological assumption of the time 
that African society was 'traditional'in contrast to European society, these plans were explained as a 
means to assist the evolution of Africans into the 'modern' world' (Rutherford, 2001: 23) 
The colonial state was far from monolithically powerful, and was not always immovably opposed to 
'traditional' systems of social organisation. It is perhaps better understood as heterogeneous, in that it 
often relied on negotiation with local administration and mediation with local actors to ensure a more 
nuanced integration of 'modern' and 'traditional' power systems (Moyo, 1995: 70). The portrayal of 
'natives' as un-modern and traditional often justified a retraction of state intervention on the premise that 
Africans were 'too mired in irrationality and superstition' for technical development to work, especially in 
the 1960's and 1970's as the effects of the NLHA increased political resistance to colonial authority 
(Alexander, 2006: 79). 
However, discourses around development and modernisation provided powerful modes of interpretation 
that shaped state practice and official representations of rural Africans and land even after the end of 
white rule. After 1980 the new Zimbabwean government embarked on a policy of reconstruction, 
development and redistribution under a banner of socialism that aimed to reverse the political and 
material inequalities inherited from the Rhodesian regime. It saw a significant investment in education 
and health and much international donor support. However, this project was heavily tempered by 
political pragmatism and the restrictions of the Lancaster House constitution, and was 'decisively shaped 
by the particular modernising agenda and practices of its Rhodesian predecessor' (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 
2003: 4). 
As Alexander notes, in contests over land in the 1980's 'the appeal of the opposition between 'modernity' 
and 'tradition', so long a characteristic of the Rhodesian state (and the analyses thereof) lived on, both as a 
means of contesting and co structing authority, and of justifying the imposition of 'modernising' policies 
on people construed as traditional and thus resistant to 'development' (Alexander, 2006: 11). The 
national discourse had set the 'lost land' at the centre of the fight for independence. Land was presented 
as a sacred terrain, and the peasantry as ancestrally entided to claim rights to it, but in post-independence 
Zimbabwe the duality of 'traditional' and 'modern' complicated this picture. 
The national discourse had created a burden of expectation over land redistribution, and agrarian reform 
understandably became an imperative of the new government. In 1980 an estimated 6,000 white farmers 
owned 15.5 million hectares of land, or 39% of land in the country, most of it being considered the most 
fertile and suited to agricultural production. In contrast 4.5 million black famers subsided on 16.4 million 
hectares of sub-prime land in the communal areas (Moyo, 1995). The government's land reform program 











million hectares of land, a transfer representing approximately 23% of households in communal areas 
(Sachikonye, 2004). 
Initial redistribution of commercial land was forthcoming but was constrained by the Lancaster House 
constitution's enshrining of property rights and the 'willing buyer, willing seller' clause, and the increasing 
influence of the CFU and international donor organisations who emphasised that land redistribution had 
to be conceived of as a matter of economic significance rather than a political right. A consensus 
emerged amongst policy makers that commercial land was too valuable to redistribute widely, and so 
instead agrarian policy should focus on improvement within communal areas (Alexander, 2007: 115; 
Moyo, 1995). 
This consensus began to shape policy on land resettlement, as grounds for settlement began to depend on 
the lands potential for rationalisation and productivity. 'The resettlement policy offered redistribution, 
but cast the land not as the historical right of a dispossessed people, but as productive space in need of 
close state regulation' (Alexander, 2007: 113). Commercial land was largely seen as 'indispensible' because 
of its economic value, and newly settled lands were envisioned as 'islands of modernity', with settlers 
expected to sever all ties with past methods of farming and enter under the tutelage of the state 
(Alexander, 2007: 114). 
In the developmental discourse the images and characters of the national struggle are recast: land 
becomes a productive entity, ahistorical and unraced, white farmers become politically neutral figures, 
exemplars of modernity to be aspired to, and peasants become subject to their own economic potential as 
measured by standards of commercial productivity, rather than historically imbued with a sacred right to 
the land. 
This was reflected in the slow pace of land reform. By 1989 only about 48,000 households had been 
resettled. As illegal squatting increased on land during the 1980's, often as a form of direct opposition to 
the strictures of resettlement policy, the contrasts and contradictions of the 'national' and the 
'developmental' became frames by which contests over land rights could be represented. Squatters, state 
officials, customary rulers and local and national politicians could defend or condemn the illegal 
habitation of land in these terms. 












'Officials will say these people are squatters but these people will say, 'no, this is our motherland'. The 
Resettlement Officer has a lot of power but he knows if he moves these people the politicians will 
criticise him' (Alexander, 2007: 157) 
Manicaland's Provincial Administrator argued that historical claims to land could not be recognised, a 
view supported by Mugabe: 
<People wanted specific pieces of land because their forefathers lived there. But everyone used to live 
somewhere... We are,bitter but we can't reverse ... You must follow the procedures of the resettlement 
programme' (Alexander, 2007: 114) 
'Ifwe were to ask your forefathers whether they lived in the same area as their ancestors graves, the 
answer would be in the negative. Now that we are buying farms to resettle people, who will stay there if 
you want to protect ancestors graves? Of course we must protect our ancestors graves but we must stay 
on arable land where we can be productive' (Mugabe, 1985, quoted in Raftopoulos, 2003: 221) 
Squatters, often supported by local politicians, chiefs or officials, justified their incursions into occupied 
land on the grounds of the national struggle for lost land. As one chief observed, 'they need the land that 
their children liberated from the hands of the white commercial settlers' (Alexander, 2007: 158). 
Here we can see how discourses around development and modernisation can destabilise the identities and 
symbols connected to the land in the national discourse, and in doing so legitimate state control and 
economic policy. At the same time the national discourse is again a means of holding the government to 
account. Just as the guerrillas and ZAPU used liberation war credentials and their identities as heroes as a 
means of challenging the power of ZANU-PF, claims to authority over and rights to land are situated 
within a discourse that reasserts land as the sacred terrain of the nation. 
Although seemingly contradictory these discursive claims to authority over the land often existed 
simultaneously, utilised by different actors in different circumstances, often in tandem. For example 
pressure for more extensive land redistribution and the imminent end of the Lancaster House 
constitution often saw ZANU-PF revert to radical rhetoric that drew upon the national discourse. In the 
1990 elections Mugabe stated that 'Never again shall we be slaves in our own country ... There shall never 
be a 'no' which we shall ever accept again from landowners we approach for land' (Alexander, 2007: 181). 
However the resulting Land Acquisition Act of 1992 came with the caveat that 'only those with the 
potential to be good farmers should be chosen for resettlement and proper services should be provided 












In the 1980's 'national unity' began to mean more than the 'conscientisation' of the masses into a 
'national collective'; in the face of challenges to the government it saw the emergence of a discursive 
representation of ZANU-PF as the legitimate embodiment of the nation, a means by which nationhood 
could be measured. Political challenges drew forth discursive representations of political opponents that 
situated them outside of the nation, as either tribally motivated, or historically exploitative. If ZANU-PF 
represented 'the people' any challenges to them were against the nation. The challengers, no longer of 
'the nation', relinquished any protection from coercion or suppression and were vulnerable to the violent 
practices of the state. This is a pattern of discursive representation of political opposition that would 
again rise to prominence in the late 1990's as political mobilisation against ZANU-PF increased. 
However, the national discourse remained an important means of challenging ZANU-PF dominance. 
The discursive representation of lost lands remained a powerful means by which an emphasis on 
development and modernisation could be countered, and a frame of interpretation of identities and rights 
that proved resilient during the 1980's. Simultaneously drawn upon by both the government and those 
challenging it, the idea of indigenous right to land was an envisioned future that had the potential to 
dismantle the bifurcation of rural Zimbabwe and challenge the teleological duality of 'traditional' and 
'modem' represented within it. In the 1990's, as economic conditions worsened and ZANU-PF 
hegemony was repeatedly challenged, the national discourse reasserted itself as the dominant narrative on 













The Third Chimurenga 
The period of the third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe has witnessed an intensification of the national 
discourse. As a system of representation the narratives, images and symbols of this discourse have 
become dominant as a means of interpreting and understanding political and social realities in the 
country. They have both informed and intensified the dichotomies and antagonisms that have come to 
define politics in post-2000 Zimbabwe: on one side a radical, redistributive program based on historical 
and nativistic grounds, and on the other a liberal critique, emphasising universal notions of human rights, 
the rule oflaw and citizenship. 
Central to this has been a continuation of the political principle of 'national unity'. Opposition to 
ZANU-PF rule is discursively located as somehow outside of the nation, its history, and its 'people'. This 
'people' have become increasingly defmed in primordial and essentialist terms. The image of the 'African 
native' as the only legitimate national subject has become framed within a wider discourse that 
counterpoises an idea of authentic 'African' culture as inimical to 'racist' Western universalism. 
The Zimbabwe Crisis 
The failure of the governments one-party state agenda has been attributed to a wide range of factors; 
most noticeably the rise of political opposition in Edgar Tekere's ZUM, and in the critical stance taken by 
the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), university students and other civil society groups 
(Moyo, 1992: 31-2). Opposition to the one-party state was part of a growing, wider mobilisation of 
public antagonism to ZANU-PF rule and the increasingly visible problems of inflation, unemployment, 
and shortage of public services. The gains made in the 1980's under the developmental policies of the 
government were slowly reversing, and in the early 1990's the government adopted a 'home grown' 
Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), although after severe drought in 1991-2 it was mainly 
made up of more orthodox, IMP controlled stabilisation measures. The effects on the economy were 
difficult to defend; increased interest rates and inflation, rapid deindustrialisation, widespread 
unemployment and a decline in standards of living, and an increase in overall poverty (Raftopoulos, 2001; 











As the effects of the ESAP continued to be felt in the country a rise in public demonstration, labour 
activism and an increase in civil society organisations took place, and the collective political threat of 
these increasingly unified voices saw the government become progressively more authoritarian and 
coercive (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 2003; Raftopoulos, 2001; Saunders, 2000). As the challenges to ZANU­
PF hegemony grew, its claim to historical legitimacy was also contested. The official silence over the 
massacres in Matabeleland in the 1980's was countered by increasmg attention in the independent press 
to the effects of the violence and the discovery of graves of civilians (Alexander et aI, 2000). In 1997 the 
CCJP report Breaking the Silence was published. It was a vivid and detailed look at the conflict, its causes 
and the far reaching human rights violations that took place, and an explicit challenge to official histories 
that emphasised national unity. In response Nkomo - whose former troops and supporters were victims 
of a state-sponsored terror that he then condemned - reportedly burst into the CCJP offices and 
demanded that all copies be handed to him in the interests of national unity (Werbner, 98: 96). Mugabe, 
speaking at the funeral of a veteran ZAPU activist, accused the Bishops at the CCJP of threatening 
national unity and instead called for national forgetting, what Werbner calls imposed 'state buried 
memory': 
'Ifwe dig up the history, then we wreck the nation ... and we tear our people apart into factions, into tribes 
and villagism that will prevail over our nationalism and over the spirit of our sacrifices' (Mugabe, 1997, 
quoted in Werbner, 1998: 96) 
Despite widespread popular insistence on the remembrance of the gukurahundP2, and calls for 
compensation for its victims, the CCJP recommendation of a reconciliation commission and reparations 
trust has yet to be acknowledged by members ofZANU-PF (CCJP, 1997). 
Campaigns for the political and material recognition of hero status continued, galvanised by an emerging 
image of the 'forgotten hero', a reference to the thousands of ex-combatants who lived in poverty across 
the country (I<riger, 1995: 157). As well as facing demands for better support of former guerrillas, 
parliament also came under increasing pressure to address the question 'Who is a hero?' as calls for state 
recognition of other groups who had contributed to the war effort, like youth, teachers and political 
prisoners, continued (I<riger, 2006). The identity of vana vevhu and the national hero continued to wield 
important symbolic power in the 1990's, and the Zimbabwean National Liberation War Veterans 
Association (ZNLWV A), formed in 1989, became a powerful political constituency. The organisation 
was highly critical of the government, accusing them of neglecting those who had realised the dream of 
22 See Alexnder, McGregor, Ranger (2000), chapter 11 for details of localised remembrance processes and the often 
heavy-handed censorship of them by the state, which illustrated that the governments 'rigid, top-down control of 











Zimbabwean independence while enriching themselves (Alexander et aI, 2000; Alexander, McGregor, 
2006; Kriger, 2003, 2006). 
A notable characteristic of the ZNLWVA is its cross-party composition. It has successfully united 
former ZIPRA fighters with their ZANLA adversaries, including former 'dissidents' who, as Alexander 
and McGregor observe, 'were prepared to ally themselves with their former persecutors under the rubric 
of a redefmed nation' (Alexander, McGregor, 2006: 217). By 'redefmed' the authors are pointing to how 
the ZNLWVA have pres en ted a united image of national heroes who had been economically and 
politically marginalised by a corrupt government, and in doing so allowed for the return of the 'dissidents' 
to the nation. As 'forgotten heroes' ex-ZIPRA guerrillas, who after the 1980's violence had encountered 
significant social and material exclusion, could unite with ex-ZANLA and demand that the government 
address their mutual marginalisation under the banner of a lost nationalist vision of prosperity and 
justice23. 
The reinstitutionalisation of the category of 'national hero' in the ZNLWVA under a united identity of 
'forgotten national hero' was a significant challenge to the government. The veterans were laying claim to 
a historic legitimacy previously monopolised by ZANU-PF. In demanding financial compensation, 
political recognition and land redistribution they were highlighting the failure of the government to 
adhere to the vision expressed by the nationalist parties during the 1970's, and in doing so asserting 
ownership of it. The cohesive vision of official national history that garnered sacred legitimacy for the 
liberation party was being subverted, its hierarchical distinctions broken down. In a highly symbolic act 
members of the ZNLWVA heckled President Mugabe's Heroes Day speech in 1997 (Alexander et aI, 
2000: 256). 
Mugabe rewarded the veterans a one-off cash payment, an ongoing monthly pension, and a percentage of 
all newly acquired land for resettlement. This, combined with the military intervention in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in 1998, placed an unsustainable burden on the economy (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 
2001: 7). The late 1990's also saw an increased number of spontaneous invasions of commercial land, a 
further expression of grievance in the communal areas at the pace of land reform. The squatters were 
often evicted and arrested, but continued to justify their occupation on grounds of ancestral right to land 
and unfulfilled promises of the nationalist movement (Marongwe, 2003). The invasions kept the need for 
increased land distribution firmly on the political agenda. 
Rising civil activism in this period culminated in a popular movement for a more democratically based 
constitution, and was spearheaded by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a broad alliance of 96 
23 For a more detailed account of how former 'dissidents' came to join the ZNLWVA and their motivations and 











civil society organisations (Saunders, 2000). The government set up Constitutional Commission which 
put forward a controversial draft constitution for referendum. In late 1999 the NCA and ZCTU were 
instrumental in the formation of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
As Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) note, the 'emergence of the labour based MDC and a broad alliance 
of articulate and well organised civil society organisations posed a significant threat to a delegitimized, 
nationalist driven ZANU-PF leadership'. The MDC, NCA and white commercial farming and business 
sectors campaigned for a 'no' vote in the referendum, and in February 2000 ZANU-PF lost an electoral 
challenge for the first time in 20 years of rule. 
The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe deepened after this point. Although widely covered by 
academic literature and international press it will suffice to give a brief summary of the most defining 
events and characteristics of the crisis since 2000. A nation-wide series of land invasions took place, first 
spearheaded by war veterans but subsequently expanded to include party-trained youth militias and 
security forces24• After ZANU-PF's controversial win in the 2000 parliamentary elections the 
occupations increased as part of the governments Fast Track resettlement program, with highly partisan 
land acquisition committees set up to oversee the program (Alexander, 2006: 188-192). The much 
publicised violence used against white farmers and farm workers continued, and was accompanied by 
attacks, threats, imprisonment, torture, and disappearances of suspected MDC members or supporters. 
The scope and intensity of this violence has only intensified around elections, themselves consistently 
marred by allegations of voter intimidation and electoral fraud. 
In a widespread campaign of state-sponsored violence against any opposition to ZANU-PF, attacks were 
made on local government, businesses, and several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and most 
democratic fora were forcefully monopolised by the ruling party. This included a clampdown on the 
independent press, including the introduction of draconian legislation on privacy and journalistic 
freedom, and an undermini g of the judiciary by the ruling party through threats, arrests and intimidation. 
A widespread weakening of state autonomy has seen some state apparatus compromised by allegiance to 
ZANU-PF, most noticeably the security and intelligence services and key bureaucratic divisions (for all 
the above see Hammar, Raftopoulos, 2003; Raftopoulos, Jackson, 2004; IJR, 2006a, 2006b). This has 
taken place alongside 'Zimbabwe's catastrophic economic decline', which has seen the disintegration of 
key industries, widespread unemployment, the withdrawal of foreign aid, rapid inflation rises, fall in 
24 Debate remains as to who initiated the invasions. See Moyo, Yeras (2007) for an account that sees the veterans as 
instigators and an insistence that they be considered a separate constituency to ZANU-PF. Chan (2003) sees the 
invasions as supported, and anonymously aided, by some in the party, but underlines the initial divisions that they 
produced by highlighting the different reactions to them by some in the government before consensus emerged in 
their support Alexander (2006), and Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) seem to see them as an instrument of a 












currency value, collapse of services, a national food crisis, and massive national debt (Hammar, 
Raftopoulos, 2003: 13; Bond, Manyanya, 2002). 
In the fttst chapter of this study I outlined two dominant and dichotomous positions that are widespread 
in media commentaries on the crisis. Raftopoulos and Hammar have identified a set of 'cote discursive 
divides that continue to mark the present politics of crisis' which expand on these interpretations. These 
dichotomies have come to dominate how the crisis is represented in political rhetoric both in Zimbabwe 
and beyond. They are: a historically sanctioned and racialised policy of land rights and restitution against 
an ahistorical affttmation of liberal notions of private property, development and good governance; an 
idea of an indigenous, national subject versus an unraced, 'civic' subject; a radical, Pan-Africanist, anti­
imperialist critique of 'the West' versus a focus on universal norms of human rights and neoliberal 
globalisation (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 2003: 17). 
The unfolding of the events that constitute the Zimbabwe crisis has been marked by a particular means of 
interpretation. By this I mean the national discourse has shaped and generated a specific way in which 
events, practices and political actors are represented and approached. The symbols, narratives and 
meanings that determine how the crisis is understood are to a large extent consistent with how the 
national discourse in Zimbabwe has developed, as outlined in previous chapters, but at the time marked 
differences are apparent. The next section outlines this process, and illustrates how the dichotomies 
identified by Hammar and Raftopoulos, have both been informed by, and have helped to intensify this 
system of representation. 
'Patriotic History' 
In what can now be considered a defining article of post-2000 scholarship on Zimbabwe, Terence Ranger 
identified what he calls a 'patriotic history'25 that has been propagated by the ruling party and its 
supporters in the media, and adopted in youth militia training camps and throughout the education 
system. 'Patriotic history' 'is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary 
tradition', and in doing so reaffIrm the sacred legitimacy of ZANU-PF rule (Ranger, 2004, 200Sa, 200Sb). 
As we shall see below, through what Raftopoulos calls the 'monopolisation of history' the ruling party 
produces new boundaries around nationhood through categories of exclusion that confer static and 
polarised identities on those considered outside the nation (Raftopoulos, 2003). 
The discursive mechanisms underlying the regime's presentation of liberation history are not novel. In a 
speech on Hero's Day in 2001 Mugabe presents us with a concise portrayal of Zimbabwean national 











history, illustrating the revival of a familiar and singular narrative of continuous heroic liberation as the 
basis of nationhood: 
'The year 1890 when our country was invaded and fell under British imperial occupation, began what was 
the darkest phase of our nation so far. Our essence as a nation indeed lay in our people's resistances of 
this cruel encroachment and foreign domination that now asserted itself over our land, the 1893 and 
1895-7 struggles, and the second and third Chimurengas. All these are dramatic episodes in the story of 
our nation, episodes that have given a tragic ring to our Independence... But the same episodes have also 
given us a sense of sacrifice, of purpose, of unity and cohesion ... This is indeed our land, our heritage, our 
sovereignty, for we fought and died for it!' (Mugabe, 2001: 136) 
He then goes on to recount a narrative of the 'The Heroes of the First Chimurenga: Ambuya Nehanda 
and Sekuru Kaguvi', the 'Heroes of the Second Chimurenga lying at Heroes Acre', and proclaims the 'The 
Third Chimurenga', a continuation of the historical batde of 'the Zimbabwean people' against imperialism 
in order to claim their 'sovereignty' and their 'land' (Mugabe, 2001: 136-9). This narrative was shared with 
'the people' in order to make them aware of 'experiences which you and me as the present, living 
generation may not have lived through, but experiences nevertheless vital to our sense of well being, to 
our sense of national identity as Zimbabweans'. 
The fust sentence of the longer excerpt above underlines the reemphasis on a history of the nation that 
also precedes the series of Chimurengas. Here 'our country' existed prior to the arrival of Westerners. In 
'patriotic history' Great Zimbabwe is put forward as historical precedent, a time when 'nationhood' and 
'the people' existed in a struggle to build civilisation: 
'The essence of our nationhood lies in the Historical struggle of our People, initially against nature and 
the elements, in the process evolving practices and technologies by which they asserted mastery over 
time... We think of the Great Zimbabwe Monument. .. as indicative of those great struggles that bore the 
civilisation which at once preceded but also lead to our present circumstance' (Mugabe, 2001: 133). 
In 2003 Mugabe presided over a televised ceremony at the ruins at which one half of the Zimbabwe bird 
was returned from Berlin. This was the culmination of a campaign overseen by Dr Edward Matenga, 
curator of the Great Zimbabwe site. Minister of Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge called Matenga's book on 
the history of the soapstone birds, in which he expressed his determination to return the bird, an 
'authentic national history' (Ranger, 2004: 227). As Matenga puts it: 
'The desire [to return the bird] was inspired by the belief that the potency of Great Zimbabwe as the 











Zimbabwe birds. It seemed the spirit of the deceased inhabitants of Great Zimbabwe, who had 
bequeathed to us a wonderful heritage and a name to nationhood, were not going to rest until the birds 
were removed' (Matenga, 2003, quoted in Fontem, 2006: 220) 
The NMMZ, who manage the Great Zimbabwe site, have also taken a leadership role in a new project 
aimed at the promotion of Zimbabwe's 'Ilberation Heritage'. An important part of this has been the 
exhumation and reburial of war dead from shallow graves in Zimbabwe, as well as from former guerrilla 
and refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and the rehabilitation of communal graves and memorial 
shrines at these sites (Fontein, 2009; Shoko, 2006). This project is largely a response to the history of 
popular demands from former guerrillas, families, spirit mediums and customary authorities for the 
repatriation and reburial of human remains or symbolic soil, which gained more prominence with the 
increasing political activism of the veterans in 1990'S26. 
At one level this effort is different from previous projects of national commemoration, such as the graded 
system of heroic status at Heroes Acre, in that the NMMZ are working closely alongside local actors, 
including spirit mediums and war veterans, and in doing so is pardy responding 'to ritual demands 
previously marginalised or excluded by both these state dominated processes at Great Zimbabwe, Heroes 
Acres and elsewhere' (Fontein, 2009: 16). They complement the government sponsored bira ceremonies 
(held in every chiefdom across the nation in 2006) which sought to thank the ancestors for independence, 
cleanse the nation's legacy of violence and ask for rain (Fontein, 2009: 16). However they are a clear part 
of ZANU-PF's effort to reimagine a national past of heroic struggle. As much as the involvement of 
local authorities and war veterans may reflect their growth in power and importance in the third 
Chimurenga period, the 'Liberation Heritage' project reinscribes specific social categories and historical 
narratives established in the 1960's and 70's. In fact the wider constituencies involved in the project, and 
the traditional systems of sacralisation endorsed by it, indirecdy echo the hybridisation of the dominant 
national discourse with local historical discourses in rural mobilisation efforts during the war (see chapter 
two). 
The national history of struggle expounded in the 'patriotic history' of ZANU-PF, spanning from Great 
Zimbabwe to the third Chimurenga, is a vivid and resonant reaffirmation of the histories that galvanised 
the liberation struggle in the 1960's and 1970's. However, the leading characters in this narrative have to 
some extent changed. Joshua Nkomo and other ZAPU members are now regarded as 'national heroes', 
26 N.M:MZ is also building a new museum at Heroes Acre, and is involved in a project with the National Archives 
and the University of Zimbabwe called 'Capturing a faded memory', which aims to collect oral histories of the 
struggle (Fontein, 2009: 15). It remains to be seen how the individual testimonies collected will fit into the 











with Nkomo, after his death in 1999, being declared by Mugabe as the 'father of the nation' 27. Luis 
White points out that the increasing focus by ZANU-PF on the broken Lancaster House promise of 
funds for land reform by the British government, the increasing diplomatic and public antagonism 
between the countries in the 2000s, and Western support of the MDC, has 'made Britain central to 
Zimbabwe's history as it never had been before' (White, 2003: 95). As Mugabe observes: 
'Remember, Zimbabwe is under attack, our sovereignty is under fire from the very same imperialist 
forces which took it away from our fore bears more than a century ago ... [Zimbabwean heroes have had 
to] die simply to overcome a supposedly civilised nation which for the greater part of the closing 
millennium, has chosen to indulge towards us racial hate, animosity and systematic violence as well as 
organised economic war as a strategy for its latter-day imperialist control and domination of our country' 
(Mugabe, 2001: 70) 
As White notes 'Zimbabwe had been given a history in which it was a British colony until 1980' (White, 
2003: 97). But this revisionism is a constant feature of the national discourse, and has been since the 
1960's as it expanded to include mythic ftgures of the past. It allows for the recategorisation of agency 
into what remains the foundation of this singular national history, the sharp dichotomy between 'the 
people' and the heroes that represent their sacred destiny of united and sovereign nationhood, and the 
colonial adversary, whether \Vestern conquerors of traditional society, Rhodesian settler rule or British 
neo-colonialism. Within these categories Rhodesia elides with Britain, and Nkomo and ZAPU are 
seamlessly absorbed into an image of a 'united African people' who have historically battled these forces. 
What has increasingly alarmed observers of the Zimbabwe crisis is how this history is being widely 
propagated within the education system. Compulsory classes in history are now standard in lower and 
higher education and the curriculum has been tailored to 'reconcile' a new generation with their history, 
to borrow from Shamuyarira's formulation (see chapter two) (Ranger, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Raftopoulos, 
2004). In the words of the ZANU-PF Secretary for external affairs in 2004: 
'We did not fan the fire of our nation and struggle for independence among our children. That fire 
almost went out as our children knew nothing of that invaluable history' (Raftopoulos, 2004: 166) 
Recent exam questions for the compulsory higher education course called 'National Strategic Studies' 
included: 
27 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni's chapter in Muponde, Muchemwa (2007) for a discussion of the changing representations 












'Which political party represents the interests of imperialists and how must it be viewed by 
Zimbabweans ?' 
<African leaders who try to serve the interests of imperialists are called what and how do you view 
patriotism?' (Raftopoulos, 2004: 167) 
In the National Youth Service Training Camps (NYSTC's), where many of the youth militias so active in 
Zimbabwe since the late 1990's were trained, patriotic history is taught by war veterans and party activists, 
often using anthologies of Mugabe's speeches (Ranger, 2004: 219). These events illustrate how 'patriotic 
history' has routinely become institutionalised as a dominant official narrative, a part of sustained efforts 
by ZANU-PF to widen its reach and power. 
Territories ofthe Nation 
As noted in chapter three, dominant discourse over land in independent Zimbabwe have revolved around 
a specific, and often racialised, dichotomy of contrasting rights: on one side is the restitution of rights 
expressed by African groups in terms of ancestral possession, or for services in the liberation war, on the 
other the right to land is mediated by questions of developmental utility or constitutionally protected 
private property. This dichotomy has clouded what has been a complex history of contestation over land 
use, management, access and control between state authorities, customary rulers, politicians, immigrants 
and a rising black elite (Alexander, 2006; Rutherford, 2001; Moyo, 1995,2000,2007; Drinkwater, 1991). 
In the 'patriotic history' narrative the depiction of land does not lend itself to any careful unpicking of 
these complex issues. Instead land, as Raftopoulos and Hammar note, is presented 'as a signifier of just 
possession, indigenous location and national belonging [that] has been woven as a central thread into the 
cloth of the dominant liberation message' (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 2003: 19). In this presentation the 
reclamation of lost land is the most definitive feature of the struggle for independence. As opposed to 
the recognition of human rights, the need for gender equality, or other campaigns of the nationalist 
movement, the right to land was enriched with a historical genealogy that placed it as the ultimate telos of 
the nation: 
We know and still know that the land was the prime goal for King Lobengula as he fought British 
encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land was the principal grievance for our heroes of the 
First Chimurenga, led by Nehanda and Kaguvi. We know and still know it to be the fundamental premise 
of the Second Chimurenga and thus a principal defmer of the succeeding new Nation and State of 
Zimbabwe. Indeed we know it to be the core issue and imperative of the Third Chimurenga which you 











This depiction necessarily obscures the historical complexities of land ownership and rights, as well as the 
inconsistencies in the ruling party's policy agenda towards it. It instead sustains the dichotomy outlined 
above, but, more than that, it fIxes land as a territorial boundary of Zimbabwean nationhood. As 
Chenjerai Hunzvi, the leader of the war veterans, defended the land occupiers as 'Zimbabweans on 
Zimbabwean land', he explicitly set forth limits on who, and on what grounds, is belonging of the nation 
(Chan, Primorac, 2004: 71). 
If the land, or the rural areas, are Zimbabwe, then urban Zimbabwe has come to be redefIned as a 
territorial location not quite of Zimbabwe itself. The:MDC has traditionally garnered much of its support 
from Harare, Bulawayo and other urban locations, and during the 1990's urban residents were 
increasingly joining new social organisations and seeking different forms of social representation than the 
nationalist parties (Raftopoulos, 1994: 19-20). Challenges to ZANU-PF allegiance have been translated 
into challenges to the nation, in which rural location is a key criterion of nationhood, as exemplifIed by 
The Deputy Minister of Industry and International Trade Phineas Chihota in 2005: 
'The defInition of an indigenous person is one who has a rural home allocated to him by virtue of being 
indigenous, and a home that one has acquired in an urban area because it has been bought or it has been 
allocated to him by the State' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 182) 
During an election rally in 2000 Mugabe singled out Harare residents as being 'undisciplined, totemless 
elements of alien origin'. In 2004 he attempted to invite them back into the nation, the implication being 
that loyalty to ZANU-PF constitutes nationhood: 
'You are Zimbabweans, you belong to Zimbabwe which was brought by the blood of our heroes lying 
here and other scattered throughout the country. Should we give it away to se1l-outs-here in Harare? This 
is our capital city. You are sons and daughters of revolutionaries. \Vhat wrong have we done you? Harare: 
think again, think again, think again!' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 28) 
A certain uncomfortable ambiguity has developed in defming the boundaries between what is presented 
in this discourse as a traditional, sacred, rural space predominantly supportive of the ruling party, and a 
Westernised and socially diverse urban space that favours the opposition. This discursive territorialisation 
of nationhood seemed to form part of the logic behind Operation MU17Jlabatsvina, launched in May 2005 as 
a means to curtail informal trade and illegal settlement in urban areas. Murambatsvina saw homes and 
informal businesses destroyed, and thousands of urban workers dispossessed and displaced ryambe, 
2008). 











As previously observed, the national discourse establishes the boundaries of national formation. The 
limits of citizenship, and the rights that it entails, ru;e constructed along the discursive boundaries of 
historical narratives and spoken collectivities. Identities are imagined and reified, and political legitimacy 
bestowed. In post-2000 Zimbabwe the status of the 'war hero' remains a privileged category, witnessed 
in the importance of veterans in justifying the land invasions and their presence in the land committees 
and other bureaucratic StruCtures28. The ZANU-PF 'Green Bombers', 'patriotised' from their time in the 
NYSTC's are considered 'new heroes' in this schema, and along with the veterans constitute a kind of 
'super citizen' (Hammar, Raftopoulos, 2003: 26). To some extent this has endowed them with a different 
kind of rights, or at least made them immune from legal restrictions usually placed on citizens, as 
witnessed in the pardon granted to all those involved in political violence before the 2000 elections, and 
the chronic lack of prosecution of those responsible for much of the violence during the decade (Worby, 
2003: 68). 
The new 'Liberation History' project has entailed a more inclusive form of state sacralisation, but the 
hierarchy of heroic nationhood at Heroes Acre continues to permanendy inscribe as inviolable the heroic 
status of key figures from the national elites. Recent burials have been marred by controversy over the 
'national hero' credentials of those chosen for commemoration. These have included the 2001 burials of 
former Minister of Youth Border Gezi, who set up the NYSTC's, and Chenjerai 'Hider' Hunzvi (Mugabe, 
2001: 141-3; Fontein, 2009: 12). 
As much as discourses of national history and commemoration map out inclusive and unequal ideas of 
nationhood, they also produce categories of exclusion. Upon his death in 2000 Ndabaningi Sithole, the 
first leader of ZANU who since his role in the internal setdement process in the late 1970's had become a 
staunch opponent of Mugabe, was excluded from burial at Heroes Acre (Fontein, 2009: 12). A ZANU­
PF Department of Information and Publicity Document entided Traitors do Much Damage to National Goals 
provides a history of how 'traitors', or 'sell outs', who 'sell out the course of [their] people to an enemy 
that would have forcefully vanquished and taken over the peoples heritage, self-respect, rights and dignity' 
(ZANU-PF,2005: 1). Echoed in much rhetoric from the ruling party and its allies, this document 
constructs a specific social category of 'sell-out', one who has not betrayed a party or movement, but 'the 
people' themselves. Sithole is portrayed as someone who through his American education had been 
'groomed to do the dirty work' of subverting the nationalist struggle. He is 'a devious leader' of a 
breakaway ZANU faction, who had 'turned into one of the worst traitors of the struggle to liberate 
Zimbabwe, Africa and indeed the black race' (ZANU-PF, 2D05: 10-16). In this document modern 
28 The debates around 'Who is a war hero?' remain a powerful source of contest, with questions of heroic 
authenticity repeatedly raised about 'supposed' war veterans, especially those working in groups who oppose the 











manifestations of the 'sell out' include Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the CCJP Pius Ncube, and 
prominent !vIDC member Welshman Ncube. 
The nation-space is presented as compromised by the figure of the 'sell out', a signifier that fixes those it 
is bestowed upon as excluded from not just a place within the nation, but also from the rights and 
privileges that nationhood entails. As with the gukurahundi in the 1980's and opposition forces post-2000, 
those depicted as outside the nation often relinquish any legal protection from state-orchestrated or 
popular violence, and are often the targets of it. In the third Chimurenga the categories of this exclusion 
have been centred historically on a conflation of race and (neo)-colonialism, whiteness and Britishness. I 
also observe how absence from the narratives of national history is itself a form of exclusion. 
An Excluded Opposition 
The oft-quoted excerpt from a speech made by Mugabe below is perhaps the most useful summation of 
the how the MOC have been discursively located in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Its eloquence may distinguish 
it from the often cruder denunciations of the Zimbabwean opposition movement, but the logic behind it 
remains the same: 
'Often a myth is peddled that ZANU-PF lost to a 9 month old opposition party. Nothing can be further 
from the truth... The!vIDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its 
youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent 
high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superfices; for it is immovably and 
implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology 
of return to white settler rule. The!vIDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that 
converges on it and controls it; that drives and direct; indeed that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a 
counter revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and 
oppressed our people yesterday.' (Mugabe, 2001: 88-9) 
Here the !vIDC is fixed as immovably outside the nation, but also as fixed within history. It is presented 
as 'implacably' part of the same forces that sought to prevent national self-determination, a mere 
instrument of a longer historical mission to derail Zimbabwean independence. But the saliency of this 
image can only be understood in light of more recent events in Zimbabwe. 
Much of the !vIDC leadership had its origins in the Zimbabwean trade union movement, and initially the 
party's ideological leanings reflected this genealogy, with a strong emphasis on social democratic policies 
geared towards more equitable distribution of capital, technology, and skills, increased democratic 











Bond, 2001; Bond, Manyanya, 2002). However in a movement whose demographic includes numerous 
civil society organisations and figures from the white business sector, and as the MDC sought foreign 
donor support from the IFI's and powerful Western think tanks such as Freedom House, it moved more 
towards a neo-liberal platform that stressed market oriented reform such as widespread privatisation, 
albeit tempered by a commitment to meeting basic needs29• In the process the MDC critique of ZANU­
PF has dovetailed with that of Western governments, international organisations and much media 
commentary, centring on an exhortation of liberal notions of private property, human rights and the rule 
of law, good governance and an idea of an unraced, democratic citizenry. 
At the same time some of the MDC leadership, and parts of its support base, is white. In contrast to the 
racialised language of ZANU-PF the universalism of the MDC's democratic rhetoric was openly 
inclusive, and as white interests came increasingly under threat the party offered a means to contest the 
threat to private property rights (IJR,2006: 19). Needless to say the ahistorical presentation of a 
democratic citizenry allowed a form of political representation that cleansed whites of their historical 
connotations with colonialism and settler rule. With the MDC a viable opposition party the 'anti­
memory' that suppressed the image of the white settler didn't have to rely on unified loyalty to ZANU-PF 
and a withdrawal from public politics. In 2000, in lieu ofwhite support for the 'no vote', and white 
membership of the MDC, Mugabe publically revoked the reconciliation policy of the 1980's, stating that 
'the national reconciliation policy we adopted in 1980 is threatened, gravely threatened, by the acts of the 
white settlers in this country and we shall revoke that national reconciliation, we shall revoke it' (Ndlovu­
Gatsheni, 2008: 138). In doing so he relinquished the constraints of 'anti-memory', and as in the 1980's 
with the CAZ and ZUM, white political activism drew forth representations of white identity built around 
the historical liberation narrative. As the infamous Dr. Jonathan Moyo, then Secretary of State for 
Information, said in 2001: 
'White farmers, who were killing my comrades, now become a party and call this democracy? Do you 
think Jews will sit with former Nazis? We will not be foolish and pretend we don't know what you were 
doing yesterday ... The MDC is a front for white Rhodesians' (Rutherford, 2004: 556) 
This is the context by which we can understand the representation of the MDC as 'sell-outs', as outside 
the boundaries of the imagined nation. The MDC have become associated with an ideological position 
often characterised as neo-imperialism and that rejects the premise of ZANU-PF rule and land 
29 Bond and Manyanya highlight the influence of industrialist Eddie Cross in this development, and locates the 
l\IDC's policy position in a history of a white petit-bourgeoisie politics in Rhodesia which has often contested the 
interests of foreign capital, and 'combines 'conservative' economic policies that meet the needs of the white­
dominated big business sector, with the memory of state support for a then-white, now-black working class' (Bond, 











restitution. Such representation is part of the larger dichotomies identified earlier in this chapter. The 
liberal critique of ZANU-PF rule is presented as directly opposed to an interpretive framework that 
recognises indigenous and historical rights to land, valorises the heroism of historical struggle and bases 
political legitimacy on historical contribution to the nationalist struggle. This is what Ranger has termed, 
in a nod to Fukuyama's thesis on the inevitability of the dominance of universal liberal capitalism, 'history 
versus 'the end of history" (Ranger, 2004: 220). If the 'end of history' implies a universalism that cannot 
recognise the historical rights to land, and to power, then 'history' is the wielding of historical narratives 
that seek to counter this critique by presenting a depiction of national history and a register of national 
belonging couched in historically resonant representations. 
Exdusion l?Y Absem-e 
As pointed out above, representations of the MDe or whites remain moored upon a historical dichotomy 
between 'the people' as defmed by their representatives, the nationalist parties, and the colonial adversary, 
those who seek to obstruct the national destiny. In post-2000 Zimbabwe white people are presented as 
non-indigenous 'sons of Britain'. In terms of belonging they are located in the colonial era, and their 
identity is characterised as such. On his revocation of the reconciliation policy Mugabe said that: 
'when you show mercy to those who are hard hearted, when you show non-racialism to die-hard racists; 
when you show a people with a culture - false culture of superiority based on their skin and you do 
nothing to get them to change their personality, their perceptions, their mind, you are acting as a fool' 
(Gandhi and Jambaya, 2002: 9) 
This discourse around national exclusion, resting on a conflation ofwhiteness and Britishness, was acted 
out in the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001, which required all those seeking to retain 
or acquire citizenship to renounce all foreign citizenship or entitlement to it. The exercising of citizenry 
rights became subject to nationality, and the result was the disenfranchisement of many white 
Zimbabweans and farm workers suspected of supporting the MDC. 
The farm workers, who are mainly immigrants from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and their 
descendents, mostly came to the country as economic migrants during colonial rule when the Rhodesian 
state faced a shortage of labour. They are estimated to be over two million in number, forming about 
15% of the population (Muzondidya, 2007: 326). They, along with the relatively small population of 
Zimbabweans of coloured and Asian origin, are an example of how national exclusion is not always 
explicit and instead can be constituted by an absence of representation. These groups, who Muzondidya 
terms 'invisible subject minorities', have been characterised by a distinct lack of representation in the 











Sachikonye,2003). Their status as part of 'the people' is rarely elucidated by nationalist elites and they 
lack any national political representation. 
Under colonial rule farm workers were categorised as 'colonial native' as opposed to 'aboriginal native', 
and coloureds and Asians as 'colonial subjects', and accorded differing rights and privileges according to 
these categorisations. Although in post-independence Zimbabwe these categories were maintained for 
electoral and administrative efficacy, race and ethnicity was no longer used for the allocation of rights and 
resources. However both of these groups have been broadly excluded from policies aimed at the 
restructuring of society's racial divisions. Policies of Africanisation of the civil service, land reform, and 
empowerment have been centred on the unequal division between whites and 'indigenous' Africans, and 
'have not only been conspicuously silent on the position and status of subject minorities, but have also 
lacked clarity and conviction with regard to them' (Muzondidya, 2004: 223). Rutherford notes that fann 
workers - and the same can be said to a certain extent of coloureds and Asians - have 'a liminal identity 
within the entrenched official imagination of Zimbabwe... and [have] been marginalised from 
development policies, political rights, and social programmes' (Rutherford, 2001: 3-4)30. 
With this quote Rutherford is alerting us to the importance of understanding how the dominant 
imagining of Zimbabwe finds expression in institutional arrangements and political practices. How 'the 
people' are represented, through historical narrative and the presentation of identity, lays down the 
boundaries of nationhood, which in turn has implications for the exercising of rights and allocation of 
resources. In the third Chimurenga 'subject minorities', like whites and supporters of the MDC, have faced 
increased discrimination. Coloured people have frequently been labelled as white by both supporter of 
ZANU-PF and members of the government, and have been marginalised from the land reform process. 
In 2002 Indian businesses were threatened with seizure by a radical group of war veterans, whose leaflets 
stated that: 
'Black people did not die for this country so Indians could go on oppressing them ... It is our land. We 
fought for it. It belongs to us' (Muzondidya, 2004: 229) 
Farm workers, subject to long-held views that they collaborate with white farmers and are non-indigenous 
aliens, have faced widespread violence and dispossession, and by 2003 over two thirds had been 
aggressively displaced. Only 5% of them have been resettled under the Fast Track Programme 
(Muzondidya, 2007: 336). 
30 For the purposes of summation I am perhaps guilty of conflating the experiences of farm workers with those of 
coloureds and Asians, and I have attempted to stretch the generalisation of their experiences to an appropriate and 
responsible level. For a more in-depth study of the status and history of farm workers please see Rutherford, 2001 











'The People' as Natives 
The above discussion of exclusion outlines how the national discourse excludes the imagination of certain 
collectivities. Instead of white Zimbabweans or Zimbabwean farm workers from Zambia we are 
presented with 'sons of Britain' and Zambian farm workers. This begs the question that if this is who 
'the people' aren't, who are 'the people'? As Muzo~didya notes: 
'... the nation state has increasingly been conceived as the political expression of a single or a dominant 
and relatively homogenous group: 'native Africans'. In the historical text/narrative that has emerged, 
<;>nly 'native Africans' or vana vevhu / abantwana bomhlabathi (,children of the soil'), have been projected not 
only as the original and true inhabitants of Zimbabwe but also as having pre-eminent rights over the 
country's land and other resources' (Muzondidya, 2004: 225) 
Of course this is not a novel development. As noted in chapter one the original representations of the 
Zimbabwean people by the nationalist parties relied on an under-developed and essentialised image of a 
unified African collectivity. The Africanism of the nationalist parties in the 1960's and 1970's was 
pronounced, and cultural authenticity was performed in the valorisation of African tradition, ritual, music 
and dress. A narrative emerged of an 'African' people building a great civilisation at Great Zimbabwe. f.. 
'silence' over ethnicity was discursively established that didn't allow for the destabilisation of the idea of 
the 'indigenous black Zimbabwean'. The Zimbabwean native African was an established social category 
within the national discourse. 
In the third Chimurenga this primordial idea of the native has powerfully re-emerged into public political 
rhetoric, fuelled by the sharp distinctions drawn between Europea'n liberalism and citizenship and 
ZANU-PF's insistence on the ancestral right to African land in the face of imperialism. The image of the 
'unified African' has become a signifier of African consciousness, culture and self-determination. It has 
signalled a return to radical Africanism as the basis for ZANU-PF's controversial redistributive politics. 
In 2000 Mugabe unequivocally declared that: 
'This country is our country and this land is our land... They think because they are white they have a 
divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for 
Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabwcrans' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 174) 
A 2002 report by the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe analysed the state-controlled Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporations Vision 30 project, which sought to ensure that the majority of broadcasting 











which sought to address 'national values and the country's cultural values' (Gandhi, J ambaya, 2002: 2). 
National Ethos and the Vision 30 project were part of a wider campaign that sought to celebrate 
Zimbabwean and African culture, and included cultural galas and musical recordings coordinated by the 
Department ofInformation and Publicity in the President's Office. The report noted that: 
'.:_ the panellists' def11lition of nation did not appear to cater for identity in terms of being Zimbabwean, 
that is a people staying within the specific boundaries of Zimbabwe... Zimbabwe's nationhood appeared 
to be subsumed under that of Africa, as witnessed by the constant reference to 'African' rather than 
Zimbabwean' (Gandhi, J ambaya, 2002: 5) 
In an evocation of Pan-Africanist history Zimbabwean 'African' identity is constantly linked to the history 
of slavery, of radical African-American figures like Malcom X, and to black resistance movements in the 
Americas31 • This 'African' identity is continually counterpoised to a similarly narrow and restrictive idea 
of 'Whiteness' or of the 'European'_ As one party intellectual on National Ethos observed: 
'Since the value system of the Europeans, of the W'hite man, of the Rhodesians in Zimbabwe is exclusive, 
it is racist, it does not have a place for us ... we should come up with this kind of ethos; Zimbabwe for 
Zimbabweans, Africa for Africans, Europe for Europeans' (Gandhi,Jambaya, 2002: 8) 
This proclamation of native autochthony has become a centrepiece in the division between the values of 
the third Chimllrenga and th.ose of the liberal critique of it. To put it differently the idea of the primordial 
native African is presented as inimical to that of Western liberal values. As Professor Tafataona Mahoso, 
a staunch supporter of the third Chimllrenga and a powerful commentator on Zimbabwean politics, puts it 
'Mugabe is now every African who is opposed to the British and North American plunder and 
exploitation... So, old Mugabe here is not the person of Robert Mugabe. Rather it is that powerful, 
elemental African memory going back to the first Nehanda and even to the ancient Egyptians and 
Ethiopians who are now reclaiming Africa in history as the cradle of humankind... The Zimbabwe 
opposition and their British, European and North American sponsors have exposed themselves as forces 
opposed to Mugabe as Pan-African memory, Mugabe as the reclaimer of African space, Mugabe as the 
African power of remembering the African legacy and African heritage which slavery, apartheid and 
imperialism thought they had dismembered for good ... What the West takes for memory is mechanical 
recall, superficial regurgitation of formulaic catechisms which are taken out of context because they must 
31 ZANU-PF has in fact cultivated links with various radical black and ethnic minority civil groups in the USA, 












be both uni-polar (centralised) and globalised rule of law, transparency, free enterprise and human 
rights' (Ranger, 2004: 222) 
Here Mugabe, and the third Chimuenga, is a metonym for the broader realisation of a distinctive mode of 
being, the authentic 'African'. The nation is subsumed under a broader Pan-African movement that seeks 
to 'remember' the spiritual and cultural essence of the African native. The national subject is at once the 
African subject, a unified body represented as inalienably unique and separate from any other culture or 
social category. The historical narrative of the national discourse is presented as a composite feature of a 
wider history of oppression and exploitation that spans 'slavery, apartheid and imperialism'. The national 
discourse has in this sense widened to a Pan-African vision ofAfrican self-determination and 
particularism, but the edification of this mode of interpretation is reliant on an insularity. It is established 
on a simplistic and narrow division between what are presented as two distinct cultures and ideologies, 
the 'white' imperialist and the 'African' native. This not only prevents the imagination of different 
collectivities within each culture, but also forecloses any discussion of a complex hybridisation between 
them. 
Conclusion 
The period of the third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe, and more specifically the nature of official nationalism 
within it, cannot be regarded as entirely historically distinct. In fact what we have witnessed is a not 
exactly a return of already established national identities, narratives and images, but their intensification. 
By intensification I mean, to a large extent, the dominance of their usage as a means of interpreting and 
understanding the events of the Zimbabwe crisis. If the dominant national discourse in the past has had 
to share discursive space, and had been tempered by, liberal ideas of citizenship and human rights, in 
post-2000 Zimbabwe it has achieved a more hegemonic status amongst the national elites. The context 
of this intensification has been a political climate that in much commentary and political rhetoric has been 
reduced to a set of polarities and antagonisms. On one side is a radical redistributive politics justified on 
historical and nativistic grounds, on the other universal liberal ideas of human rights, the rule of law and 
citizenship often conflated with neo~imperialism. 
This dic~otomy has amplified the resonance of a historical narrative of national history that has always 
been centred on the struggle between 'the people', including their national heroes and legitimate leaders, 
and a colonial adversary. The identities this narrative celebrates have again garnered important political 
currency. The prominence of the ZNL\WA in the events leading up to the land invasions, and the self­
identification of ZANU-PF rule as historically legitimised pay testament to this fact. Perhaps even more 
central has been the enduring image of the land as a place of ancestral possession. Largely unshackled by . 











paramount importance to the justification of the ZANU-PF's politics. If before a technical, unraced idea 
of land and private property remained the basis of land reform in Zimbabwe the national discourse 
around indigenous location has changed how rights to land are understood in post-2000 policy. 
Exclusion, whether through explicit representation of historical identity or its absence, remains a central 
machination of the national discourse in Zimbabwe. The nationalist elites who maintain the presentation 
of this discourse, and who through the politics of exclusion practice it, are its authors. It is this feature, 
the authoring of exclusion, the deciding of who is or isn't of the nation, that has also remained a central 
part of how the nation of Zimbabwe is imagined32• In the 1980's the people of Matabeleland found 
themselves subject to this discursive authority, and the logic behind their representation as part of a 
tribeless, homogenous Zimbabwe remains the same in the third Chimurenga. Firstly, a nationalist party 
must by implication represent the entire nation, and so it must provide an idea of who 'the people' are, 
and are not. Secondly, the right to do so, and act upon, that representation, comes from the identity of 
the party itself as historically legitimate bearers of Zimbabwe's destiny. In this case we are reminded of 
the slogan ZANU-PF V ANHU, VANHUlZANU-PF (ZANU-PF is the people, the people are ZANU­
PF): being of ZANU-PF is being of the nation. 
But being of the nation in the third Chimurenga has come to mean something more than being simply loyal 
to ZANU-PF. Building on already established images of a 'unified' and authentic African collectivity that 
emerged in the Africanist leanings of the nationalist movement in the 1960's and 1970's, 'the people' has 
become short hand for an essentialised, Pan-African native subject. The representation of an 'African' 
native as unique and alien to Western racist culture is a further demonstration of how the political 
polarities that have emerged in post-2000 Zimbabwe have intensified the social categories constructed 
within the national discourse. In the third Chimurenga the national subject is not only black, and so 
negates the idea of a non-racial Zimbabwe, but is also presented as culturally and politically inimical to 
universalist politics. 
32 See Worby (2003) for a sophisticated and insightful discussion on the relation between sovereignty, modernity and 












Before independence in 1980, a certain way of thinking about ideas of the nation and nationhood had 
already been established. With the emergence of mass nationalism in the 1960's came a seemingly 
contradictory way of defining who 'the people' of Zimbabwe are. In one sense Zimbabwe was conceived 
of as a future democratic community, a collectivity in which Zimbabwe-ness presided over other forms of 
identity, whether racial, ethnic or of associational membership. This democratic discourse, reflecting the 
political goals of the nationalist movement to establish a one-man one-vote system in the country, was 
complicated by a conception of 'the people' as 'united Africans', an emphasis on the 'African character' of 
the nation. This essentialised notion of the 'African' was enriched by, and fixed within, a specific history 
of the nation, a narrative of how 'an African people' have since the time of Great Zimbabwe fought 
against a colonial adversary in order to realise their national destiny of self-determination. 
This historical narrative has a territorial dimension. It presents a certain depiction of land, invested with 
indigenous belonging and sacred authority, and in doing so allows for a different conception of rights to 
land and land redistribution. 
This narrative also extols the identity of the 'national hero', a powerful social and political category reified 
by elite processes of national sacralisation. This has created a discursive terrain in which political 
legitimacy and authority can be contested. Through reference to 'heroic' status ZANU-PF rule has 
consistently been challenged, by both ZAPU and the 'forgotten heroes' of the 1980's and 90's. At the 
same time it has legitimised the rule of ZANU-PF by placing it at the head of a hierarchy of national 
historical authority, the natural heirs to previous 'national heroic leaders' like Nehanda and Kaguvi. 
As the national discourse has ordained ZANU-PF with historical and spiritual legitimacy, it has created a 
certain logic of representation, a way of understanding 'national unity'. Most visibly emerging in the 
1980's, it implies that if ZANU-PF are the rightful leaders of 'the people', then their representation of 'the 
people' is valid, and can be acted upon. In this sense unity becomes not only a case of 'a people united 
through being Zimbabwean' but also as 'united in the support of the party that speaks on behalf of the 
Zimbabwean people, that represents them, and legitimately defines their historical destiny'. Identification 
with ZANU-PF becomes identification with the people. Political challenges to ZANU-PF rule are thus 
from outside 'the nation', not representative of 'the people'. Just as the authority to practice these 
exclusions comes from the narrative of liberation history, the way in which these exclusions are 
represented reflect social categories established within it: ethnic identities that run counter to an idea of a 












These features of the national discourse have intensified during the Zimbabwe crisis, both reinforcing and 
helping to produce the 'core discursive divides that continue to mark the present politics of crisis' 
(Hammar, Raftopoulos, 2003: 17). They have through history produced and delimited what it means to 
be Zimbabwean, and what it means to lead the Zimbabwean people. It reduces and simplifies historical 
representation, how Zimbabwean history can be thought about and used to understand the present. And 
it restricts, or at least alters, conventional understandings of rights, citizenship and justice, and the 
constitution of political legitimacy. 
One has to contemplate whether this is a situation specific to Zimbabwe. I would like here to quote 
Moeletsi Mbeki at length from an article he wrote in The Sunday Tribune in February 2008 in which he 
sought to address what he saw as the inaction towards and tolerance of the ZANU-PF government by 
Southern African states: 
'Southern Africa is unique in Africa in that most of its countries are still ruled by nationalist parties that 
fought against colonialism. These ruling parties: Zanu PF in Zimbabwe; MPLA in Angola; CCM in 
Tanzania; Frelimo in Mozambique; BDP in Botswana; ANC in SA; or Swapo in Namibia, consider 
themselves to be entitled to rule their countries forever by virtue of having struggled agains t 
colonialism ... All this is, of course, shortsighted and largely futile. Nationalist parties and their 
governments in Southern Africa can no more stop the march of progress and history any more than the 
colonialists before them could' (Mbeki, 2008) 
Although it is not the aim of my research to use the particular nature of national discourse in Zimbabwe 
to explain the actions of Southern African governments regarding the crisis, I feel that Mbeki highlights 
an important feature of the battle for power occurring in the country. Zimbabwe is the first Southern 
African country to experience an opposition party founded after the fall of colonialism that garners 
popular support and stands a real chance of democratically usurping the incumbent nationalist party that 
liberated the country from colonialism. Thus the struggle for power in Zimbabwe is, as Mbeki highlights, 
an important precedent for the entire region. 
Needless to say the claims made by the national discourse in Zimbabwe are often cited as important in 
understanding the popularity Mugabe still has amongst African political leaders, especially in the face of 
criticism that continental efforts to try and resolve the Zimbabwe crisis have been a case of tragic inaction 
and apologism. As Raftopoulos and Phimister note in their important article on the subject: 
'At the heart of President Robert Mugabe's offensive against the array of forces opposed to his rule are 
repeated attempts to place the Zimbabwe problem at the centre of a larger anti-imperialist and Pan­











redress for colonial injustice, language which has resonated on the African continent, and within the 
Third World more generally. Knowing that his authoritarian rule would be confronted with widespread 
national and international critique centred on property rights, human rights and the rule of law, Mugabe 
and his advisors constructed alternative discourses around the need for renewed liberation struggle 
solidarity, the continuing effects of marginalisation attendant on the globalisation process, and 
presumptions of liberal imperialism' (Raftopolos, Phimister, 2004a: 1) 
In South Africa in particular one can make some casual observations. When you hear how Julius Malema, 
leader of the ANC Youth League represents the Democratic Alliance as an imperialistic force led by a 
'white madam' and her 'servants', or when Jacob Zuma talks about black and Afrikaner South Africans as 
having one passport as opposed to English South Africans having two, you cannot help but wonder 
about the importance of representation and notions of authenticity in South African politics. The 
creation of a ministry specifically mandated to deal with issues pertaining to former combatants of the 
struggle also draws interesting, if incomplete, parallels. 
I feel that this is an area of investigation that needs to be addressed by scholars of Southern Africa today. 
We need to be able to understand how nationalist movements that remain in power present history, how 
they define 'the people', and how these representations inflect political practice. I have attempted to 
illustrate how nationalism in Zimbabwe was both a set of political aims and ambitions, but also a way of 
representing national collectivity and culture, of discursively mapping a Zimbabwean 'people'. This has 
entailed drawing on discourses of authenticity and indigenous subjectivity, an idea of a primordial 
'African' people. Bhabha and Chaterjee have outlined the importance of realising the 'difference' 
between post-colonial and Westert,l nationalism with their studies on Southern Asia. Perhaps it is here, in 
the representation of a nebulous and prior presence, that we can begin to locate this 'difference' in 
Southern African nationalisms? This of course requires further critical interrogation and study. If 
anything the Zimbabwe crisis, and the effects it has had on people within the country, underlines the 
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